Asset preservation orders against third parties

The case and the problem

LED won a copyright case against Eagle Homes. It got declarations and an injunction, and chose an account of profits (making the wrongdoer hand over its profits). Eagle Homes’ debt was not yet fixed in money terms.

Mr and Mrs Cardile owned and ran Eagle Homes. The trial judge found they paid themselves dividends to shift assets away from LED’s reach. They also controlled a second company, Ultra Modern, which began trading as “Eagle Homes”.

LED sought orders stopping Ultra Modern and the Cardiles, who were not parties to the case, from disposing of assets. Emmett J refused. The Full Federal Court allowed LED’s appeal and sent the case back, and Emmett J then made broad restraining orders.

The High Court, in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd, allowed a further appeal and remitted the matter for narrower orders.

The test for a non-party

The majority judges said courts should use the term “Mareva orders,” not “injunctions.” This avoids confusion about the legal basis for the order. For non-parties, the key question is what the administration of justice requires.

They set a baseline rule: no order can bind a non-party unless that person owes something to a party, or holds, controls or can dispose of a party’s property.

The judges then explained when an order against a non-party may be appropriate. This depends on meeting other usual criteria and discretionary factors. They stressed this is a possibility, not an automatic result.

Two situations were identified. First, the third party holds or controls assets belonging to the debtor, including claims and expectancies (future or uncertain legal rights). Second, some enforceable process might let the judgment creditor (the person owed money) reach the third party’s property. This could happen through appointing a liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, or receiver, among other methods.

The judges added that relief is rarely granted unless the third party holds, or might soon hold or dissipate, property actually owned by the defendant.

LED pointed to older cases where third parties’ affairs were mixed with the debtor’s. The judges distinguished these cases. They said those cases involved more than mere mixing — there was deliberate blurring and attempted transfer of property rights.

Caution and discretion

The judges said this type of order needs great caution. It binds the person, not the property itself. It does not take away their title or possession.

In practice, though, it acts like a strict promise not to deal with the property, backed by contempt penalties if broken. The judges agreed it is a drastic remedy, not to be granted lightly.

They listed factors courts should weigh. These include whether the applicant acted quickly, whether a money judgment has already been won, and whether other legal action against the third party is possible. If other action is possible but has not been taken, courts should ask why.

Courts should also consider how hard it would be to work out and recover damages, if the order turns out to be unjustified. The judges said that where other proceedings are available but not yet started, an undertaking to start them will usually be required.

The order should generally come with an undertaking as to damages, a promise to cover losses if the order is wrongly granted. Courts granting this kind of interim relief should generally grant only the minimum necessary, and should state when the order stops applying.

How the Court applied it

The Court said Ultra Modern could dispose of assets it owned or lawfully acquired. The only Eagle Homes’ property clearly made available to it was the business name, possibly with some goodwill attached.

For the Cardiles, the Court found a prima facie case (a case strong enough on the evidence so far) that the dividends were a non-commercial payment made to limit funds available to meet a judgment. It also found a reasonably arguable case that the dividends were an alienation of property under s 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), meaning a transfer of property that law can undo.

The Court also noted a liquidator of Eagle Homes would probably be entitled to pursue those funds.

On remitter, the orders were narrow. Ultra Modern was restrained from dealing with the business name. Each Cardile was restrained from dealing with assets up to about $1.05 million, subject to exceptions like legal and ordinary living expenses.

The Court called this relief interlocutory, meaning temporary, pending final resolution. Kirby J gave separate reasons but agreed with the orders made.

Where the authority sits

Cardile is a High Court decision. It came on appeal from the Federal Court.

This means Cardile binds lower Australian courts. The High Court itself can still reconsider its own decision later.

The joint reasons point to s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). This section lets the Federal Court make orders it thinks appropriate, including interlocutory orders (orders made before final judgment, to preserve the position in the meantime).

But there is a limit. Section 23 is not authority for granting an injunction if there is otherwise no proper case for one.

The passage does not cite any other statute, rule, or later decision on this point.

For more background, see the related articles on equitable relief, interlocutory process, and enforcing a money judgment against a debtor.

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