Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon

High Court of Australia · 1993

RemediesRemedies Framework

Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon [1993] HCA 4; (1993) 176 CLR 344

A fourteen-day pleasure cruise ends in a shipwreck on the tenth day. Beyond her injuries and lost property, can a passenger recover for the ruined holiday and her distress, and keep a refund of her fare as well?

What happened?

The cruise ship “Mikhail Lermontov”, owned and operated by the Baltic Shipping Company, left Sydney on the evening of 7 February 1986 on a pleasure cruise scheduled to end on its return to Sydney on the morning of 21 February 1986 (Mason CJ [1]). On 16 February 1986 it struck a shoal off Cape Jackson, on the north-eastern tip of the South Island of New Zealand, was holed and sank (Mason CJ [1]). Mrs Dillon, a passenger, lost possessions and suffered injuries (Mason CJ [1]). The fare of $2,205 was payable in advance (McHugh J [2]), and Baltic refunded $787.50 as the unused portion of the passage money (Mason CJ [5]; Deane and Dawson JJ [2]).

Mrs Dillon sued Baltic in the Admiralty Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Baltic admitted negligence, and Carruthers J gave judgment for her, including $1,417 described as “Restitution of fare” and $5,000 described as “Compensation for disappointment and distress at the loss of entertainment (and facilities for enjoyment which had been promised)” (Mason CJ [1]). The Court of Appeal of New South Wales dismissed Baltic’s appeal by majority, Mahoney JA dissenting (Mason CJ [2]). Special leave to appeal on whether Mrs Dillon could avoid a deed of release she had signed and on whether the exclusion clauses in her ticket formed part of the contract was rescinded during the hearing, so only two questions remained: whether she could recover the balance of the fare as money paid on a total failure of consideration, and whether she could recover damages for disappointment and distress (Mason CJ [3]-[4]; Deane and Dawson JJ [4]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed in part. The order of the Court of Appeal was set aside so far as it dismissed Baltic’s appeal to that Court; in its place, that appeal was allowed and Carruthers J’s order for restitution of the fare, and the interest relating to it, was set aside. The Court of Appeal’s costs order was left undisturbed, and Baltic was ordered to pay 75 per cent of Mrs Dillon’s costs in the High Court (Mason CJ [48]). Six judgments were delivered: those of Mason CJ, Brennan J, Deane and Dawson JJ jointly, Toohey J, Gaudron J and McHugh J.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Damages for disappointment and distress. The Court held that Mrs Dillon was entitled to damages for disappointment and distress for the breach of a contract to provide a pleasure cruise, but the Justices did not state the governing principle in the same way. Each judgment is numbered separately, so each paragraph reference below names the Justice. Mason CJ, with whom Toohey J and Gaudron J agreed on this issue (Toohey J; Gaudron J at [12]), described the policy and conceptual foundations of the general rule against such damages as “flimsy” and the rule as “now somewhat uncertain” ([35]-[38]), but preferred “the rule that damages for disappointment and distress are not recoverable unless they proceed from physical inconvenience caused by the breach or unless the contract is one the object of which is to provide enjoyment, relaxation or freedom from molestation” ([44]); a contract for what was in essence a pleasure cruise was of the second kind ([45]).

Brennan J treated the question as one of remoteness: disappointment of mind that is merely a mental reaction to a breach and the damage it causes is too remote, but it is recoverable where it is itself the direct consequence of the breach, as where the contract contains an express or implied promise to protect the promisee from disappointment of mind, for example by providing a service conducive to peace of mind or tranquillity ([3]-[8]); the shipwreck, in breach of the promise to carry her safely, directly caused her distress ([9]).

Deane and Dawson JJ said that the general rule is “an essentially pragmatic and judicially imposed assumption” for the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale, and that they were “unable to agree” that it should now be effectively abolished by judicial decision; it does not apply where the party in breach agreed, expressly or impliedly, to provide pleasure, entertainment or relaxation or to prevent molestation or vexation, as Baltic did ([16]-[18]). McHugh J would not presently reject the general rule, but held that damages for distress or disappointment are recoverable where they arise from breach of an express or implied term that the promisor will provide pleasure, enjoyment or personal protection, or are consequent upon physical injury or physical inconvenience; he left the question whether the general rule should be overruled for a case in which the Court had heard full argument ([45]-[47]).

Restitution of the fare. The Court held that Mrs Dillon could not recover the balance of her fare ($1,417.50) by restitution as money paid on a total failure of consideration. Mason CJ, with whom Brennan J and Toohey J agreed on this issue (Brennan J at [1]), held that the benefits she enjoyed during the first eight full days of the cruise made the failure of consideration “partial, not total” ([17]), that the advance payment was not conditional on complete performance ([18]), and that in any event “full damages and complete restitution will not be given for the same breach of contract” ([30]-[31]).

Deane and Dawson JJ held that the consideration for the fare was, in substance, the pleasure cruise as a holiday experience rather than carriage from Sydney to Sydney, and that even on the assumption that it was entire and indivisible it did not wholly fail ([12]); and that, having sought and obtained full compensatory damages, she was not entitled to a refund of the price as well ([13]-[14]). Gaudron J held that the contract was not an entire contract in respect of the duration of the cruise and that early termination gave rise to damages and not a refund ([9]-[10]), and that a damages claim, being “a claim to the full benefit of the contract”, precludes a refund of the fare ([11]).

McHugh J held that the fare was payable in advance to provide a fund for the benefits to be enjoyed throughout the cruise, so that Baltic’s right to retain it became unconditional once it began to provide those benefits, and that the remedy for the incomplete cruise was damages for breach and not restitution ([4], [13], [16]). Brennan J added that it was erroneous to award both an amount representing the fare and damages for disappointment and distress ([10]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Mason CJ (with whom Toohey J and Gaudron J agreed on this issue)

Read judgment: [44]–[45] (opens in a new tab)

Mason CJ’s formulation and its application to the cruise contract support the award of damages for disappointment and distress, which the Court left undisturbed. Paragraph numbers are Mason CJ’s own, as printed in the judgment.

Separate reasoning · Brennan J

Read judgment: [3]–[9] (opens in a new tab)

Brennan J reached the same result by a remoteness analysis of his own. The paragraph numbers are Brennan J’s own.

Separate reasoning · Deane and Dawson JJ (jointly)

Read judgment: [16]–[18] (opens in a new tab)

Deane and Dawson JJ treated the general rule as a pragmatic assumption and placed the cruise contract in a category to which it does not apply. The paragraph numbers are their own.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J

Read judgment: [45]–[47] (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J stated the circumstances in which such damages are recoverable and declined to decide whether the general rule should be overruled. The statement that the question can be considered when the Court has heard full argument is his own and is not the Court’s reasoning. The paragraph numbers are McHugh J’s own.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Mason CJ (with whom Brennan J and Toohey J agreed on this issue)

Read judgment: [17]–[18] (opens in a new tab)

The conclusion that the failure of consideration was partial, not total, and that the payment was not conditional on complete performance, is the ground on which the order for restitution was set aside. The paragraph numbers are Mason CJ’s own.

Classification unresolved · Mason CJ

Read judgment: [30]–[31] (opens in a new tab)

Mason CJ’s statement that full damages and complete restitution will not both be given for the same breach is expressed as an alternative ground (‘even if the respondent had an entitlement to recover the cruise fare’, [31]). But he had said at [20] that, given his conclusion on restitution, there was ‘no necessity for me to consider whether the two claims can be maintained’ and that he recorded his view because the question had been argued. Whether that passage is a ratio, an alternative holding or obiter is therefore left unresolved. The paragraph numbers are Mason CJ’s own.

Ratio · Deane and Dawson JJ (jointly)

Read judgment: [13]–[14] (opens in a new tab)

Deane and Dawson JJ gave this as a further reason why the restitutionary claim failed: having sought and obtained full compensatory damages, Mrs Dillon had indirectly enforced the promise, so the damages stood in substitution for the promised consideration. They treat it as a ground of decision (‘a further reason ... why Mrs Dillon’s action for restitution of the fare paid to Baltic must fail’). The paragraph numbers are those of Deane and Dawson JJ.

Separate reasoning · Gaudron J

Read judgment: [11] (opens in a new tab)

Gaudron J, after holding that early termination gave rise to damages and not a refund, added that a claim for damages is a claim to the full benefit of the contract and, if successful, precludes a refund of the fare. The paragraph number is Gaudron J’s own.

Separate reasoning · Brennan J

Read judgment: [10] (opens in a new tab)

Brennan J, in dealing with damages, said that it was erroneous for the trial judge to award both an amount representing the fare and damages for disappointment and distress, because damages for breach are intended to restore the plaintiff to the position of performance. The paragraph number is Brennan J’s own.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J

Read judgment: [4] (opens in a new tab), [13] (opens in a new tab), [16] (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J reached the result through the conditional or unconditional character of the advance payment, a route of his own. The paragraph numbers are McHugh J’s own.

Why does this case matter?

Students often remember this case for a single sentence about holidays and distress. A problem built on it rewards an answer that separates the two questions the Court decided and attributes each step to the Justices who took it.

Exam and application relevance

Attribute each formulation to the Justice who gave it, naming the Justice with the paragraph, because each judgment is numbered separately and a bare paragraph number does not identify a passage.

The Court decided a common law claim on a 1986 cruise contract. A claim today for services supplied to a consumer may also arise under the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)): s 60 provides a guarantee that services will be rendered with due care and skill, and s 267(4) allows a consumer to recover damages for loss or damage suffered because of a failure to comply with a guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable (compilation of 16 September 2026). The Court did not apply those provisions.

Check your understanding

1. What two questions remained for the High Court once special leave on the deed of release and the exclusion clauses was rescinded, and what had the Court of Appeal done on each (Mason CJ [2]-[4])?

2. How did Brennan J’s approach to damages for disappointment and distress differ from Mason CJ’s formulation (Brennan J [3]-[9]; Mason CJ [44])?

3. What did McHugh J say about whether the general rule should be overruled, and what reason did he give (McHugh J [45]-[47])?

4. According to Deane and Dawson JJ, what was the consideration for which the fare was paid, and why did it not wholly fail (Deane and Dawson JJ [12])?

5. Which Justices said that damages and a refund of the fare could not both be recovered, and in what terms (Mason CJ [30]; Brennan J [10]; Deane and Dawson JJ [13]-[14]; Gaudron J [11])?