Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions
Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462
A man charged with murdering his estranged wife said the gun went off by accident. The jury heard that once the killing was shown, it fell to him to satisfy them it was not murder. Who should carry that burden in a criminal trial?
What happened?
Reginald Woolmington, aged 21 and a half, was convicted at the Bristol Assizes on 14 February 1935 of the wilful murder of his wife, who was 17 and a half, on 10 December 1934, and was sentenced to death (Viscount Sankey LC). At an earlier trial at the Somerset Assizes at Taunton on 23 January the jury had disagreed (Viscount Sankey LC). The couple married on 25 August, a child was born on 14 October, and on 22 November she left him and went to live with her mother; he was anxious that she come back (Viscount Sankey LC). His wife’s aunt, who lived next door, heard his voice asking “are you going to come back home?”, a door slam and then a gun, and saw him leave on a bicycle (Viscount Sankey LC).
His own account was that he took a gun, with its barrels sawn off, to her mother’s house to frighten her into returning by threatening to shoot himself, and that when he brought the gun across his waist “it somehow went off”, which he called a pure accident (Viscount Sankey LC). When arrested he said “I want to say nothing, except I done it, and they can do what they like with me” (Viscount Sankey LC). The trial judge told the jury that “all homicide is presumed to be malicious and murder, unless the contrary appears from circumstances of alleviation, excuse, or justification”, and at the end of the summing-up that if the Crown satisfied them beyond reasonable doubt that the woman died at the prisoner’s hands, “he has to show that there are circumstances to be found in the evidence which has been given from the witness-box in this case which alleviate the crime so that it is only manslaughter or which excuse the homicide altogether by showing that it was a pure accident” (Viscount Sankey LC).
The Court of Criminal Appeal said it might have been better had the judge directed the jury differently, but dismissed the appeal on 18 March under the proviso to s 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, which allows an appeal to be dismissed if no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred (Viscount Sankey LC). The Attorney-General then certified that the appeal involved a point of law of exceptional public importance, and it came to the House of Lords (Viscount Sankey LC).
What did the Court decide?
The House of Lords allowed the appeal. Viscount Sankey LC delivered the only opinion, dated 23 May 1935, and the other four Lords concurred: Lords Hewart, Tomlin and Wright each said so, and Lord Atkin, who was presiding at the Privy Council that day, asked Viscount Sankey to say that he concurred. The House declined to apply the proviso, saying that it could not say that if the jury had been properly directed they would inevitably have come to the same conclusion. The order was that the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal be reversed and the conviction quashed, and that the cause be remitted back to the Court of Criminal Appeal “to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this judgment”.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Viscount Sankey LC held that the trial judge’s direction was wrong in law. He said that “It is not the law of England to say, as was said in the summing-up in the present case” that if the Crown satisfy the jury that the woman died at the prisoner’s hands then he has to show circumstances that reduce the crime to manslaughter or excuse it as a pure accident, and that if the proposition laid down by Sir Michael Foster or in the summing-up in Rex v Greenacre means this, “those authorities are wrong”.
He said that, if Foster meant that the accused must prove his innocence, there was no previous authority for his proposition; he doubted that in the early cases the question of the burden of proof was considered, saying they were concerned with the ingredients of murder, and said that if a judge could rule that the onus had shifted to the prisoner the judge, and not the jury, would decide the case, which is not the common law. He said that “Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception”, and that if at the end and on the whole of the case there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.
On a charge of murder, he said, the Crown must prove death as the result of a voluntary act of the accused and malice, which it may prove expressly or by implication where the act is intentional and unprovoked. When evidence of death and malice has been given, the accused is entitled to show, by evidence or by examination of the circumstances adduced by the Crown, that the act was unintentional or provoked, and if the jury are satisfied with his explanation, or are left in reasonable doubt whether the act was unintentional or provoked even if his explanation is not accepted, he is entitled to be acquitted.
Viscount Sankey added that “No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained”. The direction in issue concerned a charge of murder in which the accused said that the killing was an accident.
In stating the principle Viscount Sankey made it subject to the defence of insanity and to any statutory exception. On insanity he said that M’Naughton’s case “stands by itself”, that it “is quite exceptional and has nothing to do with the present circumstances”, and that in it “the onus is definitely and exceptionally placed upon the accused to establish such a defence”; he cited Rex v Oliver Smith (1910) 6 Cr App R 19 for the statement that insanity, if relied upon as a defence, must be established by the defendant. Nothing in the opinion suggests that insanity was raised at the trial or on the appeal, and the House did not decide the content of that defence. The opinion names no statute and no particular statutory exception.
Why does this case matter?
Questions on the criminal trial often rely on this case for a famous phrase, and students tend to repeat the phrase without the facts of the trial or the charge to which it was applied. What a statement of principle was applied to, and who made it, determines what it can support in an answer.
Exam and application relevance
In an answer about the burden of proof in a criminal trial, identify the charge and which element or defence is in issue, and say what the trial judge’s direction was or would be. Attribute the statements to Viscount Sankey LC and describe the case as an English House of Lords decision that is persuasive in Australia. The position in a particular Australian jurisdiction also depends on that jurisdiction’s legislation and on High Court authority, which this case does not itself supply.
Check your understanding
1. What did Woolmington say about how his wife came to be shot, and what had happened at the first trial (Viscount Sankey LC)?
2. What did the trial judge tell the jury that the prisoner had to show once the Crown had proved that the woman died at his hands (Viscount Sankey LC)?
3. On what basis did the Court of Criminal Appeal dismiss the appeal, and what did the House of Lords say about that basis?
4. Which Lord delivered the opinion, and what did Lords Hewart, Atkin, Tomlin and Wright say?
5. What did Viscount Sankey LC say about Sir Michael Foster’s proposition and the summing-up in Rex v Greenacre if they meant that an accused must prove his innocence?
6. What did Viscount Sankey LC say about M’Naughton’s case, and why?