Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland · 1999

Equity And TrustsEquitable Assignment And Priorities

Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] QCA 525

A bankrupt takes back from his trustee his causes of action against a bank and others, and issues a writ four days later without telling the defendants about the assignment. Does the missing notice stop the action?

What happened?

Graham Thomas had a cause of action against the respondents before October 1991 ([38]). He was declared bankrupt on 24 October 1991, and his rights of action passed to his trustee in bankruptcy, who did not bring proceedings on them ([38]). The bankruptcy terminated on 8 December 1994 ([38]). By a deed of assignment dated 5 January 1996, in consideration of $500 paid by Mr Thomas, the trustee assigned to him its rights, title and interest in any right of action that may have been vested in the trustee against, among others, the respondents, who were National Australia Bank Ltd, Arthur Andersen (a firm) and John Ebbage ([38]).

Mr Thomas began the action in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 9 January 1996, without having given the respondents notice of the assignment ([10], [15]). The trustee was not joined ([16]). At least by 3 November 1997 all the respondents had received written notice of the assignment ([10]). The parties agreed to have tried as a preliminary question whether Mr Thomas was entitled to bring and maintain the action, in that no notice had been given to the defendants before it began ([15]). The primary judge, the Chief Justice, held that because notice of the assignment had not been given before the action was begun, Mr Thomas had no right to bring and maintain it, and dismissed the action with costs ([15]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Pincus JA and Thomas JA) allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the orders made below and, in their place, ordered that the respondents’ application to the primary judge be dismissed with costs ([37]). Each member of the Court gave separate reasons and each concurred in the orders.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Pincus JA identified the question as “whether notice affects priorities only, or whether, on the other hand, notice to the debtor is necessary in order to pass title to the debt”, and said that, as far as he could discern, there was no reason to distinguish between assignments of legal property and assignments of property recognised by equity for present purposes ([18]). After reviewing Walker v Bradford Old Bank, Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works, Ward v Duncombe, Anning v Anning, In re City Life Assurance Co and the work of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane ([19]-[23]), he said that the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corporation Pty Ltd relied principally on Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd, in which authorities contrary to the conclusion reached appeared to have been overlooked, and that Warner Bros appeared to him irreconcilable with a dictum of Dixon J in Comptroller of Stamps (Vict) v Howard-Smith ([24]).

He concluded that there were authorities tending both ways but that “the weight of authority on this point, at least so far as Australia is concerned, favours the appellant”, and that the view that the assignee’s title is not complete so as to enable suit to be brought before notice is given to the person liable “should not be followed” ([25]). McMurdo P said that she was not persuaded that Mountain Road was rightly decided, for the reasons given by Pincus JA and because Warner Bros was distinguishable on its facts ([9]).

Thomas JA said that the mere fact that the action was commenced before notice of the assignment was given did not preclude the appellant from maintaining it ([40]), and agreed with Pincus JA’s reasons ([43]). McMurdo P and Thomas JA each also said that, if notice had been required before suit, an amendment to the pleading could have cured the position ([10], [11], [42]).

The respondents submitted that the rule requiring notice originates in Dearle v Hall ([4]). Pincus JA described the rule as being “that assignees of a fund vested in trustees take priority according to the date on which they give notice to the trustees” ([20]). He quoted Cotton LJ in Gorringe that “there must be such a notice to enable the title of the assignee to prevail against a subsequent assignee”, an effect established by Dearle v Hall, but that there was “no authority for holding this rule to apply as against the assignor of the debt” ([19]).

He quoted Lord Macnaghten in Ward v Duncombe that “Notice does not render the title perfect” ([20]) and Warrington LJ in City Life on the objects of giving notice ([22]), and observed that references to an assignment being effective as between assignor and assignee without notice to the debtor do not mean that it is void against everyone else, because in City Life the assignment was effective against the debtor to defeat a set-off ([22]). McMurdo P set out passages describing the rule, quoted the authors of Equity Doctrine and Remedies that it is applicable only between competing equities, and recorded Lord Macnaghten’s remark that he was inclined to think that the rule has on the whole produced at least as much injustice as it has prevented ([4]-[6]).

She also quoted Sir John Pennycuick’s statement in Warner Bros that Dearle v Hall is not “directly in point on the position of an equitable assignee of the benefit of a contract” ([7]). None of the three judges decided a contest between competing assignees.

The respondents also contended that the order dismissing the action could be upheld because the trustee in bankruptcy, as assignor of the chose in action, was a necessary party and the suit was a nullity without it ([16]). Pincus JA considered Tolhurst, William Brandt’s Sons v Dunlop Rubber, Performing Right Society v London Theatre of Varieties, Long Leys, National Mutual Life Nominees and the reasons of Fitzgerald P and McPherson JA in Equus Financial Services v Glengallen Investments ([26]-[30]), and said that “The proposition that the absence of the assignor from the proceedings instituted rendered them a nullity is plainly wrong” ([31]).

He treated joinder of the trustee as “a matter of procedure” and saw no practical advantage in joining it, because the advantage generally said to come from having the assignor a party is to avoid the debtor, having paid the assignee, being faced with a claim by the assignor, and no such fear had been suggested ([33]). He added, while saying that it was not strictly necessary to do so, that where an established practice can lead to “undue delay, expense and technicality” the Court should attempt to avoid those results, having regard to rule 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) ([34]-[36]).

McMurdo P agreed with Pincus JA’s reasons on non-joinder ([13]), and Thomas JA agreed with his reasons and said that the notion that the proceedings were a nullity was erroneous ([43], [44]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Pincus JA (McMurdo P and Thomas JA agreeing on the point, each giving separate reasons)

Read judgment: [18]–[25] (opens in a new tab), [9] (opens in a new tab), [40] (opens in a new tab), [43] (opens in a new tab)

The primary judge dismissed the action because no notice of the assignment had been given before it was brought ([15]); Pincus JA’s rejection of that reasoning is the principal ground on which the appeal was allowed and the dismissal set aside ([25], [37]). McMurdo P adopts his reasons on the point ([9]) and Thomas JA agrees with them ([43]).

Separate reasoning · McMurdo P and Thomas JA

Read judgment: [10]–[12] (opens in a new tab), [42] (opens in a new tab)

McMurdo P (“On either basis, the appeal must be allowed”, [12]) and Thomas JA ([42]) each add that any need for notice could have been met by amendment. These are alternative routes to the same orders rather than the reasoning of Pincus JA on the question of title, and agreement in the orders does not adopt every reason.

Proposition 2

Obiter · Pincus JA and McMurdo P

Read judgment: [4]–[7] (opens in a new tab), [19]–[20] (opens in a new tab), [22] (opens in a new tab)

The passages describe the rule in Dearle v Hall and its criticism as background to the question whether notice is needed for title. No judge applied the rule to a contest between assignees, because none arose, so the descriptions of the rule’s content and criticism were not necessary to the orders, even though Pincus JA’s observations on the purpose of notice form part of his reasoning on the question in the previous proposition.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Pincus JA (McMurdo P and Thomas JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [26]–[33] (opens in a new tab), [13] (opens in a new tab), [43]–[44] (opens in a new tab)

The respondents put non-joinder forward as an independent ground for upholding the dismissal of the action ([16]); rejecting it was necessary to allowing the appeal, and McMurdo P and Thomas JA adopt the reasoning ([13], [43], [44]).

Obiter · Pincus JA

Read judgment: [34]–[36] (opens in a new tab)

Pincus JA introduces his remarks on rule 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules by saying that it is “not strictly necessary” to expand on the point ([34]), and they add reasons for a conclusion already reached at [31]-[33].

Why does this case matter?

A question about notice to a debtor can arise in more than one setting, and students often reach for the same authorities in each. Before choosing an authority, ask which question the problem actually raises: whether the assignee can maintain proceedings, what the person liable may still do after the assignment, or who ranks first as between competing assignees. An examiner reading an answer will look for whether the authority chosen answers that question.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where someone sues on a right that has been assigned to them, identify what was assigned, by whom and when, whether the assignment was in equity or under a statute, when and to whom notice was given, whether the assignor is a party, and whether any other person claims the same right. Then attribute each statement you use to McMurdo P, Pincus JA or Thomas JA, who gave separate reasons, and ask of each passage whose reasons it is in and which order it supports.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland. It binds the lower courts of that State and is persuasive elsewhere. It was delivered in 1999 and applies the Rules of the Supreme Court and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) as they then stood, before the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth); in a modern problem check the current procedural rules and any legislation that governs the transfer of the right in question.

Check your understanding

1. Who held the cause of action when Mr Thomas was bankrupt, when did the bankruptcy end, and on what date was the deed of assignment made ([38])?

2. What had and had not been done about notice and joinder when the action began on 9 January 1996 ([10], [15], [16])?

3. How did Pincus JA state the question about notice and the assignee’s title to a debt, and what did he conclude about the New Zealand decision in Mountain Road ([18], [24], [25])?

4. What did McMurdo P say about Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd, and on what basis did she say the appeal must be allowed whichever view of notice was correct ([9]-[12])?

5. In what words did Pincus JA state the rule in Dearle v Hall, and what did he quote Cotton LJ as saying about the rule and the assignor ([19], [20])?

6. Why did Pincus JA say that references to an assignment being effective between assignor and assignee do not mean that it is void against all others ([22])?

7. What did Pincus JA conclude about the failure to join the trustee, and what did Thomas JA say about the proceedings being a nullity ([31], [43], [44])?