RnD Funding Pty Limited v Roncane Pty Limited
RnD Funding Pty Limited v Roncane Pty Limited [2023] FCAFC 28
A controller moves money out of a charged bank account and a related company uses it to buy shares. What must the lender hold before equity lets it follow the money, and what can it claim in the shares?
What happened?
RnD Funding Pty Ltd (RnD), a commercial lender controlled by Mr Nakat, lent money to Australian Tailings Group Pty Ltd (ATG), a mining company then controlled by Mr Hillam. Repayment under the first facility was secured by a General Security Deed granted by ATG, which created a revolving security ([2], [6]). By 15 October 2018 ATG was in default because $320,000 had not been repaid ([11]). The default was a Control Event, the revolving security crystallised into a fixed charge, and ATG was no longer entitled to deal with its assets, including the money in its account ([12], [17]).
Rather than paying the accumulated funds into the Controlled Account, Mr Hillam, who was the controlling mind of ATG and of Roncane Pty Ltd at the relevant times, caused $520,000 to be transferred from ATG’s account to another company he controlled, Prop Fest Pty Ltd ([18]). The money was used to pay the purchase price of shares in Goldus Pty Ltd, which were transferred to Roncane ([19]). The primary judge rejected Mr Hillam’s evidence that the money went to Roncane under a loan, and the appeal proceeded on the basis that Roncane did not receive the funds or their benefit as a bona fide purchaser or borrower for value ([20]).
RnD claimed to trace its security interest in the funds into the shares and asked for a declaration that it was entitled to ownership of them ([2]). The primary judge treated a tracing claim as needing a proprietary base in the form of a vested beneficial interest in trust property, thought other interests such as equitable liens insufficient, and thought it well established that a fiduciary relationship was required ([28]). The tracing claim based on the security interest failed ([34]).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Beach, Derrington and Halley JJ) allowed RnD’s appeal. Derrington J gave the reasons, and Beach and Halley JJ agreed with his reasons and proposed orders ([1]). It granted declaratory relief (the substance is in the Proposition below) and ordered Roncane to pay RnD’s costs of the appeal, and gave the parties leave to make further submissions on the costs of the hearing before the primary judge (orders 1-4; [136]-[138]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Derrington J said that the authorities show no settled opinion on whether a fiduciary relationship is necessary to the right to trace in equity ([93]). He listed categories in which courts have recognised a right to trace, including the owners of stolen money and the holders of equitable security interests ([109]). The list is not exhaustive, but it tends to negate any requirement for an initial equitable proprietary interest derived from a fiduciary duty, and the suggested rationales for such a requirement do not justify excluding other equitable interests.
In his words, “it is the nature of the equitable interest as being one relating to property which is the genesis of the right to invoke tracing” ([110]). Fiduciary duties are very often present where tracing is sought, but may simply be a regular cause of the need to trace and not a precondition for it ([111]). He also separated the right that permits tracing from the “tracing links” that show whether the original property is manifest in other property, the second being derivative upon the first ([51]).
The precise equitable interest that carries a right to trace need not be finally determined. It includes at least the interest of an equitable chargee or equitable mortgagee, and the Court did not decide whether a lesser interest such as an equitable lien would suffice ([113]). RnD held an equitable charge over the funds in ATG’s account, which arose from the General Security Deed and its operation on ATG’s default. That was a proprietary right enforceable in equity, so RnD could use the equitable tracing rules without relying on a separate fiduciary relationship between it and ATG or any other party ([114]).
RnD was therefore entitled to trace its security interest into the Goldus shares ([128]-[129]). The interest that attaches to the substitute asset is the same security interest that inhered in the money, so tracing a security interest gives a security interest and not a share of the proceeds or title to them ([127], [130]). The Court declined RnD’s primary request for a declaration of constructive trust, because that would convert RnD’s security interest into a beneficial interest in the title to the shares and there was no warrant for enlarging its interest in that way ([131]).
The appropriate remedy was a declaration that Roncane holds the shares subject to RnD’s security interest under the General Security Deed ([132]). The declaration was limited, as at the date of the first instance judgment, to the $320,000 shown to be in default, and the Court said that this does not mean the security is limited to that amount ([133]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Derrington J, with whom Beach and Halley JJ agreed
Read judgment: [110]–[112] (opens in a new tab), [114] (opens in a new tab)
RnD’s principal ground challenged the primary judge’s view that a tracing claimant must hold a vested beneficial interest in trust property and, with it, a fiduciary relationship ([45]-[47]). Derrington J’s conclusion that the nature of the equitable interest as relating to property, and not an antecedent fiduciary relationship, founds the right to trace, applied to RnD’s charge, is the reasoning on which that ground was decided.
Obiter · Derrington J, with whom Beach and Halley JJ agreed
Read judgment: [113] (opens in a new tab)
The part of [113] that reaches beyond the equitable chargee or mortgagee (equitable liens, mere equities, personal equities, interests carrying a continuing benefit or a power of disposal) states what the Court thought may follow in other cases and says expressly that the lien question need not be decided; RnD’s own interest was a charge, so the result did not depend on it.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Derrington J, with whom Beach and Halley JJ agreed
Read judgment: [127]–[133] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs decide RnD’s secondary claim and the form of relief. The conclusion that RnD could trace its charge into the shares, that its interest in the shares is a security interest of the same kind, and that the right order is a declaration rather than a constructive trust, produced the declaration the Court made.
Why does this case matter?
A tracing answer can slip into bank accounts and mixed funds without first asking what the claimant held in the original property and what it can then claim in the substitute. This case gives a modern Full Court discussion of both questions on a commercial fact pattern: secured lending, a controller who moves money between related companies, and a share purchase. Examiners can transplant that pattern to lending and insolvency problems.
It also shows how much depends on the way a claim is framed. The Full Court spent several paragraphs on how RnD had pleaded and argued its case below, including its reliance on a claim of ownership and on the vaguely used “locked box” provisions, before it isolated the claim it upheld ([3]-[4], [38]-[44]).
Exam and application relevance
Name the claimant’s position in the original asset precisely before running tracing links: legal owner, beneficiary under a trust, holder of a charge, or something else. Then identify what the claimant seeks in the substitute asset and the order it should ask for, and give reasons.
RnD Funding is a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, not of the High Court, so present its analysis as that Court’s. The reasons describe the authorities as lacking a settled opinion on the role of a fiduciary relationship ([93]) and note English statements to a different effect ([75]), so where a problem invites it, set out both positions and say which one the Full Court preferred. If the claimant’s interest differs from RnD’s, say how far the Full Court’s reasoning reaches and argue the remainder from principle.
Check your understanding
1. Whose reasons are the Court’s reasons for judgment, and what did the other two Justices say ([1])?
2. What happened to ATG’s revolving security on default, and what did Mr Hillam do with the $520,000 ([17]-[19])?
3. What did the primary judge require of a tracing claimant, as the Full Court records it at [28], and which paragraph states the Full Court’s conclusion on RnD’s own interest ([114])?
4. Name two of the categories of claimant listed at [109], and say what Derrington J drew from the list at [110].
5. Why did the Court refuse the declaration of constructive trust, and what limit did it place on the amount stated in the declaration ([131], [133])?