Foskett v McKeown

House of Lords · 2001

Equity And TrustsTracing

Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102

A fraudster pays the last two of five insurance premiums with money stolen from trust beneficiaries, then dies. The policy pays his children about 1 million pounds. Can the beneficiaries claim a share, or only their money back?

What happened?

On 6 November 1986 Mr Murphy effected a whole-life policy with Barclays Life Assurance Co Ltd for a sum assured of 1 million pounds, at an annual premium of 10,220 pounds. Five premiums were paid, in November of 1986 to 1990. He paid the 1986 and 1987 premiums from his own resources. The 1989 and 1990 premiums were paid out of money that he had misappropriated from purchasers of plots of land at a site in the Algarve, and the source of the 1988 premium was disputed. The purchasers had paid some 2,645,000 pounds to be held on the trusts of a trust deed, the land was never developed, and 20,440 pounds of their money was used to pay the fourth and fifth premiums.

The policy was held on trust. On 1 December 1989 Mr Murphy appointed it as to one-tenth for his wife and nine-tenths for his three children equally. He committed suicide on 9 March 1991, and the insurers paid 1,000,580.04 pounds to the trustees of the policy. The dispute was between the children and the purchasers. The purchasers claimed at least 40 per cent of the policy moneys, as two of the five premiums had been paid with their money. The children said that the purchasers had no interest in the policy moneys, or at most a claim to the 20,440 pounds with interest.

A majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Richard Scott V-C and Hobhouse LJ, Morritt LJ dissenting) held that the purchasers were entitled to be repaid the amount of the fourth and fifth premiums with interest but not to a pro rata share of the proceeds. The purchasers appealed to the House of Lords, and the children cross-appealed, claiming that the purchasers had no rights in the policy moneys at all.

What did the Court decide?

The House of Lords allowed the purchasers’ appeal and dismissed the children’s cross-appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Lord Millett’s speech sets out the reasoning for allowing the appeal. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who had at the conclusion of the hearing been minded to dismiss the appeal, changed his mind on reading Lord Millett’s draft and allowed it “for the reasons which he gives”; Lord Hoffmann agreed with Lord Millett’s conclusion, and differed from him only on how the shares should be calculated.

Lord Millett said that tracing is “neither a claim nor a remedy” but the process by which a claimant identifies the proceeds of his property, and that the transmission of a claimant’s property rights to traceable proceeds is part of the law of property and not of the law of unjust enrichment. Property rights “are not discretionary” and do not depend on what is “fair, just and reasonable”. A beneficiary has a continuing beneficial interest in the trust property and its traceable proceeds, which binds everyone who takes them except a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

He stated the basic rule for a mixed substitution: where a trustee wrongfully uses trust money to provide part of the cost of acquiring an asset, “the beneficiary is entitled at his option either to claim a proportionate share of the asset or to enforce a lien upon it to secure his personal claim against the trustee for the amount of the misapplied money”. It does not matter whether the trustee mixed the trust money with his own in a single fund before acquiring the asset or made separate payments out of the differently owned funds.

The claimant need not show that his money increased the value of the new asset. The lien is available only against a wrongdoer and those who derive title from him otherwise than for value, and not against innocent contributors, who share rateably. Applying those principles, Lord Millett held that the policy, a chose in action, was the product of all the premiums and that the death benefit was attributable to all of them. He rejected the Vice-Chancellor’s treatment of the first premium as decisive and Hobhouse LJ’s reliance on whether the later premiums made any difference to the sum payable, said that the nearest analogy was “an instalment purchase”, and held that ownership of the policy “cannot be made to await events”.

He would have apportioned the proceeds by a more elaborate method, based on the units allocated to the policy for each premium, but said that he was alone in that approach and was content that the money be divided in the proportions in which the parties contributed to the premiums.

Lord Browne-Wilkinson added that the purchasers’ claim rested on “their equitable proprietary interest in identified property”, which depended on no discretion, and that it was “a case of hard-nosed property rights”. He regarded the payment of the later premiums as wholly analogous to the mixing of moneys in a bank account, and said that the rights of the parties were fixed when the premiums were paid and could not depend on how events turned out. Lord Hoffmann described the case as a straightforward case of mixed substitution and the purchasers’ claim as “a vindication of proprietary right”.

He regarded the notional units as part of the formula for calculating what would be payable and not as separate property, treated the policy as a single chose in action, and would divide the fund simply in proportion to the contributions to the five premiums, without a discount for the timing of payments, a point he said had not been argued. Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed with Lord Hoffmann on that point.

Lord Steyn and Lord Hope dissented on the appeal and would have dismissed it. Lord Steyn treated tracing as a process of identifying assets that belongs to the realm of evidence, and said that equity’s method of securing the return of the stolen money was a lien or charge over it. He accepted that a proprietary claim to insurance proceeds is possible in principle, but held that the stolen money was not causally relevant to the death benefit, because the children’s rights had crystallised before any of it was used, and that it “would be an innovation to create a proprietary remedy in respect of an asset (the death benefit) which had already been acquired” when it was used.

Lord Hope accepted that the purchasers could trace their money into the proceeds and held that they were entitled to be reimbursed with interest. On the proportionate share he asked what was “fair, just and reasonable” after weighing the equities, and concluded that the purchasers could not show that their money contributed to, or increased the value of, the amount paid, so that the equities lay with the children. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Steyn and Lord Millett each agreed with Lord Hope’s reasons for dismissing the children’s cross-appeal.

Why does this case matter?

Students tend to run together three questions: where the claimant’s money went, what right the claimant has in what it became, and what the court can order. The speeches in this case treat each of them separately, so an answer that attributes a point to the wrong Lord or runs the questions together will be wrong whichever Lord is followed.

Exam and application relevance

Identify how the claimant’s money came to be in the asset, whether it was paid into a single fund or in separate payments, and who is resisting the claim: the wrongdoer, someone who took from the wrongdoer as a volunteer, a purchaser for value, or another innocent contributor.

Attribute each statement to the Lord who made it, and check which Lords adopted it, because the five speeches did not all take the same route. Where a problem varies the facts, such as whether the claimant’s money added anything to the value of the asset, test the variation against what each Lord said about it.

Check your understanding

1. Which premiums were paid with the purchasers’ money, and what was said about the source of the 1988 premium?

2. What did the majority of the Court of Appeal decide, and what did the children’s cross-appeal add?

3. What did Lord Browne-Wilkinson say about his view at the end of the hearing and why it changed?

4. What did Lord Millett say tracing is, and what did he say a beneficiary may do where a trustee wrongfully uses trust money to provide part of the cost of an asset?

5. Which Lords would have dismissed the appeal, and what reason did Lord Steyn and Lord Hope each give?

6. How did Lord Hoffmann and Lord Millett differ about the calculation of the shares, and which approach did Lord Browne-Wilkinson prefer?