Parker v The Queen
Parker v The Queen [1963] HCA 14; (1963) 111 CLR 610
The House of Lords had ruled on what a killer is presumed to intend, and a New South Wales murder summing-up drew that topic in. Would the High Court treat the English decision as binding?
What happened?
In October 1960, at an out-station near Jerilderie in the Riverina, Frank Parker’s wife told him she was leaving with another man, Dan Kelly. She and Kelly set off on Kelly’s bicycle. On the trial judge’s report, as Dixon CJ set it out, Parker followed in his car and drove it at Kelly where he stood with his bicycle at the edge of the road, and the impact broke both Kelly’s legs. Parker then attacked him with a knuckle duster and stabbed him in the neck with a knife, and Kelly died (pp 619 to 625). At the trial Parker said that he had set out to get his wife back to their children, without thought of injuring Kelly beyond perhaps a fight, and that he lost control of himself (p 623).
He was convicted of murder in New South Wales. The trial judge directed the jury that provocation was not available in the circumstances of the case, and also directed them, on the same report, that a person who attacks another with a weapon likely to cause death or serious bodily injury will normally be taken to have intended the natural and probable consequences of the attack (p 625). The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed Parker’s appeal, and he applied, long out of time, to the High Court for special leave to appeal. Dixon CJ treated the question on which the application depended as whether provocation should have been left to the jury, but said that the summing-up had also drawn in the topic of presumed intention, on which the House of Lords had decided Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290 (p 632).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court (Dixon CJ, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ) extended the time and refused special leave to appeal. Taylor and Owen JJ, in joint reasons, held that on neither version of the applicant’s evidence was there a case of provocation to go to the jury (p 641), and Menzies J that there was no evidence on which the jury could find that the accused did not intend to cause the death (p 647); both would refuse special leave. Dixon CJ said that provocation should have been left to the jury and the conviction of murder could not stand, and concluded that Parker should be tried again, unless it were thought better to substitute a conviction for manslaughter (pp 632 to 633). Windeyer J would have granted special leave, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial (p 664).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Dixon CJ recalled a statement in Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358, introduced with the words “we said”, that the introduction of the maxim that a person is presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of his act is “seldom helpful and always dangerous”, and said that the House of Lords’ decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290 “seems only too unfortunately to confirm the observation” and “forces a critical situation” in the Australian relation to decisions in England as precedents.
He then said that he had hitherto thought that the Court ought to follow decisions of the House of Lords at the expense of its own opinions and of cases decided in Australia, but that having carefully studied Smith’s case he thought the Court could not adhere to that view or policy. There were propositions in the judgment that he believed to be “misconceived and wrong”, that were fundamental, and that he could never bring himself to accept. On the matter of presumed intention he would not depart from the law as the Court had long since laid it down, and he thought that Smith’s case “should not be used as authority in Australia at all”. He added that he did not think the case before the Court really involved any of the so-called presumptions, although the summing-up had drawn the topic into the matter.
In the next paragraph Dixon CJ recorded that he was authorised by all the other members of the Court to say that they shared the views expressed in the foregoing paragraph. The other three sets of reasons (Taylor and Owen JJ jointly, Menzies J and Windeyer J) do not discuss Smith’s case; the joint reasons of Taylor and Owen JJ cite it once, among other cases, with a “cf.”.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Obiter · Dixon CJ, recording that the other members of the Court shared the views he expressed
Read judgment: pp 632–633 (opens in a new tab)
The statement about Smith’s case was not necessary to the order: the application was decided on provocation, special leave was refused, and Dixon CJ himself said the case did not really involve any of the so-called presumptions. It is nonetheless the whole Court’s declared position, because Dixon CJ records the agreement of the other four Justices, and it is the passage the case is cited for.
Why does this case matter?
Students tend to say either that an Australian court must follow the House of Lords or that English decisions count for nothing here. An examiner looks for the student who can say what weight an English decision has in an Australian court, and who gives the source and status of that statement accurately.
Exam and application relevance
Cite Parker for what Dixon CJ said about the House of Lords and Smith’s case and for his record that the other four members of the Court shared the views he expressed, naming him as the speaker. Report that the statement came in an application for special leave that was refused, and that Dixon CJ said the case did not really involve any of the so-called presumptions. The passage records the Court’s attitude in 1963 to a particular House of Lords decision, so check later High Court treatment of the relationship between Australian and English authority before stating it as the current position.
Check your understanding
1. Who stated the Court’s position on Smith’s case, and how did the other members of the Court come to share it?
2. What did Dixon CJ say about whether the case before the Court really involved any of the so-called presumptions, and why does that matter to the weight of the passage?
3. What was the order, and which Justices would have made a different one?