MJZP v Director-General of Security

High Court of Australia · 2025

CasesAustralian Legal SystemReasoningPrecedent And Ratio Decidendi

MJZP v Director-General of Security [2025] HCA 26

Four Justices upheld a secrecy law with reasons that did not match. When it was challenged again, the challenger said the earlier case had left no rule behind. What had that case actually settled?

What happened?

MJZP was a corporation that provided a carriage service under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). The Director-General of Security made an adverse security assessment of it in connection with s 315A of that Act, and the Minister for Home Affairs, as the ASIO Minister, certified under s 38A(3) of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) that disclosing certain information to MJZP, its directors or its employees would prejudice security ([30]). MJZP sought review of the assessment in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Before the hearing the Minister partly revoked that certificate, and MJZP was given a revised unclassified statement of grounds ([31]). The Minister also issued three certificates under ss 39A and 39B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”), and after a four-day hearing at which the certified information and documents were not disclosed to MJZP or its legal representatives the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review ([32]-[33]).

MJZP then brought a proceeding in the Federal Court under s 44(1) of the AAT Act, alleging error of law in the Tribunal’s decision ([34]). Section 46(2) of the AAT Act required the Federal Court, where a certificate was in force certifying that disclosing matter in a document would be contrary to the public interest, to “do all things necessary to ensure that the matter is not disclosed to any person other than a member of the court as constituted for the purposes of the proceeding” ([2]).

In the High Court MJZP, as plaintiff, challenged the validity of s 46(2) by special case. It contended that the provision required the Federal Court to depart from the “general rule” of procedural fairness more than was reasonably necessary to protect a compelling and legitimate public interest, and so deprived it of an essential characteristic of a court under Ch III of the Constitution ([3]). The High Court had already considered s 46(2) in SDCV v Director-General of Security (2022) 277 CLR 241.

There the Full Court of the Federal Court had declared that s 46(2) “is a valid law of the Commonwealth”, and the High Court, by a majority of 4:3, dismissed the appeal from that declaration ([6], [18]). The plaintiff in MJZP said that SDCV was not authority against its argument and, to the extent necessary, asked for leave to re-open and overrule it. The Commonwealth, supported by interveners (the Attorneys-General of Tasmania, Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales), said that SDCV was a complete answer ([3]-[4]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court answered Question (1), whether s 46(2) of the AAT Act is invalid because it infringes Ch III of the Constitution, “No”, and ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs. The Justices were unanimous in the answers, in two sets of reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ held, in joint reasons, that the Commonwealth’s principal submission was correct: SDCV “provides a complete answer to the plaintiff’s case and should not be re-opened” ([5]). Gageler CJ and Gordon J had been in the minority in SDCV ([8]-[9], [19]); the joint reasons nevertheless applied it.

Their first step was to say what SDCV had decided. The seven Justices in SDCV had divided as follows. Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ held that s 46(2) was valid in its entirety, because s 46 considered as a whole “simply offers that person a statutory remedy in addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law”, with forensic consequences different from those of the other remedies ([7]). Gageler J, Gordon J and Edelman J each held that s 46(2) was invalid in its entirety, on reasoning of their own ([8]-[10]).

Steward J held that s 46(2) did not necessarily prevent the Federal Court from avoiding practical injustice to an applicant, because supplying certified documents to the Federal Court did not oblige it to receive them into evidence, so that it could refuse to admit them or admit them only on conditions agreed to by the respondent, and, consistently with Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, that an applicant suffered no practical injustice because the right of appeal that s 46 regulated was a beneficial part of the statutory scheme ([11]).

On that footing the joint reasons said that the plaintiff’s submission “that no ratio decidendi can be extracted from the reasoning in SDCV beyond that s 46(2) does not infringe Ch III of the Constitution is incorrect” ([12]). It was “necessary to the order dismissing the appeal in SDCV” that four Justices (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, and Steward J) held that s 46(2), in its application to documents in respect of which there is a certificate in accordance with s 39B(2), did not infringe Ch III. The reason, in a formulation the joint reasons took from the Commonwealth’s submissions, was that the provision “forms an inseverable part of an additional avenue for review that is beneficial” and so causes no practical injustice. “In respect of the statutory and factual situation it resolved, that is the ratio decidendi of SDCV” ([12]).

The joint reasons dealt with Steward J’s further remarks separately. He had also said that, had s 46(2) precluded the Federal Court’s duty and capacity to provide other forms of procedural fairness, he “may well have formed the view that s 46(2) was not a valid law” ([13]). The joint reasons said that these observations “cannot alter the fact that what was ultimately essential” to his agreeing in the orders was his conclusion that “even in a case where s 46(2) strictly applied in accordance with its terms it did not result in an applicant suffering any practical injustice”, because the provision forms part of an otherwise beneficial regime ([13]). It followed that the plaintiff, to obtain its declaration, needed leave to re-open SDCV and had to persuade the Court to overturn it ([14]).

The plaintiff gave reasons for leave, including that the Justices in the SDCV majority had reached their conclusion for different reasons and that SDCV had produced no binding statement on the construction of s 46(2) ([15]). The joint reasons refused leave. They invoked the “strongly conservative cautionary principle, adopted in the interests of continuity and consistency in the law” which they took from NZYQ, and Gibbs J’s statement that no Justice is entitled to arrive at their own judgment “as though the pages of the law reports were blank, or as though the authority of a decision did not survive beyond the rising of the Court” ([16]).

A party who asks the Court to re-open an earlier decision upholding the validity of the same provision, “on precisely the same basis as the challenge rejected in the earlier decision”, carries “a particularly heavy persuasive burden which the plaintiff in this case has not come close to discharging” ([16]).

Their reasons included these. The plaintiff’s “means and ends” or proportionality argument was in substance the argument about the provision’s rigidity that had been put in SDCV and accepted by the minority there ([17]). That the reasoning of the SDCV majority was “responsive to the immediate context of s 46(2)” rather than a general principle “works against the application for leave to re-open SDCV”, because the appeal in SDCV was from a declaration that s 46(2) was valid, and “nothing has changed since SDCV was decided except the constitution of this Court” ([18]). All seven Justices in SDCV accepted that procedural fairness is an essential characteristic of a Ch III court and that the concern is practical injustice, and the two groups differed on the context in which to assess it ([19]). The differences between the judgments concerned “only the application of established principles to a single provision” ([21]).

Edelman J, who had been in the SDCV minority, agreed with the answers proposed in the joint reasons ([42], [69]) but wrote separately on how a ratio is identified. On his account, a court lower in the hierarchy is generally bound by the rationes decidendi of a higher court, and a ratio can be stated at different levels of generality ([36]-[37]). For a court of several judges he described a narrow view, under which a ratio is the essential reasoning common to a majority at a low level of generality, so that a decision may have none, although seriously considered obiter dicta of the High Court still bind lower courts and a court bound by a decision whose ratio cannot be discerned must apply it unless the case is reasonably distinguishable ([38]); and a broader view, under which a ratio can be stated at a high level of generality by respecting the necessary aspects of the reasoning of every member of the majority.

He said that the broader view is “orthodox” (quoting Nettle J) and that “Every decision has its ratio” (quoting Sir Anthony Mason) ([39]-[40]). Only the reasons of the majority count, and those in dissent “must be put to one side” ([42]).

Applying that account, Edelman J held that SDCV had no ratio in the narrow sense, because at least two matters essential to Steward J’s reasons (whether certified documents must be tendered, and whether a special advocate could be appointed) were rejected by the plurality of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, but that at a higher level of generality its ratio was that s 46(2), in its particular context, is consistent with Ch III because it is not productive of practical injustice ([57]-[58]).

He thought the absence of a ratio at low levels weighed in favour of re-opening SDCV ([65]-[66]), but concluded against it because a re-opening might leave “the reasoning of this Court” to “splinter even further than it did in SDCV” and leave lower courts more uncertain, so that principles beneath the result should for the time being be developed by lower courts ([67]-[68]). The joint reasons do not use the vocabulary of levels of generality and do not discuss tender, a special advocate or gisting.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: [6]–[14] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab)

To decide whether the earlier decision in SDCV answered the plaintiff’s challenge, the joint reasons set out how the seven Justices in SDCV had divided ([7]-[11]) and then identified its ratio decidendi as what was necessary to the order dismissing the appeal from the four Justices in the majority ([12]). They held that Steward J’s further observations could not alter what was ultimately essential to his agreement in the orders ([13]), and concluded that the plaintiff needed leave to re-open SDCV and that SDCV would have to be overturned for the declaration to be granted ([14]). These steps were necessary to the conclusion that SDCV was a complete answer.

Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: [15]–[23] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons refused leave to re-open SDCV. They applied the cautionary principle against re-opening, said that a party challenging the validity of the same provision on the same basis as the challenge already rejected carries a particularly heavy persuasive burden, and gave six reasons why the plaintiff had not discharged it ([16]-[22]), including that the reasoning in SDCV was responsive to the immediate context of s 46(2) and that nothing had changed except the constitution of the Court ([18]). That was the ground for the answer ‘No’ to Question (1), so it is the ground of the decision.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J (agreeing with the answers proposed in the joint reasons)

Read judgment: [28] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [36]–[42] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [57]–[58] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [65]–[69] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J agreed with the answers to the questions but gave his own account of how a ratio decidendi is identified, distinguishing a narrow view from a broader view and stating a ratio at different levels of generality, and held that SDCV had a ratio at a high level of generality but none at the low level of the procedure to be followed by the Federal Court. He said that the absence of a low-level ratio weighed in favour of re-opening SDCV but concluded that re-opening risked leaving the reasoning more splintered. The joint reasons do not use this vocabulary, so none of it is the Court’s reasoning.

Why does this case matter?

A divided decision of the High Court tends to produce two opposite mistakes. One student copies sentences from each majority Justice’s reasons into “the rule”. Another sees that the reasons do not match and concludes that nothing binds. An examiner looks for the student who avoids both and can say, with the Justices’ names, what the earlier decision is authority for. Lawyers need the same skill: they must say what an earlier decision is authority for before they can argue that it should be followed, distinguished or re-opened.

Exam and application relevance

Cite MJZP at [12]-[13] (the joint reasons) for how the Court identified the ratio of SDCV, and name the four Justices of the SDCV majority whose conclusions the joint reasons treated as necessary to the order. The joint reasons confine their statement to the statutory and factual situation that SDCV resolved ([12]), the validity of s 46(2) of the AAT Act in its application to certified documents, so say that MJZP concerned that earlier decision on that provision.

If you use Edelman J’s account of rationes decidendi and levels of generality ([36]-[41]), say that it comes from his own reasons and that the joint reasons do not use that vocabulary.

Check your understanding

1. Which four Justices did the joint reasons treat as the majority in SDCV, and what did they say was necessary to the order dismissing the appeal in that case ([12])?

2. How did the joint reasons deal with Steward J’s remark that he may well have formed the view that s 46(2) was not a valid law if the Federal Court’s duty and capacity to provide other forms of procedural fairness had been precluded ([13])?

3. Why did Edelman J put the reasons of the SDCV dissenters to one side when identifying the ratio of that decision, and which Justices on the MJZP bench were among them ([8]-[10], [19], [42])?