Masters v Cameron

High Court of Australia · 1954

ContractContract Formation

Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353

A farm owner and a buyer signed a memorandum fixing the land, the price and the date for possession, and a deposit was paid. It was also expressed to be subject to a formal contract. Was anyone bound before that contract was signed?

What happened?

On 6 December 1951 Mrs Violet Christina Cameron, a widow, signed a memorandum agreeing to sell her farming property at Bowelling in Western Australia, of about 5,000 acres, for £17,500 cash, and to do some fencing work (359-360). The memorandum ended: “This agreement is made subject to the preparation of a formal contract of sale which shall be acceptable to my solicitors on the above terms and conditions, and to the giving of possession on or about the Fifteenth Day of March 1952.”

Mr Norman Masters, on behalf of himself and his wife, signed beneath it, agreeing “to purchase the above property on the above terms and conditions” (360). The Court described the parties, the property, the price and the date for possession as all clearly settled (360). A deposit of £1,750 was paid to Dalgety & Co Ltd, the agent Mrs Cameron had employed to sell the property, and both sides later claimed it (357-358, 364-365, 367).

After signing, Mr Masters asked Mrs Cameron’s sons to leave the fencing work they were doing and help him clean up fallen timber, took possession of a room in the house, made structural alterations and additions, put down superphosphate and seed and erected a tank, while insisting that she be ready to hand over exclusive possession on 15 March 1952. To be able to do so she sold her sheep and bought a house in Perth (366). The purchasers then encountered financial difficulties that had nothing to do with her and denied that they were legally bound to buy (366-367).

Dalgety took out an originating summons in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and questions were framed for trial between the purchasers and Mrs Cameron (357-359). Wolff J decided that a binding contract had been concluded by the signing of the memorandum and gave judgment for Mrs Cameron against the purchasers for the £1,750 with costs. The purchasers appealed to the High Court (359).

What did the Court decide?

The Court gave one joint judgment as the judgment of the Court. It allowed the appeal with costs, discharged the judgment of the Supreme Court and made fresh orders about the payment out of the money held in court and about costs (367). It answered the four questions that had been framed for trial: whether a binding contract of sale and purchase was made, on what terms the £1,750 was paid, whether the purchasers were estopped from denying that they agreed to buy, and who was entitled to the money (364-367).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In negotiations that end with agreed terms and a promise of a formal contract, the Court (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ) said that the case may be one of three kinds, and the kind decides whether the parties are bound before the formal contract is executed. In the first, the parties “have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms”, but propose to have them restated in a fuller or more precise form that is not different in effect.

In the second, they “have completely agreed upon all the terms of their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to” them, but have made performance of one or more terms conditional on a formal document. In the third, “the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract” (360). The first two kinds produce a binding contract; the third does not, because the terms of agreement “are not intended to have, and therefore do not have, any binding effect of their own” (360-362). The question “depends upon the intention disclosed by the language the parties have employed”, and no special form of words is essential (362).

Words such as “subject to contract”, and expressions of similar import, are read in their natural sense. The Court said it had been recognised throughout the cases that such words “prima facie create an overriding condition, so that what has been agreed upon must be regarded as the intended basis for a future contract and not as constituting a contract” (362-363). It also said that no formula, including the words “subject to contract”, is “so intractable as always and necessarily to produce that result” (362).

It treated the memorandum as containing all the essentials of a contract, so that whether there was a contract depended entirely on the meaning and effect of the final sentence (360). The context gave no reason to take the case outside the authorities. The formal contract was to be on the stated terms, but it was to be acceptable to the vendor’s solicitors, and the meaning was sufficiently evident that it would contain the stated terms in a form satisfactory to them and “whatever else the solicitors may fairly consider appropriate to the case”. No binding contract had been made (364).

The deposit and the purchasers’ conduct did not change that result. Where a deposit is paid on signing a document that leaves each party free to decide against a binding contract, the prima facie inference is that it takes the character of a deposit if a contract is made but in the meantime does not become the property of the intending vendor, and nothing displaced the inference; the money was paid on terms that it be treated as a deposit if a formal contract were executed and otherwise returned to the purchasers (364-366).

The purchasers’ conduct after signing did not estop them: it “plainly could not have been intended by him or relied upon by the respondent as a representation that there was any other relationship between them than that which was to be found within the four corners of the agreement of 6th December 1951” (366-367). The Court called the outcome unfortunate for Mrs Cameron but said the purchasers’ liberty arose from her having introduced the qualifying sentence herself (366-367).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ (joint judgment of the Court)

Read judgment: pp 360–362 (opens in a new tab)

These pages state the framework within which the Court decided whether the memorandum bound the parties: the three kinds of case, the consequence of each, and the principle that the answer depends on the intention disclosed by the parties’ language. The Court applied that framework to the memorandum at 364 and the decision that there was no binding contract depends on it.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ (joint judgment of the Court)

Read judgment: pp 362–364 (opens in a new tab)

These pages state the prima facie effect of a ‘subject to a formal contract’ qualification, qualify it by recognising that no formula is intractable, and apply it to the memorandum in the case. They are the ground on which the Court answered the first question (whether a binding contract was made) against the respondent.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ (joint judgment of the Court)

Read judgment: pp 364–367 (opens in a new tab)

These pages contain the answers to the second, third and fourth questions put to the Court: the destination of the deposit, the estoppel claim and the consequent orders. They follow from the answer to the first question and are necessary to the orders made.

Why does this case matter?

A problem that says a formal document is to follow invites an answer from a rule of thumb, and the usual errors run in both directions. An examiner rewards an answer built on what the parties said and did about the later document, and one that notices that money paid and conduct after signing raise questions of their own.

Exam and application relevance

Where parties have agreed terms and say that a formal document is to follow, set out the words used about the later document and what, on those words, the parties treated as still to be done. Ask what those words and the surrounding facts show about when the parties meant to be bound, and treat money paid and conduct after signing as separate issues.

Masters v Cameron concerned a memorandum for the sale of farm land, not the settlement of a dispute. Applying it to terms of settlement agreed by letter, email or at a mediation is an application of the same principle of contract formation by analogy.

Check your understanding

1. In the Court’s three kinds of case, which produce a binding contract before the formal document exists, and which does not (360-362)?

2. What did the Court say about the essential terms in the memorandum, and which sentence did it say the question of a contract depended on (360)?

3. What did the Court say about the effect of “subject to contract” and similar words, and about whether any formula always and necessarily has that effect (362-363)?

4. Why did the purchasers’ conduct after 6 December 1951 not estop them from denying that they were bound (366-367)?