Kronenberg v Macaulay
Kronenberg v Macaulay [2025] NSWCA 195
For decades a farmer told his son the farms would one day be his; the son bought land, took on debt and farmed with him in partnership. Did that conduct show that the son relied on the promises?
Clarified by Penya v Penya [2026] NSWCA 73
In Penya v Penya, on a ground that the primary judge had applied too high a standard for a clear and unequivocal promise, Bell CJ (Adamson JA agreeing) said at [38] that there was much to be said for Leeming JA’s observations in Kronenberg, although his Honour did not ultimately need to pursue the point in that case and the same might be said in Penya because the appellant failed on other grounds. His Honour added that it did appear that the plurality in Kramer v Stone had determined that a “clear and unequivocal promise” is required to found a proprietary estoppel, or at least an estoppel based upon representations, “with the consequence that that decision must be followed in this Court”. Mitchelmore JA, who had agreed with Leeming JA in Kronenberg, said at [75] that Leeming JA did not need to decide the issue in that case and nor need it be decided in Penya, and agreed that the primary judge could not be criticised for employing the language endorsed in Kramer at [37]. Penya is a decision of an intermediate court, which does not bind the High Court.
What happened?
Neil Macaulay died in 2021, and his wife Janet had died in 2012. They had four children: two daughters, Christina Kronenberg and Tracey Ford, and two sons, Scott and Craig Macaulay ([1]). Neil owned Parkvale (about 2,121 acres) and co-owned Miltons (about 404 acres) with Scott. A partnership of Neil, Janet and Scott, and after Janet’s death of Neil and Scott, farmed those properties and Fairfield (about 607 acres), which Scott owned ([2]). Scott was about 25 in 1988, and the partnership was established on 30 June 1989 ([27]).
He became co-owner of Miltons in the mid-1990s and bought Fairfield in 1999, borrowing most of the price from a bank ([28], [29], [36]). Neil’s wills of 2007 contemplated Scott receiving Parkvale and Neil’s share of Miltons on condition that Fairfield passed debt-free to Craig ([43], [46]). In 2017 Neil terminated the partnership and Scott was ostracised from the family ([50], [92]). Neil’s last will, made in August 2018, left a house to Scott and the balance of the estate to Christina, Tracey and Craig in equal shares, and appointed those three as executors ([3], [49]).
Scott sued in the Equity Division for declarations of constructive trust over Parkvale and Miltons, based on representations over about three decades that the farms would ultimately be his and, alternatively, on a common intention or joint endeavour constructive trust, and in the further alternative for family provision under s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) ([4], [5], [7]). Hmelnitsky J upheld Scott’s claim on the basis of statements Neil had made over about three decades and ordered relief conditional on Scott conveying free and clear title to Fairfield to Craig and renouncing the devise to him of the house ([7], [8]).
He did not determine the family provision claim ([7], [18]). Christina and Tracey appealed. They did not challenge the findings that Neil made the statements, but argued that the statements were in their context insufficient to give rise to an estoppel (grounds 1-4), that Scott had not relied on them (grounds 5-9) or suffered detriment (grounds 10-12), and that the relief was wrong (grounds 15-20) ([13]). Scott opposed the appeal, and Craig, who appeared in person, supported the primary judge ([14]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Leeming JA, Mitchelmore JA and Free JA) allowed the appeal on 28 August 2025. It set aside orders 1 and 2 made on 3 December 2024 and orders 6, 7 and 8 made on 2 May 2025, dismissed Scott’s claims in prayers 1 to 5 of the statement of claim, remitted his claims in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the statement of claim for further hearing in accordance with its reasons, which includes his claim for family provision, and ordered Scott to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal ([234], [236], [238]-[240]). The Court did not consider the common intention and joint endeavour constructive trust claims, which the primary judge had not determined ([233]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Leeming JA, with whom Mitchelmore JA and Free JA agreed ([239], [240]), held that Scott had failed to establish reliance and that this was dispositive of the appeal ([205]). He accepted that the onus rested on Scott, and he cited the joint judgment in Sidhu v Van Dyke that reliance is a fact to be found and is not to be imputed on evidence that falls short of proof of it ([199]). Although the appeal challenged findings of fact, the Court could intervene on a rehearing, making allowance for the primary judge’s advantages ([189]), and the cogency of the primary judge’s reasoning was to be assessed against the findings he made and not against other evidence available at trial, because Scott had not filed a notice of contention ([191]).
The primary judge had relied on two things: Scott’s purchase of Fairfield and a one third interest in Miltons, and his failure to extricate himself from the partnership afterwards ([190]). Leeming JA said that the representations the primary judge found to have been made did not refer to anything said before 1999 save in general introductory terms, and he asked how Scott’s acquisition of Fairfield in 1999 could amount to reliance on an assumption that he would ultimately be given Parkvale ([194]); that the first finding of a representation was one said to have been made when Miltons was purchased, and it seemed a little unreal to treat one of three partners as relying on it to join in buying land with partnership funds ([195]); and that Scott did not allege any promise from Neil before he joined the partnership, while it was the partnership that bought Miltons and Fairfield ([196]).
He said that the assumption changed significantly after about 2007, when the obligation to transfer Fairfield to Craig qualified it ([197]); that the primary judge had not found that there was any time after 1994 when Scott could have left the partnership, that it seemed unrealistic to think he could as a practical matter have sold Fairfield to pay down his debts, and that the question was largely speculative on an issue on which Scott bore the onus, with no findings or reasons by the primary judge supporting the conclusion ([200]); and that this was not a case like Giumelli v Giumelli, where a child works on the land for nothing or well below market rates on the strength of promises of eventual ownership, because Scott worked in a farming partnership and also obtained legal title to significant parts of the land ([201]).
The critical steps of reliance, becoming co-owner of Miltons and owner of Fairfield and liable for the debt, occurred in 1995 and 1999, before anything was said, on the primary judge’s findings, about acquiring Parkvale ([202]). The strongest aspect of Scott’s case came with the 2007 wills, but by then Scott had been a partner for 18 years, which was sufficient to resolve the issue ([203]), and there was force in the appellants’ other submissions, including that his acquiescence in the changed assumption without confronting Neil very much suggested that he did not treat the assumption as giving rise to an estoppel ([204]).
Leeming JA concluded that Scott’s case for proprietary estoppel, as run at first instance and defended on appeal, was based on representations about his inheritance by will if Neil predeceased him ([142]). His reasons included that the statements said the farms would “ultimately” or “one day” be Scott’s, that the 2007 wills and Neil’s attempts to secure family agreement to his estate plan were prominent in Scott’s case, and that it was hard to see how Scott could rely on those matters yet contend that he owned the farms in Neil’s lifetime ([142]).
He said that once the case was reduced to one about promises as to a will, it was necessary to bring to account that people are free to change their wills, and he set out the principles in Barnes v Alderton, Wantagong Farms and Bassett v Cameron, including that the question is whether it was reasonable for the claimant to understand the particular encouragements in the circumstances to be an irrevocable promise ([144]-[146]). He said the primary judge had fallen short of addressing that question explicitly ([147]), but that the primary judge’s finding that Scott’s reliance on what Neil said about his will was reasonable should be regarded as a conclusion that Scott understood it to be irrevocable, a finding informed by the primary judge’s advantage in seeing Scott give evidence over parts of three days, so that the appellants had not demonstrated a finding with which the Court could interfere ([148]-[150]).
In dealing with detriment he added that where the estoppel concerns a testamentary promise and not an inter vivos entitlement to land, it is “to say the least arguable” that it is subject to the statutory powers to make orders for family provision, but he said that it was better not to reach a firm conclusion because, although the point was advanced in the appellants’ written submissions, Scott’s written and oral submissions had not engaged with it ([215]).
Leeming JA said that ground 2, whether the representations were sufficiently clear and unequivocal, raised a pure question of law that neither side had fully engaged with, which he would have invited further submissions on had it been determinative of the appeal ([97]). The primary judge had said that the level of clarity required for proprietary estoppel is not as high as for a contract or promissory estoppel, relying on this Court’s decision in Kramer v Stone at [84] ([151], [152]).
Leeming JA noted that the joint majority judgment of the High Court in Kramer v Stone had since said, at [36]-[37], that there must be a “clear and unequivocal” promise made by the party estopped, and that “There is a question whether the High Court has altered the law to which it will be necessary to return” ([153], [154]). The appellants’ submission that Kramer reaffirmed the requirement fell short of saying that the primary judge’s statement was wrong, and Scott confirmed that the statement was correct, so the parties’ attitude informed the approach taken ([155], [156]).
He observed that the passages the joint judgment cited concerned promissory estoppel ([157]) and said that “There are some difficulties in accepting that if the case be one of proprietary estoppel by encouragement from a promise, the promise must be clear and unequivocal”, giving nine numbered reasons ([158]). They included that the joint judgment did not say it was changing the law, that it made no negative reference to what Ward P had said at [84] with the agreement of Kirk JA and Leeming JA, to many intermediate appellate decisions, or to statements by Nettle J and Keane J in Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd consistent with a less stringent requirement, and that acceptance of the requirement would produce incoherence because conduct amounting to more than acquiescence but less than a clear and unequivocal representation would fall outside proprietary estoppel ([158]).
He added that he might be reading too much into the joint judgment, since it described the species as “encouragement from a promise” and so might have been alive to other forms of proprietary estoppel by encouragement ([159]). He concluded that it was not necessary to pursue the point, that there had not been anything like full argument on it, that the Court’s orders were not affected by the outcome of ground 2, and that if the Court expressed a view it would have an impact on other hearings where the issue may be dispositive, so it was best not to decide the ground ([160]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Leeming JA (Mitchelmore JA and Free JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [189]–[205] (opens in a new tab)
Leeming JA concluded that Scott failed to establish reliance and said that this was dispositive of the appeal ([205]), and the orders allowing the appeal followed ([232], [238]). The reasoning on reliance is therefore the ground of decision.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Leeming JA (Mitchelmore JA and Free JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [142] (opens in a new tab)
Leeming JA’s characterisation of Scott’s case as one about an inheritance by will if Neil predeceased him is the premise on which his later analysis of reliance proceeds ([142], [197]).
Classification unresolved · Leeming JA (Mitchelmore JA and Free JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [144]–[150] (opens in a new tab)
Leeming JA determined the grounds about whether Scott reasonably understood the representations as irrevocable against the appellants, declining to interfere with the primary judge’s finding. The appeal was nonetheless allowed on the independently dispositive failure to establish reliance ([205]), so a plain ratio label would overstate the part this determination played in the orders.
Obiter · Leeming JA (Mitchelmore JA and Free JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [215] (opens in a new tab)
Leeming JA said it is to say the least arguable that an estoppel as to a testamentary promise is subject to the family provision powers, and added that it was not necessary to reach a firm conclusion and better not to. The remark is not needed for the orders.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Leeming JA (Mitchelmore JA and Free JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [97] (opens in a new tab), [154]–[159] (opens in a new tab)
Leeming JA identified difficulties with the requirement but said in terms that the Court’s orders were not affected by the outcome of ground 2 and that it was best not to decide it ([160]). The observations are not necessary to the result, and the Court did not depart from Kramer v Stone.
Why does this case matter?
A case that is cited for an observation is easy to misreport unless the student checks which element of the claim actually decided the appeal and which Justice’s words are being relied on. This decision also has a later history in the Court of Appeal. An examiner looks for an answer that identifies the ground on which the appeal turned, attributes each statement to Leeming JA, and says how a later decision has treated them.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about promises concerning family land, work through each element of the claim and set out the facts that bear on it, noting the order in which events happened. Where the promise is about what the promisor will leave by will, say so and apply the authorities that deal with testamentary promises. Attribute each statement to the Justice who made it.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, which does not bind the High Court and is persuasive outside New South Wales. The judgment mentions s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) as the basis of Scott’s alternative claim for family provision; check the current provision before relying on it in a problem.
Check your understanding
1. How did the primary judge’s orders treat Fairfield and the devise of the house to Scott, and what did the appellants not challenge ([8], [13])?
2. Which two things did the primary judge rely on to find reliance, and what did Leeming JA say about the dates of the representations the primary judge had found ([190], [194]-[196])?
3. What did Leeming JA say about Scott’s case compared with Giumelli v Giumelli ([201])?
4. What did Leeming JA say was the critical step of reliance, and when did it occur ([202])?
5. How did Leeming JA characterise Scott’s case as run at first instance, and what did he say about the primary judge’s finding on whether Scott’s reliance was reasonable ([142], [150])?
6. What did the joint majority judgment in Kramer v Stone say at [36]-[37], and what did Leeming JA say about it at [154] and [158] ([153], [154], [158])?
7. Why did Leeming JA say it was best not to decide ground 2 ([160])?
8. What orders did the Court make about Scott’s claims and costs ([238])?