Penya v Penya

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2026

Equity And TrustsEstoppel

Penya v Penya [2026] NSWCA 73

A daughter says her parents told her, in loose family talk over many years, that the business and the house would be hers if she worked in the business without pay. How definite must such talk be before equity treats it as a promise?

What happened?

Paula-Marie Penya was the only child of Paul and Therese Penya ([2]). Paul applied under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) to have trustees appointed to sell the family home at Eastlakes, which he and Therese held as tenants in common, and Paula-Marie brought separate proceedings seeking a constructive trust over the home and an accounting remedy in respect of the proceeds of sale of the family real estate business, which her parents had sold in September 2018 ([1], [2], [7]). She founded her claim principally on proprietary estoppel, alleging that from about March 1996 her parents had made promises about what would happen to the business and the home if she worked in the business without remuneration, and that she had worked there for many years to her detriment in reliance on them ([9]).

The primary judge, Williams J, accepted that Paul and Therese intended Paula-Marie to inherit the whole of their estates and that there were many conversations to that effect ([11]), but found that no clear and unequivocal promise had been made that she would receive the business or the home during her parents’ lifetimes ([13]). Her Honour accepted that Paul had said in March 1996 that Paula-Marie would get the business when he retired, but did not regard that as a clear and unequivocal promise that she would be given ownership on his retirement, as opposed to the opportunity to step up into the role of principal licensee ([22]).

She added that, even if the requisite clarity had been shown, she would have dismissed the claim because Paula-Marie had not relied on any promise to her detriment ([18]). Kramer v Stone had been decided after final submissions but before judgment ([18]). Paula-Marie appealed on 14 grounds, of which grounds 1 to 9 were grouped under the heading of the clear and unequivocal promise ([27], [28]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Bell CJ, Mitchelmore JA and Adamson JA) dismissed the appeal with costs, on a hearing of 24 February 2026 and orders of 29 April 2026 ([74], [75], [76]). Bell CJ rejected the challenge to the primary judge’s credibility assessments (ground 13) and each of the grounds directed to the primary judge’s findings about the promises, and dismissed ground 8 ([36], [37]-[40], [41]-[69]). He said that grounds 10 and 11, on reliance and detriment, did not strictly arise, that the findings on those matters were open to the primary judge and that ground 11 must also fail, and he dismissed grounds 12 and 14 as contingent ([70]-[73]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Ground 8 was that the primary judge applied “too high a standard” for a clear and unequivocal promise ([37]). Bell CJ, with whom Adamson JA agreed ([76]), said that Paula-Marie appeared to accept that the expression accurately stated an element of a claim based on proprietary estoppel but to contend that the element had a variable content, and that the phrase derives directly from the plurality in Kramer at [37]. He noted that the plurality appeared to treat Kramer as a case of proprietary estoppel although the authorities cited for that element derived from promissory estoppel cases ([37]).

He then referred to Leeming JA’s identification, in Kronenberg v Macaulay at [158], of nine reasons why there are arguably some difficulties in accepting that, in a case of proprietary estoppel by encouragement from a promise, the promise must be clear and unequivocal ([38]). His Honour said: “There is much to be said for Leeming JA’s observations in Kronenberg although his Honour did not ultimately need to pursue the point in that case (see at [160]) and the same may be said in the present case because of Paula-Marie’s failure on other grounds.” He continued that “it does appear that the plurality in Kramer has determined” that a clear and unequivocal promise is required to found a proprietary estoppel, or at least such an estoppel based upon representations, “with the consequence that that decision must be followed in this Court” ([38]).

Paula-Marie relied on Trentelman v The Owners - Strata Plan No 76700 at [120], where it was said that an equitable estoppel can be established although the expectation is based on a promise that would not be certain enough to be a valid contract, or is formed on the basis of vague assurances ([39]). Bell CJ said that, to the extent the passage referred to vague assurances, it “cannot, in my view, sit with Kramer and should not be followed to this extent” ([39]).

He concluded that the primary judge “cannot be criticised for employing the language endorsed in Kramer”, especially because the plurality appeared to treat Kramer as a case of proprietary estoppel, that her Honour did not apply too stringent a test, and that ground 8 must be dismissed ([40]). On ground 2 he agreed that the statement that Paula-Marie would get the business when Paul retired was equivocal, said that unequivocal “means leaving no doubt or unambiguous”, and said that “the critical point is not what the representation in fact meant but that it was not unequivocal” ([44]).

Mitchelmore JA agreed with the order proposed by Bell CJ. She referred to Leeming JA’s observations in Kronenberg at [151]-[160], with which she had agreed, and said: “Leeming JA did not need to decide the issue in that case, and nor need it be decided in the present case”, the factual substratum not having been established. She agreed with the Chief Justice that the primary judge cannot be criticised for employing the language endorsed in Kramer at [37], and otherwise agreed with his reasons for dismissing the appeal ([75]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Bell CJ, Adamson JA agreeing

Read judgment: [37] (opens in a new tab), [40] (opens in a new tab), [44] (opens in a new tab)

Bell CJ dismisses ground 8 because the primary judge cannot be criticised for using the language endorsed in Kramer and did not apply too stringent a test ([40]), and dismisses ground 2 because the statement relied on was equivocal ([44]). These are the grounds of decision on those grounds of appeal; Adamson JA agrees with Bell CJ ([76]) and Mitchelmore JA agrees that the language of Kramer at [37] cannot be criticised ([75]).

Classification unresolved · Bell CJ, Adamson JA agreeing

Read judgment: [38]–[39] (opens in a new tab)

Bell CJ says that the plurality in Kramer has determined the clear and unequivocal promise requirement so that Kramer must be followed in this Court ([38]), and that the vague assurances passage in Trentelman cannot sit with Kramer ([39]). They answer Paula-Marie’s reliance on Trentelman and support the dismissal of ground 8 ([40]), but he also says that Leeming JA’s point in Kronenberg need not be pursued in this case because the appellant failed on other grounds ([38]), Mitchelmore JA says the issue need not be decided ([75]), and the appeal also failed on the findings of fact. A single ratio or obiter label would hide that.

Separate reasoning · Mitchelmore JA

Read judgment: [75] (opens in a new tab)

Mitchelmore JA concurs in the order and agrees that the primary judge cannot be criticised for employing the language of Kramer, but says that the issue Leeming JA did not need to decide in Kronenberg need not be decided in this case; she otherwise agrees with Bell CJ’s reasons for dismissing the appeal.

Why does this case matter?

A New South Wales problem about a family promise can lead a student to the High Court, to Kronenberg, to Trentelman or to this case, and an answer that treats them as interchangeable misreports what a court of each level has said. Examiners reward the answer that attributes each statement to the Justice who made it and says how firmly that Justice put it.

Exam and application relevance

Penya is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Within New South Wales it binds the courts below it, and it is persuasive in other jurisdictions and does not bind the High Court. This account goes no further than the judgment of 29 April 2026; later treatment of Kramer’s promise element, of Kronenberg and of Trentelman should be checked before it is relied on.

In a problem where a claimant says that family members gave assurances over many years, set out what was said, to whom and when, and ask what each statement could be taken to mean, as Bell CJ did with the March 1996 statement about the business ([14], [22], [44]). When stating Penya, attribute the statements about Kramer and Trentelman to Bell CJ, with whom Adamson JA agreed, and the statement about the issue Leeming JA left undecided in Kronenberg to Mitchelmore JA, and keep apart what the Court said about the promise element from what it said about the primary judge’s findings of fact ([36], [41]-[43]).

Check your understanding

1. What did Paula-Marie say, in ground 8, that the primary judge had done wrong, and what did Bell CJ say she appeared to accept about the expression clear and unequivocal promise ([37])?

2. Where did Bell CJ say that expression derives from, and what did he note about the authorities the plurality in Kramer cited for it ([37])?

3. What did Bell CJ say about Leeming JA’s observations in Kronenberg, and why did he say the point need not be pursued in this case ([38])?

4. What did Bell CJ say about the vague assurances passage in Trentelman at [120] ([39])?

5. What did Mitchelmore JA say about the issue Leeming JA did not need to decide in Kronenberg ([75])?

6. What did Bell CJ say unequivocal means, and what did he say was the critical point about the March 1996 statement ([44])?