Commonwealth v Verwayen

High Court of Australia · 1990

Equity And TrustsEstoppel

Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; [1990] HCA 39

The Commonwealth told an injured sailor it would admit liability and not plead the time bar. Months later, with his damages hearing approaching, it changed its mind. Was it free to do so, and if not, what was he owed?

Clarified by Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; [1999] HCA 10

In Giumelli v Giumelli the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ, with which Kirby J agreed, rejected an argument that Verwayen confines relief for an equitable estoppel to reversing the claimant’s detriment: Verwayen is not authority for any such curtailment ([33]), and its reasoning does not foreclose, as a matter of doctrine, an order requiring the promised land to be conveyed ([48]).

Clarified by Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19; (2014) 251 CLR 505

In Sidhu v Van Dyke the joint reasons of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, with which Gageler J agreed, said that in some cases the value of the promise may not be the just measure of relief, quoting Deane J’s observation in Verwayen about cases where the potential damage to the estopped party is disproportionately greater than any detriment to the other ([83]), but held that where the unconscionable conduct consists of resiling from a promise which induced detrimental conduct, the relief necessary is usually that which reflects the value of the promise ([85]). Sidhu therefore supplies the usual measure that Verwayen’s divided bench did not.

What happened?

On 10 February 1964 HMAS Voyager and HMAS Melbourne collided near Jervis Bay. Mr Verwayen was serving on the Voyager and claims to have been injured. For years after the collision, legal opinion was influenced by obiter remarks of Windeyer J in Parker v The Commonwealth that a member of the armed forces could not recover for the negligence of another member in the course of duty; this Court disapproved those remarks in Groves v The Commonwealth in 1982 (Mason CJ).

Mr Verwayen sued the Commonwealth in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 2 November 1984, long after the limitation period had expired. In 1983 the Commonwealth had told the solicitors of another Voyager survivor, Mr Palmer, that it would not rely on the limitation statute, and in September 1984 the same solicitors asked it to “treat these men the same and waive the Statute” for Mr Verwayen and four others. On 25 January 1985 the Australian Government Solicitor advised that the Commonwealth proposed to admit liability and waive the statute.

Its defence of 14 March 1985 admitted negligence and did not plead the limitation defence. It joined in applications for an expedited hearing of damages, and on 27 November 1985 a Minister wrote to Mr Verwayen that “the Commonwealth has admitted negligence and is not pressing the statutory limitation period as a defence” (Mason CJ; Toohey J; Gaudron J; McHugh J).

The Commonwealth then changed its policy. Shortly before the damages hearing, it obtained leave to amend its defence to deny negligence, to plead that no duty of care was owed to servicemen engaged in combat exercises, and to plead the limitation statute. O’Bryan J entered judgment for the Commonwealth. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Kaye and Marks JJ, King J dissenting) allowed Mr Verwayen’s appeal, holding the Commonwealth estopped from relying on the limitation statute, and remitted the action for trial on negligence and damages.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the Commonwealth’s appeal with costs, by four Justices to three. Seven Justices wrote seven sets of reasons. The Full Court’s order stood, so the action was remitted for trial; Dawson J, speaking for the majority on this point, said that if Mr Verwayen amended his reply, the trial would proceed as an assessment of damages only.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

The four Justices in the majority agreed on the result but not on why. Deane J and Dawson J held the Commonwealth estopped. Toohey J and Gaudron J held that it had waived the two defences by renouncing them in the course of the litigation, which for them required no proof of detriment: “Detriment is not an essential attribute of waiver” (Toohey J).

The Justices who reasoned through estoppel differed about detriment. Deane J said the detriment Mr Verwayen would suffer “could not be measured in terms merely of wasted legal costs. The past stress, anxiety, inconvenience and effort which were involved in the pursuit of the proceedings would be rendered futile.” Dawson J said “the real detriment” was that Mr Verwayen was induced “to allow the litigation to proceed for more than a year without taking any steps to bring it to a conclusion by way of settlement or, if necessary, withdrawal”, and that the equity “could only be accounted for by the fulfilment of the assumption”.

The minority saw the detriment as costs, or as compensable loss: for Mason CJ, holding the Commonwealth to its representations “would be a disproportionate response to the detriment suffered”; for Brennan J, “The relevant detriment does not consist in a loss attributable merely to non-fulfilment of the promise”; for McHugh J, any equity “can be satisfied by means less drastic”.

On the measure of relief, there is no majority statement. Mason CJ said “equitable estoppel will permit a court to do what is required in order to avoid detriment to the party who has relied on the assumption induced by the party estopped, but no more”, which in appropriate cases will require “that the party estopped be held to the assumption created, even if that means the effective enforcement of a voluntary promise”, and that “there must be a proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid”.

Brennan J said “The remedy is not designed to enforce the promise although, in some situations (of which Waltons Stores v. Maher affords an example), the minimum equity will not be satisfied by anything short of enforcing the promise.” McHugh J said a court of equity “will only require the promise or assumption to be fulfilled if that is the only way in which the equity can be fulfilled”. Deane J started from the other end: “Prima facie, the operation of an estoppel by conduct is to preclude departure from the assumed state of affairs.

It is only where relief framed on the basis of that assumed state of affairs would be inequitably harsh, that some lesser form of relief should be awarded.” Dawson J said “To avoid the detriment may, however, require that the party estopped make good the assumption”, though “the relief required may be considerably less”. Gaudron J, who found it unnecessary to decide the point, noted her agreement with Mason CJ that the doctrine “does not, in every case, require the making good of the assumption”.

Why does this case matter?

Remedy is where estoppel answers most often lose marks: a student states a single test for relief, attributes it to “the High Court” and applies it. An examiner who knows Verwayen will expect the source and subsequent treatment of a passage to be explained.

The case also matters to any problem in which a party gives assurances about how it will conduct litigation and then changes course late. Verwayen is the High Court’s treatment of that situation, and a student who has not read it tends to deal with it as a question about amending pleadings and nothing more.

Exam and application relevance

When you state the measure of relief for an equitable estoppel, start from the later cases and use Verwayen for the range of views it contains, naming each Justice. Before using a passage about relief, identify its author, its role in that Justice’s reasoning and its treatment in later authority. If your facts involve a promise made in or about litigation, use the features the Justices in the majority relied on: an express assurance given in answer to a request, conduct confirming it over many months, joint applications for an expedited hearing, and a late change of position.

Verwayen also did not settle whether there is a single doctrine of estoppel. Mason CJ and Deane J each argued for one; Dawson J treated estoppel at common law and in equity as different in role, McHugh J found it unnecessary to decide, and Toohey J thought it inappropriate to formulate a subsuming principle in that case.

Check your understanding

1. What did the Commonwealth say and do between January and November 1985, and which of those steps did the majority rely on?

2. Which Justices decided the appeal on estoppel, which on waiver, and which would have allowed it?

3. How does Deane J’s starting point for relief differ from Brennan J’s, and how did each describe the relevant detriment?

4. What did Giumelli v Giumelli later say about whether Verwayen limits relief to reversing the detriment?