Equitable estoppel: reliance, detriment and remedy

How equitable estoppel is proved and satisfied: who bears the burden of proving reliance, when an induced assumption made a difference, and how the High Court has measured the relief that follows.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
equity-and-trusts
Topics
estoppel, equitable-remedies

Learning outcomes

  • State who bears the legal burden of proving reliance in an equitable estoppel claim, and prove reliance from the evidence rather than presuming it.
  • Apply the causation question of whether the induced assumption made a difference to what the claimant did or did not do.
  • Argue the measure of relief by naming the reasons relied on, rather than treating Commonwealth v Verwayen as a single holding.
  • Explain when a court will award a money sum instead of the promised property, and what that sum measures.

An equitable estoppel claim is won twice. Once the assumption and the inducing conduct are identified, two questions decide the case: did the claimant actually act on the assumption, and what will a court order if they did? Australian law answers the first by proof rather than presumption, and the second by a discretion that, in a promise case, usually starts from the promise. These are general principles of Australian equity, stated by the High Court of Australia and binding in every Australian jurisdiction. For the varieties of estoppel and its elements, see Estoppel.

Reliance is a fact, not a presumption

The claimant bears the legal burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct induced the conduct relied on, and that legal burden does not shift. In Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 194 the New South Wales Court of Appeal had applied a “presumption of reliance”. The High Court dismissed the appeal but rejected that reasoning. In the joint reasons of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, with which Gageler J agreed, “[r]eliance is a fact to be found; it is not to be imputed on the basis of evidence which falls short of proof of the fact”, and to speak of a shifting onus of proof “is both wrong in principle and contrary to authority”.

Their Honours added that speaking of an evidentiary onus on the defendant risks distraction from the required analysis. Inference from the whole of the evidence does the work a presumption would otherwise do.

Did the assumption make a difference?

Gageler J, agreeing, added one observation on causation. The induced belief need not be the sole or predominant cause of what the claimant did, but it must be a contributing cause, which means more than holding the belief and taking it into account. The claimant had to establish that having the belief “made a difference” — that she would not have acted as she did without it. There is no real detriment if the claimant would have been in the same position anyway. Within Sidhu that framing is Gageler J’s; the joint reasons did not put it in those words.

It is no longer only his. In Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 485 the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ — a majority of four, Gleeson J dissenting, the appeal dismissed — made it the third element of an equitable estoppel arising by encouragement from a promise, citing Sidhu: “[i]n order to establish reliance, it is ordinarily necessary for the promisee to show not merely that the promise was one factor taken into account in motivating the promisee’s action or omission but that the promisee would not have acted or omitted to act in the absence of the promise”, so that it must usually be shown that the promisee’s reliance “made a difference to [the promisee] taking the course of action or inaction”. So attribute the counterfactual to the majority in Kramer, and cite Gageler J in Sidhu for where it came from.

The measure of relief divided the Court

In Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 3942 the appeal was dismissed with costs by four Justices to three, and Dawson J recorded that of those four, Toohey and Gaudron JJ decided on waiver while Deane J and he decided on estoppel. This is where naming the judge matters most.

Deane J, who was for dismissal and decided on estoppel, said that prima facie an estoppel by conduct operates to preclude departure from the assumed state of affairs, and that “[i]t is only where relief framed on the basis of that assumed state of affairs would be inequitably harsh, that some lesser form of relief should be awarded”.

Mason CJ held instead that equitable estoppel permits a court “to do what is required in order to avoid detriment to the party who has relied on the assumption induced by the party estopped, but no more”, though in appropriate cases that requires holding the party estopped to the assumption, even if that enforces a voluntary promise. Brennan J framed the question as the minimum equity needed to avoid the relevant detriment, the remedy not being designed to enforce the promise though sometimes nothing less will satisfy it. Both of those Justices were in the minority on the result, which is why the detriment-limited view cannot be presented as what Verwayen decided. Gaudron J, for dismissal on waiver, agreed with Mason CJ that the doctrine does not in every case require making good the assumption, but did not decide the point.

Nor can Verwayen be used as a ceiling. Exactly that argument was run in Giumelli: the appellants said an order for conveyance “went beyond any ‘reversal’ of the detriment” and “claim[ed] decisive support from the decision in Verwayen”. The joint reasons answered that “in our view and consistently with the course of Australian authority since Verwayen, that decision is not authority for any such curtailment of the relief available in this case”, and that its reasoning “does not foreclose, as a matter of doctrine”, an order of the kind the Full Court had made.3 Verwayen has not been overruled; it simply does not state the measure.

What a court does with the discretion

In Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 3871 Brennan J said the object of the equity “is not to compel the party bound to fulfil the assumption or expectation” but to avoid the detriment that non-fulfilment would occasion, and that in moulding its decree the court “goes no further than is necessary to prevent unconscionable conduct”. Mason CJ and Wilson J said that holding a representor to the representation “is merely one way of doing justice between the parties”. The order left standing there was damages in lieu of specific performance, not a lease.

In a promise case that latitude usually runs out at the promise. The joint reasons in Sidhu held that where the unconscionable conduct consists of resiling from a promise that has induced conduct to the other party’s detriment, “the relief which is necessary in this sense is usually that which reflects the value of the promise”. One limit was accepted: had the claimant been induced to make only a relatively small, readily quantifiable monetary outlay, it might not be unconscionable to resile on condition that the outlay be reimbursed.

Kramer puts those two poles together, and shows that “avoid the detriment” is not a presumption in favour of the smaller order. The joint reasons make detriment the fourth element and say that “it is the existence of detriment arising from reasonable reliance upon an unfulfilled promise that completes the recognition of the estoppel and moulds the remedial response”, the relief being “moulded accordingly to prevent th[e] detriment”. Where the detriment is “a relatively small, readily quantifiable monetary outlay on the faith of the [defendant’s] assurances”, the likely relief is, apart from interest, compensation in the amount of that outlay. But where it “involves life-changing decisions with irreversible consequences of a profoundly personal nature”, “the likely equitable relief will be to require fulfilment of the assumption upon which the plaintiff acted, such as by a conveyance of rights, or an assessment of the monetary value of the assumption”.5 Preventing the detriment can therefore require giving the claimant the expectation.

Why the order may not be the promised property

A claimant who establishes the value of the promise may still not receive the property. In Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 1013 the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ, with which Kirby J agreed, held that before a constructive trust is imposed a court should first decide whether there is an appropriate equitable remedy falling short of imposing a trust, and that before ordering a conveyance of promised land the court must consider all the circumstances of the case. These included a pending partnership action, improvements by other family members, and a brother living on the land who was not a party. The conveyance reflected the claimant’s prima facie entitlement, but qualification was needed to avoid injustice to others and relief beyond what conscience required, so the relief became a money sum charged on the property.

These considerations change the form of the relief, not its measure. In Sidhu no transfer was ordered, because of the effect on the promisor’s wife as co-owner, and the relief upheld was equitable compensation measured by the disappointed expectation.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the assumption and the inducing conduct, then ask what evidence proves the claimant acted on it. Do not presume reliance.
  2. State that the claimant carries the legal burden throughout, and build the inference from the evidence as a whole, not from the promise alone.
  3. Ask the counterfactual the majority adopted in Kramer: would this claimant have done the same thing anyway? Cite Kramer, and Sidhu (Gageler J) for its origin.
  4. Describe the detriment at the moment of departure, and whether money can readily measure it.
  5. Argue the measure of relief expressly, naming the judge relied on.
  6. Ask whether a third party or competing claim makes the promised property the wrong form of order, and if so convert the measure into money.

Where the authority sits

Case law, and High Court case law; no statute governs. Where a point comes from Verwayen, cite the Justice and say whether that Justice was in the majority on the result: the fullest statements of the detriment-limited measure there are from Justices who would have allowed the appeal. The later decisions do what the divided bench did not — Giumelli on the form of the order, Sidhu on proving reliance and the measure, and Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48 on the elements and on how detriment moulds the remedy. Giumelli and Kramer are also the answer to a Verwayen-based submission that relief can go no further than reversing the reliance detriment.

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