Consideration, variation and part payment

How consideration operates when an existing obligation is varied: part payment of a debt, a promise to pay more for the same performance, and where equitable estoppel can and cannot stand in for consideration.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
contract-formation

Learning outcomes

  • Apply the part-payment rule in Foakes v Beer to a promise to accept less than a debt, and identify what would take the promise outside it.
  • Distinguish a promise to pay more for performance already owed that is supported by a practical benefit from one that is not, and say what Australian status that reasoning has.
  • Choose between fresh consideration, a deed and equitable estoppel as the route to enforcing a variation, and explain why estoppel does not replace consideration.

This article examines English decisions on part payment and variation, which are persuasive only in Australia, alongside a High Court decision on equitable estoppel that binds every Australian court. The sources cited here do not establish how Australian appellate courts have treated the English consideration rules, so those rules must be checked before they are stated as Australian law. The earlier article on consideration asks whether a new promise is supported by something given in exchange; this one takes the harder setting, where the parties already have a contract or a debt and one of them promises something further. Before asking whether the variation is binding, a student must first ask what the party seeking to enforce it is giving that they were not already bound to give. The answer decides whether fresh consideration, a deed or equitable estoppel is the route, and each fails for a different reason.

Part payment of a debt

The rule is that a creditor’s promise to accept less than the whole of a debt that is already due is not supported by consideration from a debtor who pays only the lesser sum. In Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605,1 the House of Lords applied it to a judgment debtor who paid £500 on account and was promised that no proceedings would be taken on the judgment if the rest of the principal and costs were paid by instalments. The dispute was about the interest that the judgment carried. The Earl of Selborne LC held that the debtor was already bound to pay the whole debt, so neither the initial payment nor the later instalments of the principal and costs were consideration for the creditor’s promise to relinquish that interest.

Foakes v Beer is an English decision. It is persuasive only in Australia, and the sources cited here do not establish how Australian appellate courts have treated it since, so a student should check before stating it as Australian law.

The case also shows what takes a part payment outside the rule. A promise under seal in full satisfaction binds without consideration, and that was described as beyond controversy. The rule as quoted from Pinnel’s Case concerns a lesser sum paid on the day. Lord Coke, as quoted in the speeches, said that a lesser sum paid before the day or at another place than the condition limits, and received by the creditor, is a good satisfaction, and Lord Blackburn said that the authorities are that a horse valued at £500, in place of the £500 in money paid there, would have been a good satisfaction of the larger debt, and quoted Lord Coke’s report of Pinnel’s Case that a thing of that kind may be more beneficial to the creditor than money. The Earl of Selborne LC said the benefit that a creditor gets from being paid part of a debt that might otherwise be withheld, or lost in the debtor’s insolvency, is not the kind of benefit that counts; it must be some independent benefit. Lord Blackburn assented to the result, but said that he thought Lord Coke had made a mistake of fact about commercial practice in stating the rule.

Promising more for what is already owed

The mirror image is a promise to pay more for performance the other party already owes. The traditional rule, associated with Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, is that performing or promising to perform an existing contractual duty is not consideration for the extra promise.

Williams v Roffey Brothers & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 52 qualified that rule. A main contractor promised a sub-contractor extra money to finish carpentry work the sub-contractor was already bound to do. Glidewell LJ set out when the promisor’s practical benefit can be consideration:

  • the promisor has reason to doubt that the other party will complete performance;
  • the promisor promises an additional payment in return for that performance;
  • the promisor in practice obtains a benefit or avoids a disbenefit; and
  • the promise was not given as a result of economic duress or fraud.

On those conditions Glidewell LJ held that the benefit is capable of being consideration, and he said the rule in Stilk v Myrick is refined and limited rather than overruled. Purchas LJ and Russell LJ gave separate reasons. Russell LJ said he would have welcomed argument that the defendants were estopped from relying on the want of consideration, which was not before the court.

Williams v Roffey Brothers is an English Court of Appeal decision and is persuasive only in Australia. The sources cited here do not establish what Australian appellate courts have said about it, so do not present it as the law of any Australian jurisdiction without checking. The contrast with Foakes v Beer is worth drawing: a practical benefit of getting some money from a debtor was not enough in Foakes v Beer, while a practical benefit of securing completion of a building contract was held capable of being enough in Williams v Roffey Brothers. The duress condition connects the topic to the law of economic duress, which is a separate ground of challenge.

Estoppel is a different route

Where consideration fails, a student’s next question is whether equitable estoppel supplies another route. In Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387,3 the High Court held, by a decision that binds every Australian court, that a party who stood by while the other relied on the assumption that a contract would be made was estopped from retreating from its implied promise to complete it, although no contract had been concluded.

Estoppel does not replace consideration. Mason CJ and Wilson J described the orthodox case of promissory estoppel as one where a promisor promises not to enforce an existing right, and observed that estoppel tends to occupy ground left vacant by the constraints on consideration. They also said that mere reliance on an executory promise, resulting in the promisee changing position or suffering detriment, does not bring promissory estoppel into play, and that something more would be required. Brennan J said that equitable estoppel does not elevate non-contractual promises to the level of contractual promises, and that the doctrine of consideration is not blown away by a side-wind.

Brennan J explained why: equitable estoppel calls for the enforcement of a promise only as a means of avoiding the detriment, and only to the extent necessary to achieve that object. Mason CJ and Wilson J said that equitable estoppel has its basis in unconscionable conduct rather than in making good representations. Either way the inquiry is about unconscionable departure and detriment, not about bargain, and the sources cited here do not establish how the other judgments in the case measure relief. In Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19, a proprietary estoppel case about a promise of land, the joint reasons of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ quoted Brennan J’s statement in Waltons Stores and said that where the unconscionable conduct consists of resiling from a promise that induced detrimental conduct, the relief necessary is usually that which reflects the value of the promise, so Brennan J’s limit should not be read as a rule that relief is compensation for the detriment.4 The sources cited here do not establish how other later cases measure relief.

Choosing the route

As an organising framework, and not as an exhaustive statement of the routes Australian law recognises, this article considers three possible routes to enforcing a variation:

  • fresh consideration, which requires something new to be given in exchange, such as a different benefit, or on the English approach a practical benefit;
  • a deed, which binds without consideration;
  • equitable estoppel, which requires a relied-on assumption and detriment and gives relief that depends on avoiding that detriment.

The sources cited here do not establish the Australian law of accord and satisfaction, so there may be other routes. The three considered here fail for different reasons. A variation that fails for want of consideration may still be enforced through estoppel, but only if the other party relied on the assumption to their detriment and departure from it would be unconscionable. A variation obtained by pressure may have consideration and still be challenged for duress.

Where the authority sits

The High Court’s decisions in Waltons Stores v Maher and, on the one point about relief, Sidhu v Van Dyke are the binding authorities relied on here. The rules on part payment and on practical benefit are drawn from English decisions, which are persuasive only in Australia. The earlier article on consideration states the general rules, and the article on estoppel states the equitable doctrine in more detail.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the original obligation and the promise that varies it, and who is trying to enforce the variation.
  2. Ask what the party enforcing it gives that they were not already bound to give. If the answer is part payment of a debt then due, identify the Foakes v Beer issue, say that the case is English and persuasive only, and check Australian authority before treating its rule as governing.
  3. If the variation is a promise to pay more for the same performance, ask whether the promisor obtained a practical benefit, and flag that Williams v Roffey Brothers is English and persuasive only.
  4. Check for a deed, and check whether the variation was obtained by economic duress or fraud.
  5. If consideration fails, ask whether the other party relied on the promise to their detriment and whether it is unconscionable for the promisor to depart from it, applying Waltons Stores v Maher, and state that Brennan J treated relief as limited to what is needed to avoid the detriment.

Self-check

  • Have I identified what was already owed before asking whether anything new was given?
  • Have I said that Foakes v Beer and Williams v Roffey Brothers are English decisions, persuasive only in Australia?
  • Have I treated estoppel as a separate inquiry rather than as a substitute for consideration?

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