Foakes v Beer
Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605
A judgment creditor made a written agreement not to take proceedings while the debtor paid off the judgment sum in instalments. He paid the principal in full. Was she bound to forgo the interest the judgment had also been earning?
What happened?
Julia Beer had obtained a judgment against Dr John Weston Foakes for 2,090 pounds 19 shillings, the aggregate of the principal debt and costs for which judgment had been entered (Selborne LC). The judgment carried interest at 4 per cent from the time of entering up until it was satisfied, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 s 17, and the interest amounted to 113 pounds 16 shillings 2 pence at the date of the agreement (Lord FitzGerald).
On 21 December 1876 the parties made a written memorandum of agreement. The recitals recorded that Dr Foakes had asked Mrs Beer for time in which to pay the judgment. Her agreement was that she would not take any proceedings whatever on the judgment if 150 pounds was paid in every half year until the whole of the sum of 2,090 pounds 19 shillings was fully paid and satisfied. On signing, 500 pounds was to be paid on account of the debt, and the rest of the principal was to follow in the half-yearly instalments (Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn). Dr Foakes paid the principal to the last farthing, and interest of about 350 pounds remained in issue (Lord FitzGerald).
Dr Foakes contended that the agreement meant that, once the sums were paid, the judgment for the sum and interest should be treated as satisfied; Mrs Beer contended that time had been given on those conditions but the interest had not been forgiven at all (Lord Blackburn). The courts below had agreed on the construction of the memorandum (Selborne LC), and the appeal to the House of Lords was from the Court of Appeal.
What did the Court decide?
The House of Lords gave its opinions on 16 May 1884, after taking time for consideration. The Earl of Selborne LC moved that the order appealed from be affirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs. Lord Blackburn assented to the judgment proposed. Lord Watson and Lord FitzGerald each said that the judgment appealed from ought to be affirmed. Four opinions were delivered.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
The Earl of Selborne LC held that Mrs Beer’s promise, in a written agreement not under seal, to take no proceedings on the judgment so long as 150 pounds was paid every half year, so far as it relinquished the interest the judgment carried, was not enforceable because Dr Foakes gave no consideration for it. The only consideration expressed on the face of the agreement was a present payment of 500 pounds on account of the larger debt then due and payable by law under the judgment; Dr Foakes did not contract to pay the later instalments and gave no new security; and he was under an antecedent obligation to pay the whole debt, so that payment of the residue of the principal at deferred dates, by the creditor’s forbearance, could not be consideration for relinquishing interest and discharging the judgment unless the 500 pounds was.
The Lord Chancellor relied on the doctrine, reported by Coke in Pinnel’s Case, that payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater cannot be satisfaction of the whole, which he said had never been judicially overruled and had been accepted as law since the sixteenth century. He noted that an acquittance under seal in full satisfaction would be valid, and that the later cases relied on for the appellant (Sibree v Tripp, Curlewis v Clark and Goddard v O’Brien) proceeded on the distinction that by giving negotiable paper or otherwise there had been some new consideration, distinct from mere money payments in or towards discharge of the original liability.
The Lord Chancellor and Lord Blackburn construed the agreement, as the courts below had, as a conditional relinquishment of the interest; Lord Watson and Lord FitzGerald construed it as giving time to pay the principal and no more, but each held that, if the agreement did relinquish the interest, the relinquishment was without consideration (Lord Watson: nudum pactum; Lord FitzGerald: payment of part of a judgment debt payable immediately, on which the creditor is entitled to execution, is not sufficient consideration for a promise to take no proceedings on the judgment for the residue).
The Lord Chancellor’s holding on consideration was necessary to the result on the construction he adopted; for Lord Watson and Lord FitzGerald it was an alternative ground, which Lord FitzGerald said was not actually necessary on his construction.
The Earl of Selborne LC, Lord Watson and Lord FitzGerald declined to overrule the doctrine in Pinnel’s Case. The Lord Chancellor framed the question as whether the House was prepared not only to overrule the doctrine stated by Coke but to treat as binding a prospective agreement, not under seal, for satisfaction of a debt by a series of payments on account to a total less than the whole, provided the payments were regularly made; he did not think the House would do right to reverse, as erroneous, a judgment proceeding upon a doctrine accepted as part of the law of England for 280 years.
Lord Watson said it was unnecessary to consider whether the House could overrule the doctrine, because he was not prepared to disturb it. Lord FitzGerald said that the resolution in Pinnel’s Case had never been overruled, that it was not now within the province of the House to overturn the law accepted for a great length of time, and that he concurred with Lord Blackburn that it would have been wiser and better if that resolution had never been come to.
Lord Blackburn thought that Coke’s statement that a lesser sum can never be a satisfaction of a greater was not necessary to the decision in Pinnel’s Case, that it was originally a mistake of fact because prompt payment of part of a demand may be more beneficial to a creditor than insisting on the whole, and that the question was open in the House; he had written reasons to that effect, but because they were not satisfactory to the other Lords who heard the case he did not repeat or persist in them.
The Lord Chancellor said, as an observation that was not necessary to the decision, that it would be an improvement in the law if a release of the whole debt on payment of any sum the creditor was content to receive were generally binding though not under seal, but that he thought it impossible, without refinements which practically alter the sense of the word, to treat such a release as supported by new consideration from the debtor.
This is an English House of Lords decision, persuasive only in Australia. In Option Holdings Pty Ltd v Guo [2025] NSWCA 70, an appeal about an alleged oral agreement of accord and satisfaction, Bell CJ, with whom Payne JA and McHugh JA agreed, referred to the primary judge’s point that, even if such an agreement had been reached, it would not have been supported by consideration, the payment relied on not amounting to consideration, it being hornbook law that part payment of a debt is not good consideration; the Court of Appeal cited Foakes v Beer for that point as an alternative reason for dismissing the first ground of appeal.
A promisee who relied on a promise to accept less may also have a separate equitable route in Australia: Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 observed that promissory estoppel tends to occupy ground left vacant by the constraints affecting consideration, and Brennan J said that the doctrine of consideration is not blown away by a side-wind. Other later English and Australian treatment of the rule may exist.
Why does this case matter?
A common mistake is to answer a problem about a creditor who promises to accept less than a debt by asking whether the arrangement was generous or commercially sensible. An examiner is testing whether the student can identify what each side gave and what each side was already bound to do.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the promise said to be enforceable, what the promisee gave for it, and whether the promisee was already bound to give that; then say whether the promise was made by deed. Keep the question whether the promise is enforceable as a contract separate from the question whether another doctrine gives the promisee relief.
Because the decision is English, state the Australian authority if you rely on the rule. Attribute each point to the Law Lord who made it: the Earl of Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn, Lord Watson or Lord FitzGerald. The report gives no paragraph numbers, so cite the Law Lord and not a paragraph.
Check your understanding
1. What was the sum for which Mrs Beer had obtained judgment, and what did she promise in the memorandum of 21 December 1876 (Selborne LC)?
2. What statute gave the judgment its interest, and at what rate (Lord FitzGerald)?
3. What did Dr Foakes pay on signing the memorandum, and how was the rest of the principal to be paid (Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn)?
4. Which earlier case, reported by Coke, did the Lord Chancellor treat as the source of the doctrine in issue, and for how long did he say it had been accepted as law?
5. How did Lord Watson and Lord FitzGerald read the memorandum, and what did each go on to consider?
6. Why did Lord Blackburn not repeat or persist in the reasons he had written, and what did he do?