Equitable estoppel: reliance, detriment and remedy
Reliance is a fact, not a presumption
In equitable estoppel claims, the claimant must prove the defendant’s conduct actually caused their reliance. This is called the “legal burden of proof”, and it stays with the claimant throughout.
In Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19, the High Court rejected using a “presumption of reliance”. A lower court had assumed reliance could be presumed, but the High Court said reliance must be proved as a fact, not assumed.
The High Court also said it is wrong to treat the burden of proof as shifting to the defendant. Instead, courts should look at all the evidence to decide whether reliance actually happened.
Did the assumption make a difference?
In Sidhu, Gageler J (agreeing with the joint reasons) made a separate point about causation. The induced belief does not need to be the sole or main cause of what the claimant did. But it must be a contributing cause, meaning more than just holding the belief and considering it.
Gageler J said the claimant must show the belief “made a difference”. This means she would not have acted as she did without it. If she would have done the same thing anyway, there is no real detriment (a loss or disadvantage suffered by relying on the belief).
This “made a difference” test was Gageler J’s own framing in Sidhu. The joint reasons in that case did not state it this way.
In Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48, this idea became part of the main test. The joint reasons of four judges (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ) formed the majority; Gleeson J dissented, and the appeal was dismissed.
The majority made this the third element needed to prove an equitable estoppel arising by encouragement from a promise. Citing Sidhu, they said it is usually not enough that the promise was just one factor in the promisee’s decision. The promisee generally must show they would not have acted, or failed to act, without the promise.
So the “made a difference” test should now be attributed to the majority in Kramer v Stone. But its origin lies in Gageler J’s reasoning in Sidhu.
The measure of relief divided the Court
In Commonwealth v Verwayen, the High Court dismissed the appeal four to three. Dawson J noted that two of the four decided the case on waiver, not estoppel, so only two judges in the majority actually decided it on estoppel.
Deane J, one of those two, said estoppel normally gives relief based on the full assumed state of affairs. He said a lesser remedy is only appropriate if full relief would be “inequitably harsh”.
Mason CJ took a narrower approach. He said equitable estoppel gives only enough relief to avoid detriment, no more, though sometimes that still means holding the other party to the promise. Brennan J agreed, asking what minimum relief was needed to avoid detriment. But both were in the minority on the result, so this narrower view is not what Verwayen actually decided. Gaudron J agreed with the general idea but did not decide the point.
The case Giumelli later confirmed this. A party argued Verwayen capped the relief available. The Court rejected this, holding Verwayen does not limit the remedies open to a court. Verwayen remains good law, but it does not fix the measure of relief for estoppel.
What a court does with the discretion
Courts have discretion when fixing the remedy for equitable estoppel (a doctrine stopping someone going back on an assumption they caused another to rely on, to their detriment). In Waltons Stores, judges said the goal is to prevent unconscionable conduct, not force the promise to be kept. There, the court awarded damages instead of ordering a lease.
But in promise cases, courts usually give relief reflecting the value of the promise itself, as Sidhu held. One exception applies: if the claimant’s reliance was just a small, easily calculated expense, repaying that expense may be enough.
Kramer combines these ideas. Detriment (the harm suffered from relying on the unfulfilled promise) shapes the remedy. For small, quantifiable outlays, compensation for that amount is the likely result.
But where the detriment involves major, irreversible personal decisions, courts are likely to make the promise good. This might mean transferring the promised rights, or valuing them in money. Preventing the detriment can therefore mean giving the claimant what they were promised.
Why the order may not be the promised property
Even if a claimant proves what the promise was worth, they may not get the actual property.
In Giumelli v Giumelli, the court said this. Before imposing a constructive trust (a court-ordered interest in property), a court should first check if a lesser remedy will do.
Before ordering that promised land be transferred, the court must weigh all the circumstances. In that case, these included a pending partnership dispute, improvements made by other family members, and a brother living on the land who was not party to the case.
The claimant was prima facie entitled to the land, meaning entitled unless other factors changed this. But the court held that giving the full property would harm others and give more than fairness required. So the remedy became a money sum secured against the property, instead of the land itself.
This matters for the form of relief, not its measure. The amount owed can stay the same even if what the claimant receives changes.
In Sidhu, no transfer of property was ordered, because the promisor’s wife was a co-owner and would be affected. Instead, the court awarded equitable compensation (a money remedy), measured by the value of the disappointed expectation.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by identifying the assumption the claimant held, and the conduct that induced it. Then ask what evidence proves the claimant actually relied on it. Reliance is never presumed.
The claimant carries the legal burden of proving this throughout. Build the inference of reliance from the evidence as a whole, not from the promise alone.
Apply the counterfactual test adopted by the majority in Kramer. A counterfactual test asks what the claimant would have done without the promise. The question is whether the claimant would have acted the same way anyway. This test traces back to Gageler J in Sidhu.
Describe the detriment as it stood at the moment the claimant changed position. Consider whether money can readily measure that detriment.
State clearly what remedy you are arguing for, naming the judge whose approach you rely on.
Finally, check whether a third party, or a competing claim, makes the promised property an unsuitable remedy. If so, convert the remedy into a monetary equivalent instead.
Where the authority sits
This area has no statute. The rules come entirely from case law, including High Court cases.
Verwayen is one such case. But its support for a “detriment-limited” measure (relief capped at reversing the reliance detriment, no more) is weaker than it looks.
That fuller statement of the detriment-limited measure came from Justices who were actually in the minority. They would have allowed the appeal, but the majority did not agree with them on that outcome.
Later cases filled the gap the divided Verwayen bench left open. Giumelli addressed the form of the order a court makes. Sidhu dealt with proving reliance and measuring it. Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48 covered the elements of the doctrine and how detriment shapes the remedy.
If someone argues, based on Verwayen, that relief can never exceed reversing the reliance detriment, Giumelli and Kramer answer that argument.
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