Negligence: the professional standard and the duty to warn
How breach is measured for a professional: the common law standard and Rogers v Whitaker, the peer professional opinion provisions in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, the carve-out for warnings, and the material risk test.
Learning outcomes
- State the common law standard of care for a person with a special skill, and explain why peer practice is relevant but not the whole of it.
- Compare the peer professional opinion provisions of the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland civil liability statutes, and identify when each does not apply.
- Apply the Rogers v Whitaker material risk test to a failure-to-warn claim, keeping the authority of each judge’s reasons in view.
A complaint against a professional can be about what the professional did, or about what the professional failed to tell the client, and the law measures breach differently for each. This article sets the common law standard, as the High Court has stated it, beside the peer professional opinion provisions of the civil liability statutes of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, and then turns to the warning claim that each of those provisions leaves at least partly outside its reach. The statutes of the other states and territories are not covered here and may differ. The general breach framework is in Negligence: breach and the standard of care; duty, causation and remoteness are separate questions.
The common law standard: skill, but not peer practice alone
The standard of care for a person with a special skill is that of the ordinary skilled person exercising and professing to have that skill. In Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 4791 the joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ added that “that standard is not determined solely or even primarily by reference to the practice followed or supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession or trade”. The patient, Maree Whitaker, had been almost totally blind in her right eye for many years. She had surgery on that eye by Christopher Rogers, an ophthalmic surgeon, and then lost the sight of her left eye to sympathetic ophthalmia. The Court recorded that there was no question the operation was conducted with the required skill and care. Liability rested on a failure to warn of that risk, and the appeal was dismissed.
The surgeon argued that the English Bolam principle should decide the case: a doctor is not negligent if the doctor acts in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion. The Court rejected that argument as applied to the provision of advice and information. The joint reasons separated two questions:
“Whether a medical practitioner carries out a particular form of treatment in accordance with the appropriate standard of care is a question in the resolution of which responsible professional opinion will have an influential, often a decisive, role to play; whether the patient has been given all the relevant information to choose between undergoing and not undergoing the treatment is a question of a different order.”
Gleeson CJ, describing Rogers in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 4342 at [7], said that “the relevance of professional practice and opinion was not denied; what was denied was its conclusiveness.” Gaudron J, in separate reasons in Rogers, said that in her view there was no legal basis for limiting liability by the Bolam test even in diagnosis and treatment, though it might be a convenient statement of the approach dictated by the state of the evidence in some cases. That is one Justice’s view. Rogers concerned a doctor, and this article does not say how far its treatment of advice extends to other professions.
The statutory peer professional opinion provisions
The three statutes cited each provide that, where the conditions are established, a professional is not liable, not negligent or does not breach a duty in providing a professional service. The core condition is that the professional acted in a manner that, at the time the service was provided, was widely accepted by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. In each, differing widely accepted opinions do not prevent any one of them being relied on, and an opinion need not be universally accepted to be widely accepted. The provisions are:
- New South Wales, Civil Liability Act 2002 s 5O3: the practice must be widely accepted “in Australia by peer professional opinion”; the opinion cannot be relied on if the court considers it irrational.
- Victoria, Wrongs Act 1958 s 594: the practice must be widely accepted in Australia by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field; the opinion cannot be relied on if the court determines it is unreasonable, and the court must then give written reasons, except where a jury decides the matter.
- Queensland, Civil Liability Act 2003 s 225: the practice must be widely accepted by peer professional opinion by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field; the opinion cannot be relied on if the court considers it irrational or contrary to a written law.
The tests are therefore close but not identical, so a student states the words of the jurisdiction’s own section. The sections are framed by what “is established”; this article does not address who bears the onus on each condition. On the wording of the sections, where a provision applies and its conditions are established, the statute itself states the consequence, which is a different operation from the common law position above, where peer opinion bears on the standard as influential evidence of it.
The carve-out for warnings
Each statute removes at least some warning claims from its peer opinion provision, but in different words:
- New South Wales: s 5P provides that Division 6, which contains s 5O, does not apply to liability arising in connection with giving or failing to give a warning, advice or other information “in respect of the risk of death of or injury to a person” associated with the professional service.
- Victoria: s 60 provides that s 59 does not apply to liability arising in connection with giving or failing to give a warning or other information “in respect of a risk or other matter” where this is associated with the professional service.
- Queensland: s 22(5) provides that s 22 does not apply to liability arising in connection with giving or failing to give a warning, advice or other information “in relation to the risk of harm to a person” associated with the professional service.
The three formulations differ in the kind of risk or matter they name, and a problem involving advice about something other than risk to a person needs the words of the section, not a general rule that warnings are excluded.
Two of the statutes cited also say something about the warning duty itself. Queensland s 21(1) provides that a doctor does not breach a duty to warn of risk before treatment or advice involving a risk of personal injury unless the doctor fails to give, or arrange to be given, information that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would require to make a reasonably informed decision, or information that the doctor knows or ought reasonably to know the patient wants. It is framed in different words from the Rogers test, and whether the two operate identically is not established by the sources cited here. Victoria s 50 provides that a person owing a duty to give a warning or other information satisfies it by taking reasonable care in giving it. What other New South Wales provisions bear on a warning claim is not established by the sources cited here.
Material risk
The joint reasons in Rogers (at 490) stated the common law duty:
“The law should recognize that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. This duty is subject to the therapeutic privilege.”
One way to organise this test is as two limbs, one measured by a reasonable patient and one by the particular patient. In Rogers the trial judge found that the patient had “incessantly” questioned the surgeon, including about complications, and the joint reasons added that it could be argued the risk was also material on the first limb.
Rosenberg raises the application of the test, but it is not a clear authority on breach. The surgeon’s appeal was allowed on causation, Gleeson CJ said it was unnecessary to decide breach ([3]), and the Justices’ views on breach differ: Gummow J concluded the risk was not material ([82]), while Kirby J concluded the Full Court did not err on the lack of warning ([146]-[152]). The remarks below are those of individual Justices, not reasons of the Court. Gleeson CJ, in his own reasons, said that Rogers explained materiality but that “the practical application, in a given case, of the concepts of warning, and risk, may raise difficult issues for judgment” ([13]), and warned that litigation sees conduct “through the prism of hindsight” ([16]). Gummow J, in his own reasons, said that where a plaintiff sues in negligence for an injury suffered, the relevant risk is the possibility that the treatment will result in the injury that in fact occurred ([61]); that severity and likelihood are considered together, so that “A slight risk of a serious harm might satisfy the test, while a greater risk of a small harm might not” ([77]); that the second limb gives weight even to unreasonable fears if the practitioner was or should have been aware of them ([79]); and that the test “is somewhat lower than” showing the patient would not have had the treatment ([80]). Whether a warning would have changed the patient’s decision is causation, dealt with in Negligence: causation.
Applying this in a problem question
- Classify the complaint: skill in diagnosis or treatment, or a failure to give a warning or information.
- Fix the jurisdiction and read the words of its peer opinion section; only the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland sections are set out here.
- For a skill complaint, state the ordinary skilled person standard, then ask whether the statutory peer opinion conditions are established and whether the court can disregard the opinion on the statute’s own ground. At common law the joint reasons in Rogers describe peer opinion as having an influential, often a decisive, role on treatment, though Gaudron J would not apply Bolam even there.
- For a warning complaint, check whether the carve-out in that jurisdiction’s wording takes the claim outside the peer opinion section. If it does, that section does not itself decide the claim; look next to the common law material risk test and to any provision of that jurisdiction stating the warning duty (Queensland s 21 and Victoria s 50 were read; none was established for New South Wales).
- State the risk as the injury that occurred, then apply the Rogers material risk test, noting that the weighing remarks in Rosenberg are Gummow J’s, in his own reasons.
- Keep causation separate.
Self-check
- Have I said which statute I read, and not stated its words as the law of another jurisdiction?
- Have I attributed each remark from Rosenberg to the Justice who made it, and said the appeal was decided on causation?
- Have I kept the Rogers statement as a common law one, and not claimed it construes any statute?