Rogers v Whitaker
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479
A patient almost blind in one eye questioned her surgeon about the operation he proposed. He did not mention a rare risk that it could cost her the sight of her good eye. Some of his colleagues would not have mentioned it either.
Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5O-5P
In New South Wales the two questions this case separates now sit on different footings. For the treatment side, s 5O(1) provides that a professional “does not incur a liability in negligence arising from the provision of a professional service if it is established that the professional acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice”, subject to s 5O(2): peer opinion “cannot be relied on ... if the court considers that the opinion is irrational”. For warnings, s 5P provides that the Division “does not apply to liability arising in connection with the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning, advice or other information in respect of the risk of death of or injury to a person associated with the provision by a professional of a professional service”. So in a New South Wales claim about a failure to warn of such a risk, the peer-opinion defence is not available and the common law material-risk inquiry is the place to start; in a claim about the treatment itself, s 5O must be dealt with. Outside New South Wales, find and read whatever provision the jurisdiction you are answering on has before relying on either half of this case.
What happened?
Maree Whitaker had been almost totally blind in her right eye since a penetrating injury at the age of nine, but had led a substantially normal life. In 1983, preparing to return to paid work, she had an eye examination, and was referred on to the appellant, Christopher Rogers, an ophthalmic surgeon. After examining her for the first time on 22 May 1984, he advised that an operation on the right eye would not only improve its appearance but would probably restore significant sight to it. She agreed to surgery at a second consultation about three weeks later, and the operation was performed on 1 August 1984 (joint reasons).
There was no improvement in the right eye. Instead she developed sympathetic ophthalmia in the left eye and ultimately lost all sight in it, leaving her almost totally blind. The evidence was that the condition occurred about once in 14,000 such procedures, with the chance slightly greater where, as here, there had been an earlier penetrating injury to the eye operated on. It was not in question that the operation itself was performed with the required skill and care (joint reasons).
As the joint reasons record the trial judge’s findings, she had “incessantly” questioned the surgeon about possible complications, was keenly interested in the outcome including the danger of accidental interference with her good left eye, and on the day before the operation asked whether something could be put over her good eye to protect it. She did not ask specifically whether an operation on the right eye could affect the left. The surgeon’s evidence was that the condition “was not something that came to my mind to mention to her”. There was evidence from reputable practitioners on both sides: some would not have warned her of the risk, others would have.
As the joint reasons record the proceedings below, Campbell J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales rejected all the heads of negligence alleged save the failure to warn of sympathetic ophthalmia, and gave judgment for $808,564.38; the Court of Appeal (Mahoney, Priestley and Handley JJA) dismissed the surgeon’s appeal on liability and damages. He appealed to the High Court on breach of duty and causation.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed with costs. There were two sets of reasons, a joint judgment of five Justices and the separate reasons of Gaudron J, who agreed in the dismissal. The joint reasons rejected the surgeon’s argument on breach of duty. His notice of appeal also challenged the concurrent finding that Mrs Whitaker would not have had the operation if warned, but his counsel made no submissions in support of it, so the joint reasons found “no occasion to deal with this ground of appeal”. The judgment for Mrs Whitaker stood.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
In the joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ, the standard of care for a person with a special skill is “that of the ordinary skilled person exercising and professing to have that special skill”, but that standard “is not determined solely or even primarily by reference to the practice followed or supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession or trade”. Their Honours rejected the Bolam principle for the provision of advice and information: “while evidence of acceptable medical practice is a useful guide for the courts, it is for the courts to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of care”.
In treatment, responsible professional opinion “will have an influential, often a decisive, role to play”; whether the patient was given all the relevant information to choose “is a question of a different order”. The rule they stated: “The law should recognize that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.
This duty is subject to the therapeutic privilege.” Gaudron J agreed with the joint reasons save for her own comments, which went further: in her view there is no legal basis for limiting liability by the Bolam test even in diagnosis and treatment.
Why does this case matter?
Because the surgeon’s evidence looked like a complete defence: the operation was performed with proper skill, and respectable colleagues said they would have kept the same silence. Problem questions on professional negligence are often built the same way, and the answer turns on identifying exactly what the plaintiff says the defendant did wrong.
It also corrects the vocabulary students reach for. The joint reasons said the phrase “informed consent” is apt to mislead because it suggests a test of the validity of the patient’s consent, and that an allegation that inherent risks were not disclosed “can only found an action in negligence and not in trespass”. A failure-to-warn problem is therefore framed in negligence, and causation has to be proved as in any negligence claim.
Exam and application relevance
Begin by identifying precisely what the defendant is said to have done or failed to do: the conduct of the procedure, or what the patient was told before choosing it. In New South Wales that also decides which provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) are engaged.
On a failure to warn, gather the facts that bear on the risk from both directions: how serious and how likely it was, what the patient stood to lose, and anything the patient said or did that told the practitioner what mattered to them. Mrs Whitaker’s questions and her request that something be put over her good eye are the kind of fact that last item looks for. Then consider whether anything on your facts could support therapeutic privilege, and note that Gaudron J, as at present advised, saw no basis for a privilege not grounded in medical emergency or in the patient’s ability to receive, understand or evaluate the information.
Deal with causation separately: the plaintiff must still show that the failure to warn caused the harm, and Rogers itself did not decide how that is proved.
The case concerned a surgeon and a patient. If your facts involve another kind of adviser, say that you are reasoning from the joint reasons by analogy.
Check your understanding
1. What did the trial judge find about Mrs Whitaker’s questions, and what had she not asked?
2. According to the joint reasons, what role does responsible professional opinion play in deciding whether treatment met the standard of care, and why is the question of information “of a different order”?
3. State the two limbs of the joint reasons’ test of a material risk. Which limb do the trial judge’s findings about Mrs Whitaker’s questions engage?
4. On what points did Gaudron J go further than the joint reasons?
5. Why did the High Court not decide whether the failure to warn caused Mrs Whitaker’s loss?
6. In New South Wales, which statutory provision would a defendant rely on in a claim about the way a procedure was performed, and why does that provision not answer a claim about a failure to warn?