Rosenberg v Percival
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434
A patient suffered lasting jaw pain after surgery and said that, had she been warned of the risk, she would never have had it. The trial judge did not believe her. Could an appeal court overturn his finding?
Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
In New South Wales, for a claim to which Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies, s 5D(3) provides that if it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who suffered harm would have done if the negligent person had not been negligent, the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, but that any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about what he or she would have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her interest. Section 5E provides that in proceedings relating to liability for negligence the plaintiff always bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation. The subjective question the Justices describe is therefore kept by s 5D(3)(a), but s 5D(3)(b) restricts the evidence the court may receive of a patient’s own statement about what she would have done.
What happened?
Dr Percival was an experienced nurse with a doctorate in nursing who had suffered a worsening malocclusion for some years ([168]-[169]). She consulted Dr Rosenberg, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, and on 23 April 1993 he recommended orthognathic surgery, an osteotomy ([168], [171]). It is common ground that he did not advise her of risks, specific or general, of temporomandibular joint problems following that surgery ([171]). He performed a sagittal split osteotomy on 6 December 1993, and she then suffered severe temporomandibular joint complications, including chronic pain, and a second operation on 25 February 1994 produced no reported relief ([48], [106], [173], [177]).
She sued in negligence. The trial judge, Gunning DCJ, found that Dr Rosenberg performed both operations with the required skill and care and was not negligent in not warning her, and he dismissed her action ([49]-[50]). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia allowed her appeal, declared that Dr Rosenberg was in breach of his duty to warn her and ordered a new trial on the remaining issues ([2], [200]-[205]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Full Court and ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed, with the respondent to pay the costs of the appeal to the High Court and before the Full Court ([18], [224]). Each of the five Justices gave separate reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
All five Justices held that the Full Court should not have set aside the trial judge’s finding that the patient, if warned of the risk of temporomandibular joint complications, would have gone ahead with the surgery, and the appeal was allowed on that ground (Gleeson CJ at [3], [17]; McHugh J at [23], [46]; Gummow J at [91]-[92], [98]; Kirby J at [159], [162], [166]; Callinan J at [220], [223]). The trial judge’s finding rested on his adverse view of the patient’s credibility and on objective matters, including her training and experience as a nurse, her wish for the best result and the very slight risk (Gleeson CJ at [17]; Gummow J at [51], [91]; Callinan J at [223]).
McHugh J said that “a court asks whether this patient would have undertaken the surgery”, that “The test is a subjective test”, and that “what a reasonable person would have done is not conclusive”, although it will almost always be the most important factor in deciding whether the patient’s evidence is accepted ([24]). He added that “The onus is on the patient to prove that he or she would have decided not to have the operation if given a warning of the risk of harm”, and that where the patient’s own evidence is rejected it is unlikely that she will succeed unless the objective evidence in her favour is very strong ([45]).
Gummow J also described the question as “whether the particular patient would not have had the treatment had a warning been given” ([87]) and agreed with McHugh J on the limits of appellate review of a finding based on credibility ([92]). Kirby J was “not persuaded that this Court should now adopt a variant of the objective standard” ([157]) and said that restraint is required in reversing such findings on appeal, unless the case falls into an exceptional category ([159], [162]-[164]).
Gleeson CJ said that a failure-to-warn claim is judged after a risk has eventuated, and that the context in which the risk was evaluated before the surgery may be an important part of the context in which a trial judge considers causation ([14]-[16]).
The Court did not decide whether Dr Rosenberg breached his duty to warn, and no majority stated a conclusion on it. Gleeson CJ said it was unnecessary to decide the first issue ([3]); McHugh J said that, whether or not the Full Court was correct in reversing the trial judge on breach of duty, it erred on causation ([23]); and Callinan J did not have to express a final opinion on two matters he seriously doubted, namely whether what happened was a material risk of which the patient had to be warned and whether there was any absence of reasonable care in not warning her ([220]).
The Justices who dealt with the point reached different views in their own reasons. Gummow J applied the two limbs of the test of material risk in Rogers v Whitaker, said that it is not necessary to show that the patient would not have had the treatment had she been warned, because “The test is somewhat lower than that” ([80]), and concluded that the risk was not material and that the Full Court erred in holding otherwise ([81]-[82], [98]). Kirby J would have held that the warning fell short of what Rogers required and that the primary judge erred ([146]-[152]).
Gleeson CJ described Rogers v Whitaker as denying not the relevance of professional practice and opinion but “its conclusiveness”, and said that in an action by a patient “the responsibility for deciding the content of the doctor’s duty of care rests with the court” ([7]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · McHugh J
Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [45] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [46] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
The subjective question and the patient’s burden of proof supply the basis for McHugh J’s decision on causation. Once her testimony was rejected, the objective evidence was insufficient to establish that she would have refused surgery, and the limits of appellate review prevented the Full Court from overturning the trial finding. These passages explain the ground on which he allowed the appeal; they do not classify every observation in the five separate judgments.
Proposition 2
Obiter · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [7] (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ explains that professional opinion is relevant but does not conclusively determine the doctor’s duty. This is his explanation of Rogers v Whitaker, offered after expressly leaving breach undecided because causation disposed of the appeal. It is therefore an observation unnecessary to his ground of decision in Rosenberg, rather than a holding that this doctor breached his duty.
Separate reasoning · Gummow J
Read judgment: [80]–[82] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab), [98] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)
Gummow J concurs in allowing the appeal, but separately decides that the risk was not material as well as finding error on causation. His distinction between materiality and proof that a warning would have changed the patient’s decision supports that additional ground in his own reasons. It is not a majority holding on breach: the other judgments do not collectively adopt this route.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [147]–[152] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab), [165] (PDF p 64) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurs in allowing the appeal on causation while reaching the opposite conclusion from Gummow J on breach. He considers the warning inadequate and the Full Court correct on that issue, but holds that no exception justified overturning the credibility-based causation finding. His breach analysis is unnecessary to the order he supports and is not a dissent from the result or a holding of the Court on breach.
Why does this case matter?
Rosenberg is a later High Court decision on a failure-to-warn claim of the kind in Rogers v Whitaker, and the risk in using it is attributing a remark to the wrong place in the judgments. Check which Justice you are quoting and which issue the passage was written on.
Exam and application relevance
Name the Justice and paragraph for each statement you rely on, and attribute any remark about Rogers v Whitaker to the Justice who made it. Match each statement you use to the issue the problem raises, using the facts the problem gives.
The decision states the common law position in 2001. In New South Wales, for a claim within Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002, check ss 5D(3) and 5E. Section 5P provides that the Division containing the peer professional opinion provision in s 5O does not apply to liability arising in connection with giving or failing to give a warning, advice or other information about the risk of death or injury associated with a professional service.
Check your understanding
1. What did Dr Rosenberg not tell Dr Percival, and what did the trial judge find she would have done if he had ([171], [50])?
2. On which issue did Gleeson CJ say the appeal should succeed, and what did he say about the first issue ([3])?
3. According to McHugh J, what question does a court ask about a patient who was not warned, and is what a reasonable person would have done conclusive ([24])?
4. What did Gleeson CJ say Rogers v Whitaker denied about professional opinion ([7])?
5. Which two Justices reached different conclusions on whether the risk was one the patient had to be warned of, and where ([82], [146]-[152])?