Rosenberg v Percival

High Court of Australia · 2001

TortsNegligence

Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434

A patient suffered lasting jaw pain after surgery and said that, had she been warned of the risk, she would never have had it. The trial judge did not believe her. Could an appeal court overturn his finding?

Qualified by legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

In New South Wales, for a claim to which Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 applies, s 5D(3) provides that if it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who suffered harm would have done if the negligent person had not been negligent, the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, but that any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about what he or she would have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her interest. Section 5E provides that in proceedings relating to liability for negligence the plaintiff always bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation. The subjective question the Justices describe is therefore kept by s 5D(3)(a), but s 5D(3)(b) restricts the evidence the court may receive of a patient’s own statement about what she would have done.

What happened?

Dr Percival had worsening jaw problems. Dr Rosenberg recommended surgery but didn’t warn her of joint risks. Surgery caused severe complications; a second operation didn’t help. She sued. The trial judge found no negligence, including no duty to warn breach. The Full Court disagreed on the warning, ordering a new trial.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Full Court and ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed, with the respondent to pay the costs of the appeal to the High Court and before the Full Court ([18], [224]). Each of the five Justices gave separate reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

All five Justices agreed on one point. The Full Court should not have overturned the trial judge’s finding. That finding was: the patient would have had the surgery even if warned of the joint risk. The appeal succeeded on this ground.

The trial judge relied on the patient’s credibility, her nursing background, her wish for the best outcome, and the very slight risk involved.

McHugh J said the test for causation is subjective. It asks what this patient would have done, not a reasonable person. The patient bears the onus of proving she would have refused surgery if warned. If her own evidence is rejected, she will rarely succeed unless objective evidence strongly supports her.

Gummow J agreed, framing it as whether this particular patient would have refused treatment. He agreed appellate courts should rarely disturb such credibility-based findings.

Kirby J rejected adopting an objective standard here. He said appellate courts should show restraint, absent exceptional circumstances.

Gleeson CJ noted failure-to-warn claims are judged after the risk has eventuated. Pre-surgery context may matter to the trial judge’s causation finding.

The Court did not decide whether Dr Rosenberg breached his duty to warn. No majority reached a conclusion on that issue.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McHugh J

Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [45] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [46] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

The subjective question and the patient’s burden of proof supply the basis for McHugh J’s decision on causation. Once her testimony was rejected, the objective evidence was insufficient to establish that she would have refused surgery, and the limits of appellate review prevented the Full Court from overturning the trial finding. These passages explain the ground on which he allowed the appeal; they do not classify every observation in the five separate judgments.

Proposition 2

Obiter · Gleeson CJ

Read judgment: [7] (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab)

Gleeson CJ explains that professional opinion is relevant but does not conclusively determine the doctor’s duty. This is his explanation of Rogers v Whitaker, offered after expressly leaving breach undecided because causation disposed of the appeal. It is therefore an observation unnecessary to his ground of decision in Rosenberg, rather than a holding that this doctor breached his duty.

Separate reasoning · Gummow J

Read judgment: [80]–[82] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab), [98] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)

Gummow J concurs in allowing the appeal, but separately decides that the risk was not material as well as finding error on causation. His distinction between materiality and proof that a warning would have changed the patient’s decision supports that additional ground in his own reasons. It is not a majority holding on breach: the other judgments do not collectively adopt this route.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [147]–[152] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab), [165] (PDF p 64) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J concurs in allowing the appeal on causation while reaching the opposite conclusion from Gummow J on breach. He considers the warning inadequate and the Full Court correct on that issue, but holds that no exception justified overturning the credibility-based causation finding. His breach analysis is unnecessary to the order he supports and is not a dissent from the result or a holding of the Court on breach.

Why does this case matter?

Rosenberg is a later High Court decision on a failure-to-warn claim of the kind in Rogers v Whitaker, and the risk in using it is attributing a remark to the wrong place in the judgments. Check which Justice you are quoting and which issue the passage was written on.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.