Negligence: the professional standard and the duty to warn
The common law standard: skill, but not peer practice alone
If a person claims a special skill, the law judges them against an ordinary skilled person with that skill.
In Rogers v Whitaker, the High Court said this standard does not rest solely, or even mainly, on what a responsible body of professional opinion accepts. This is different from the Bolam principle, under which a doctor is not negligent if a responsible body of medical opinion supports their practice.
The patient in that case was already blind in one eye. Surgery by Dr Rogers caused her to lose sight in her other eye, through a rare complication. The surgery itself was skilfully performed. The surgeon was liable only because he failed to warn her of that risk.
The Court drew a distinction. Whether treatment meets the proper standard of care is a question where professional opinion plays an influential, often decisive, role. But whether a patient got enough information to choose whether to have treatment is a different kind of question. Professional opinion does not control that second question.
In a later case, Rosenberg v Percival, Gleeson CJ explained Rogers this way: professional opinion remains relevant, but it is not conclusive.
Justice Gaudron, in her own reasons in Rogers, went further. She thought there was no legal basis for applying the Bolam test even to diagnosis and treatment, though it might sometimes usefully describe the evidence. This was her own view, not the view of the full Court.
Rogers v Whitaker concerned a doctor. The article does not say whether its approach to advice applies to other professions.
The statutory peer professional opinion provisions
These three statutes give professionals a defence. If the conditions are met, the professional is not liable, not negligent, or does not breach a duty.
The core condition: the professional acted as was widely accepted by peer professional opinion as competent practice, at the time. Opinions can differ without stopping reliance on one view, and it need not be universally accepted, just widely accepted.
In New South Wales, Civil Liability Act 2002 s 5O[^cite:nsw-cla-2002-ss-5o-5p] requires the practice be widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion. Courts can reject it if irrational.
In Victoria, Wrongs Act 1958 s 59[^cite:vic-wrongs-act-1958-ss-50-57-60] requires acceptance by a significant number of respected practitioners in Australia. Courts can reject unreasonable opinions, giving written reasons, unless a jury decides.
In Queensland, Civil Liability Act 2003 s 22[^cite:qld-cla-2003-ss-20-22] requires the same “significant number of respected practitioners” test. Courts can reject opinions that are irrational or contrary to written law.
These tests are similar but not identical. Students should quote their own jurisdiction’s wording, not assume the others match.
The sections apply once their conditions “are established”; this article does not discuss who must prove this. Where a section applies and is established, the statute itself fixes the outcome. This differs from the common law, where peer opinion is only evidence relevant to setting the standard.
Material risk
Rogers sets the test for when a doctor must warn a patient of a risk. A risk is material if a reasonable patient would likely attach significance to it, or if the practitioner knew (or should have known) this particular patient would. This duty is subject to therapeutic privilege, an exception allowing non-disclosure in limited circumstances.
This creates two limbs: one based on a reasonable patient, one based on the actual patient before the doctor. In Rogers, the patient had repeatedly questioned the surgeon about complications. The joint reasons suggested this risk might also be material under the first limb.
Rosenberg discusses this test but is not clear authority on breach. The appeal succeeded on causation (a separate issue, about whether the lack of warning caused the harm), so the judges did not need to decide breach. Gummow J and Kirby J reached different views on breach, so these are individual judges’ remarks, not a ruling of the Court.
Gleeson CJ noted that applying Rogers can raise difficult judgment calls, and warned that hindsight can distort how conduct in litigation is assessed.
Gummow J made several points in his own reasons. The relevant risk is the possibility of the injury the patient actually suffered. Severity and likelihood of harm are weighed together, so a small chance of serious harm may still be material, while a larger chance of minor harm may not. The second limb can protect even an unreasonable fear, if the practitioner knew or should have known of it. Finally, this test for materiality is an easier test to satisfy than proving the patient would have refused treatment if warned.
Whether a warning would have changed the patient’s decision is a question of causation, not materiality.
Applying this in a problem question
First, work out what the complaint is about. Is it about skill in diagnosis or treatment, or about a failure to warn or inform?
Next, identify the jurisdiction. Only New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland are covered here, so read that jurisdiction’s peer opinion wording.
For a skill complaint, start with the ordinary skilled person standard. Then check whether the statutory peer opinion conditions are met, and whether the court can disregard that opinion on the statute’s own stated ground. At common law, the joint reasons in Rogers say peer opinion has an influential, often decisive, role on treatment. Gaudron J disagreed, and would not apply Bolam even to treatment.
For a warning complaint, check if that jurisdiction’s carve-out takes the claim outside the peer opinion section. If so, that section does not decide the claim alone. Then look to the common law material risk test, and to any specific warning-duty provision. Queensland s 21 and Victoria s 50 were considered; no equivalent provision was found for New South Wales.
To assess the risk, state it as the injury that actually happened. Then apply the Rogers material risk test. Note that the weighing comments in Rosenberg are Gummow J’s own reasons, not the full court’s decision.
Keep causation as a separate issue from all of the above.
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