Leases: dealings, breach and termination

How a lease is dealt with and brought to an end: the statutory qualification on a covenant against assigning or subletting, the notice a lessor must serve before forfeiting, the leases and breaches the notice regime does not reach, relief against forfeiture, and the point at which the residential and commercial tenancy statutes displace the general property legislation.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
property
Topics
leases

Learning outcomes

  • Identify the statutory qualification imposed on a covenant against assigning or subletting without consent, and determine whether the lease can exclude it in the relevant jurisdiction.
  • Apply the statutory notice requirement that precedes forfeiture, state what the notice must contain, and identify the leases and breaches the requirement does not reach.
  • Explain how relief against forfeiture is sought, who may seek it, and what a court may order.
  • Identify the point at which a residential, retail or business tenancies statute displaces the general property legislation, and the consequence for the landlord’s remedies.
  • Determine how a lease whose duration the parties did not fix is brought to an end, and state the limit contract principles place on a landlord’s damages where the tenant has not repudiated.

A validly granted lease then has a working life: the tenant may want to assign or sublet, the landlord may want to end the lease for breach, and either may want out of an arrangement whose duration nobody fixed. The prior question is not what the lease says but what the jurisdiction’s general property legislation allows the lease to say, because much of this law is imposed on the parties and a good deal of it cannot be excluded by agreement. Those statutes share a structure and diverge at points that change answers. Whether an arrangement is a lease at all is dealt with in Leases.

Where a lease forbids the tenant to assign, sublet or part with possession without the landlord’s consent, statute qualifies that prohibition. In five jurisdictions the consent is not to be unreasonably withheld: Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 133B(1)(a),1 Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 144(1),2 Property Law Act 2023 (Qld) s 142(3),6 Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 80(1)4 and Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) s 134(1)(a)(i).5 The Queensland provision states the obligation directly — “[t]he lessor must not unreasonably withhold consent” — while the other four reach it by deeming the covenant subject to a proviso to that effect. The Northern Territory provision applies only to a lease for a term of not less than one year (s 134(8)).

Four of those five, and not Queensland, also preserve the landlord’s entitlement to its consent expenses. New South Wales s 133B(1)(a) says the proviso “does not preclude the right of the lessor to require payment of a reasonable sum in respect of any legal or other expenses incurred in connection with such licence or consent”; Victorian s 144(1) preserves “the payment of a reasonable sum in respect of any legal or other expense incurred in relation to such licence or consent”, and Western Australian s 80(1) preserves the same payment in the same words except that it ends “in relation to the licence or consent”; and Northern Territory s 134(4) preserves “the payment of a reasonable sum in respect of legal or other expenses properly incurred by the lessor in connection with the licence or consent”.1245 Queensland’s s 142 confers no such entitlement: it runs from the proposal notice through the decision notice to the court application and says nothing about the lessor’s costs of deciding, so in Queensland a landlord’s claim for consent expenses has to be found in the lease, not in the section.6

Whether the parties can exclude that proviso is decided by the words of the section. The New South Wales, Queensland and Northern Territory provisions apply notwithstanding any express provision, agreement or term of the lease to the contrary, so a lease cannot displace them. The Victorian and Western Australian provisions are deemed to apply “unless the lease contains an express provision to the contrary”, so in those two jurisdictions a sufficiently drafted lease can ordinarily leave the landlord free to refuse consent unreasonably. Victoria has an exception that reverses this for one class of lease. By s 144(2), for “a lease relating to licensed premises within the meaning of the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998”, s 144(1) is read as if the words “notwithstanding any provision to the contrary” were substituted for “unless the lease contains an express provision to the contrary” — so for licensed premises the Victorian reasonableness proviso cannot be excluded, and Victoria belongs with New South Wales rather than with Western Australia. Western Australia’s s 80(1) carries no such exception.24

A second Victorian qualification sits outside the Property Law Act. Section 60(2) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) provides that “[s]ection 144 of the Property Law Act 1958 does not apply to or with respect to a retail premises lease to which this Act applies”, and s 60(1) replaces it with a closed list: a landlord “is only entitled to withhold consent to the assignment of a retail premises lease” where the proposed assignee proposes a use not permitted under the lease, where the landlord considers the proposed assignee lacks sufficient financial resources or business experience to meet the lease obligations, where the assignor has not complied with reasonable assignment provisions of the lease, or where the assignor has not given the assignee business records for the previous three years (or such shorter period as it has carried on business there) for an ongoing business. So for Victorian retail premises the question is not whether consent was unreasonably withheld but whether one of the four statutory grounds applies.23 Queensland adds a procedure: the landlord must give a decision notice within one month of receiving full particulars of the tenant’s proposal, with reasons for any conditions or for refusing, the parties may agree to extend that period (s 142(7)), and the tenant may apply to the court if the tenant believes consent has been unreasonably withheld or a condition is unreasonable, unnecessary or onerous, or if no decision notice arrives (s 142(8)).6 What makes a withholding unreasonable is a question of fact, and no decision on it is cited here.

Forfeiture: the notice that must come first

Forfeiture is the landlord’s remedy of last resort: ending the lease and recovering possession under a re-entry clause. In every Australian jurisdiction a right of re-entry or forfeiture for breach of a lease covenant is not enforceable until the landlord has served a notice specifying the particular breach, requiring the tenant to remedy it if it is capable of remedy, and dealing with compensation in money, and the tenant has then failed to comply within a reasonable time. That is the general pattern, and two things about it are jurisdiction-specific: whether compensation must be required in every notice, and whether a notice is required at all.

JurisdictionProvision
NSWConveyancing Act 1919 s 129(1)7
VicProperty Law Act 1958 s 146(1)8
QldProperty Law Act 2023 s 153(1)9
WAProperty Law Act 1969 s 81(1)10
SALandlord and Tenant Act 1936 s 1011
TasConveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 15(1)12
NTLaw of Property Act 2000 s 137(2)13
ACTCivil Law (Property) Act 2006 s 426(1)14

Compensation is required in every notice in only some of them. Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory each require the notice to demand compensation whether or not the landlord wants it: the words are “in any case, requiring the lessee to make compensation in money for the breach” (Vic s 146(1)(c); WA s 81(1)(c); Tas s 15(1); SA s 10(a)), and the Australian Capital Territory provision simply requires the notice to require “the lessee to pay compensation for the breach” (s 426(1)(a)(ii)). In three jurisdictions it is conditional on a claim: New South Wales requires it “in case the lessor claims compensation in money for the breach” (s 129(1)(c)), the Northern Territory “if the lessor claims compensation in money for the breach” (s 137(2)(c)), and Queensland “if the lessor claims an amount of reasonable compensation for the breach” (s 153(1)(a)(iii)). A notice in those three is not defective for omitting a compensation demand the landlord never made.7139

And Queensland has a case in which no notice is needed at all. Despite s 153, s 156(1) lets a lessor “exercise a right to re-enter the land under a term of the lease for breach of a term of the lease if the lessor reasonably believes the lessee has given up possession of the land”, and s 156(2) provides that a lessor re-entering on that basis need neither give a notice to remedy breach nor apply to the court for recovery of possession. The lessor must instead, as soon as practicable, notify each designated person for the lease whose name and address it knows (s 156(3)). What the subsection conditions the power on is the lessor’s reasonable belief, not the fact of the tenant having given up possession.9

Three jurisdictions depart from the pattern in other ways. Queensland’s notice must be in the approved form and must state, where the breach is capable of being remedied, that the tenant must remedy it and a reasonable period for compliance, and that the landlord intends to terminate if the tenant does not comply; re-entry must then be peaceable, or by written demand followed, if the tenant refuses, by proceedings for possession.9 In the Northern Territory a landlord must not exercise a right of re-entry and forfeiture unless authorised by a court order or the tenant has abandoned or voluntarily given up possession, so there the court order comes before the recovery of possession rather than after.13 Victoria’s section reaches furthest, extending to a right of re-entry arising by operation of law and to a breach amounting to repudiation, and providing that serving the notice for such a breach does not affirm the lease.8 Most of these sections take effect notwithstanding any contrary stipulation in the lease.

The leases and breaches the notice requirement does not reach

The exclusions reverse the answer, and they differ between jurisdictions.

  • Short leases. New South Wales, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory take a lease or tenancy of a year or less outside the notice requirement, and Queensland applies its division to a lease of not more than a year only as to an option to renew or to purchase the reversion. The Victorian, Western Australian, South Australian and Tasmanian provisions cited here contain no such exclusion.
  • Covenants against assignment. In Western Australia and Tasmania the notice requirement does not extend to a covenant against assigning, underletting, parting with possession or disposing of the land leased, so the landlord may forfeit for that breach without serving a notice.1012
  • Non-payment of rent. New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory each provide that the section does not affect the law on re-entry, forfeiture or relief for non-payment of rent. Read the Victorian and Western Australian versions closely, because each is qualified. Victoria’s s 146(12) reads “save as otherwise mentioned”, and Western Australia’s s 81(9) reads “does not except as otherwise mentioned, affect the law relating to re-entry or forfeiture or relief in case of non-payment of rent” — and s 81(4) is one of the things otherwise mentioned, because it applies where the lessor is enforcing a right of re-entry or forfeiture “(b) for non-payment of rent” and gives the Court power to vest the property in an under-lessee in that very case. New South Wales s 129(8), Tasmania s 15(7) and the Australian Capital Territory s 426(5)(e) carry no such qualification.81071214 South Australia instead gives the Supreme Court a dedicated jurisdiction to grant relief on equitable grounds in an action for recovery of land on forfeiture for non-payment of rent (s 9(1)).11 Queensland’s exclusions are defined by the type of lease and do not carve out rent.9
  • Bankruptcy and execution. Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory exclude a condition for forfeiture on the tenant’s bankruptcy or on the taking of the tenant’s interest in execution outright: WA s 81(8)(b), Tas s 15(6) and ACT s 426(5)(c) and (d).101214 Victoria does not, and the Victorian rules are two-stage. Section 146(9) disapplies the section to such a condition only where it is contained in a lease of agricultural or pastoral land, mines or minerals, a house used or intended to be used as licensed premises, a house let as a dwelling with the use of furniture, books, works of art or other chattels not in the nature of fixtures, or property whose preservation depends on the personal qualifications of the tenant or on neighbourhood to the lessor. For a lease of any other class, s 146(10) applies the section to the condition — in full “if the lessee’s interest is sold within one year from the bankruptcy or taking in execution”, and otherwise “only ... during the first year from the date of the bankruptcy or taking in execution”. So in Victoria the first question is the class of lease and the second is whether the interest was sold inside the year.8 New South Wales is different again: s 129(6)(c) and (e) exclude a condition for forfeiture on the taking in execution of the tenant’s interest, by lease class and then by the same one-year-and-sale rule, and say nothing about bankruptcy.7

Relief against forfeiture

In every jurisdiction cited here the tenant may apply to the court for relief against forfeiture, and the court may grant or refuse it as it thinks fit and on such terms as to costs, compensation or otherwise as it thinks fit.71214 South Australia puts the notice requirement and the relief jurisdiction in separate sections (ss 10 and 11), as Queensland also does (the notice in s 153, relief in ss 160 to 162), which is easy to mistake for an absence. Section 10 carries the notice requirement, and s 11 is the relief provision that goes with it: where a lessor “is proceeding by action or otherwise to enforce such a right of re-entry or forfeiture”, the tenant may apply to the Supreme Court or a judge, which “may grant or refuse relief as such court or judge, having regard to the proceedings and conduct of the parties under the last preceding section and to all other circumstances, may think fit”, on such terms as to costs, expenses, damages, compensation, penalty or otherwise as it thinks fit. Section 9(1) is a separate and narrower jurisdiction, confined to an action in the Supreme Court for recovery of land on forfeiture for non-payment of rent, where the court may give relief on equitable grounds in a summary manner.11 Sections 10 and 11 extend to a covenant against assigning, under-letting or parting with possession when the lessor’s consent has been vexatiously or capriciously withheld (s 12(4)), but they “shall not apply to Crown leases nor affect the law relating to re-entry and forfeiture for non-payment of rent” (s 12(5)).11 In New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and the Northern Territory the application is available after the landlord has re-entered without an action as well as while the landlord is suing for possession.1013 Queensland limits it, but only on one of the two routes its section provides, and the distinction is worth getting right. Section 160(2) says the application “may be— (a) an originating process; or (b) made in a proceeding brought by the lessor for recovery of possession of the land”. Section 160(3) then imposes its time limits on “[a]n application mentioned in subsection (2)(b)” alone: if the lessor has re-entered under s 156 or s 157(2)(a) the application must be made within one month after the re-entry, and if the lessor has applied to the court for recovery of possession it must be made before an order for possession is made. The court may extend the s 160(3)(a) period if it considers it appropriate (s 160(4)). So the one-month clock runs on an application made inside the landlord’s own recovery proceeding, after a re-entry under s 156 (tenant believed to have given up possession) or s 157(2)(a) (peaceable re-entry) — the section does not on its face put that deadline on an originating process under s 160(2)(a), and no authority resolving that wording is cited here.9 A sub-tenant has its own application, because forfeiting the head lease would otherwise destroy the sublease: in Victoria and Western Australia the court may vest the property in a person claiming as under-lessee for no longer a term than that person had under the original sublease, and in Queensland it may order the landlord to grant the sub-tenant a lease ending no later than the sublease would have.89

Ending a lease where there is no breach

A fixed term ends by effluxion of time. Where the parties fixed no term, the cited statutes do not supply a term; they supply rules for terminating certain tenancies whose duration was not fixed, and they do that differently. In New South Wales no tenancy from year to year is implied by the payment of rent, and where there is a tenancy but no agreement as to its duration it is deemed “to be a tenancy determinable at the will of either of the parties by one month’s notice in writing expiring at any time”, but the courts have read that as confined to cases in which a yearly tenancy would otherwise be implied from the payment of rent, so a tenancy implied from a monthly rent falls outside it.1516 The Queensland counterpart to that fact pattern is not s 176. Section 172(a) provides that a lease is a “lease terminable at will” if “the lessee is in possession of the land, although the lessor and the lessee have not agreed, expressly or impliedly, to the duration of the term of the lease”, and s 174 lets a party to such a lease terminate it by giving a termination notice “at least 20 business days before the termination day” — so Queensland’s answer to an unagreed duration is twenty business days’ notice, not a reasonable period. Section 176 is the residual rule, and a different one: it applies to a tenancy that is not periodic, not an unexpired fixed term and not one for which a notice period was agreed, and lets either party terminate on a stated day by giving a termination notice a reasonable period beforehand, reasonableness depending on all the circumstances including the nature of the tenancy and its terms.17 Division 7 of the Queensland part also “applies subject to any agreement to the contrary” (s 171).

Where the residential and commercial tenancy statutes take over

Much of the above does not govern an ordinary home. The general property legislation is displaced, to differing extents, by each jurisdiction’s residential and commercial tenancy statutes. In South Australia the Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 does not apply at all to a residential tenancy agreement (s 3A).11 Section 3A still defines those agreements by reference to the Residential Tenancies Act 1978 (SA), which the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) repealed; its text has not been updated. In the Northern Territory the displacement is provision by provision, not Part by Part. Section 114(1) provides that where “a provision of or under this Part and a provision of or under the Housing Act 1982, the Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 or the Residential Tenancies Act 1999 are capable of applying” to a lease or tenancy, the competing provision applies “and the provision of or under this Part does not apply”. The rest of the leases Part keeps working. Section 114(2) then settles the common cases by express lists: for a tenancy within the Residential Tenancies Act 1999, ss 115, 120, 121, 122, 123(1), (2) and (5), 124 to 133, 135 and 139 to 143 apply, while ss 116 to 119, 123(3) and (4), 134, 137 and 144 to 152 do not; for a lease within the Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003, ss 115 to 135, 139 to 143 and 151 apply, while ss 137 and 144 to 150 do not. So s 134 survives for a business tenancy and is switched off for a residential one, and s 137 is switched off for both.513 In Queensland the forfeiture and relief division does not apply to a housing lease, a residential tenancy, a resources lease or a State land lease.9 The contents of those statutes are not stated here; the first question in a lease termination problem is which Act governs this tenancy.

Contract principles, repudiation and the landlord’s damages

Forfeiture under the lease is not the landlord’s only route. In Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 CLR 1718 Mason J concluded that the ordinary principles of contract law, including termination for repudiation or fundamental breach, apply to leases, and that an express power to terminate in the lease is not a reason to treat the common law right as excluded, although the parties may by their contract regulate its exercise. Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed with those reasons, and Brennan and Deane JJ reached the same conclusion separately; the appeal was dismissed with costs and no judgment dissented. As a decision of the High Court of Australia it binds lower Australian courts, although the Court can reconsider its own decisions.

Brennan J added the limit that matters to the landlord’s damages. Immediately after explaining that a determined lease ends the covenant to pay rent and that mesne profits are damages for trespass rather than rent, his Honour said: “A lessor can recover damages for loss of the benefit of a lease only where the lessee has repudiated the lease before determination of the term. Such a repudiation is not necessarily established by proving a default in the payment of rent.” Note the temporal requirement — repudiation before the lease was determined, which includes an early termination, and not before the term would have run out. Wilson J’s separate observations are about whether completion of the schedule works was a condition precedent to the rent obligation; they do not contain this limit, and an answer that attributes it to him has the wrong judge.

And it is no longer the whole of the law on loss-of-bargain damages. In Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 1019 the High Court allowed the appeal and restored a judgment for loss-of-bargain damages in a case in which it “may be accepted” that “there was here no repudiation and no fundamental breach”. The joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ worked from what Mason and Wilson JJ had said in AMEV-UDC, that the limitation on recoverable loss applies to termination under a contractual right for a non-fundamental breach but “[i]t is otherwise in the case of fundamental breach, breach of an essential term or repudiation”, and recorded that Mason J in Tabali had defined “fundamental breach” to mean “breach of a condition or breach of another term or terms which is so serious that it goes to the root of the contract”. Where the lease contained “very clear words” making the covenant to pay rent an essential term and providing for loss-of-bargain damages on termination, effect was given to them. So the current position is that loss-of-bargain damages follow termination for repudiation, for fundamental breach, or for breach of an essential term — including a term the parties expressly made essential — and Brennan J’s sentence should not be quoted as an exhaustive rule.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the jurisdiction, then the Act. The general property statute, the residential tenancies statute and any retail or business tenancies statute are candidates, and the displacement provisions decide between them before any question of breach arises.
  2. Ask whether the notice provision reaches this lease and this breach. A term of a year or less takes it outside the provision in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory; the existing law on forfeiture for non-payment of rent is preserved in six jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and, through s 12(5), South Australia, whose s 9 gives its own relief for rent), with Victoria and Western Australia qualifying theirs; breach of the assignment covenant is excluded in Western Australia and Tasmania.
  3. Test the notice against the subsection: does it specify the particular breach, require remedy where the breach is capable of remedy, and deal with compensation (a demand is required whether or not the landlord means to claim it in Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, but only where compensation is claimed in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory)? In Queensland add the approved form, a stated reasonable period (where the breach can be remedied) and the statement of intention to terminate.
  4. Ask whether the landlord could re-enter without the court: in the Northern Territory not unless the tenant abandoned or voluntarily gave up possession (s 137(1)(b)); in Queensland, after a notice to remedy has gone unheeded, by peaceable re-entry, or failing that by written demand and then proceedings for possession (s 157(2)); and without a notice to remedy or the court where the lessor reasonably believes the tenant has given up possession (s 156).
  5. For a consent dispute, quote the proviso from the section, then ask whether the lease can exclude it — it cannot in New South Wales, Queensland or the Northern Territory, and it can in Western Australia and in Victoria, subject to s 144(2) for a lease relating to licensed premises, where it cannot. In Victoria check first whether the lease is a retail premises lease to which the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) applies, because s 60(2) of that Act disapplies s 144 and s 60(1) supplies its own grounds.
  6. Consider relief against forfeiture, and the sub-tenant’s separate application, and note any time limit on it.

Self-check

  • Have I named the Act, the section and the jurisdiction, rather than “the forfeiture provision”?
  • Have I checked whether a tenancies statute displaces the general property legislation here?
  • Have I asked whether the lease’s term or the kind of breach puts it outside the notice requirement in this jurisdiction?
  • Have I identified whose reasons I rely on in Tabali, given the five separate judgments?

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