Turner v York Motors Pty Ltd
Turner v York Motors Pty Ltd [1951] HCA 52; (1951) 85 CLR 55
A tenant let in pending a formal lease paid rent monthly in advance over a long period. The new owner gave one month’s notice under a statute. Did the statute reach that tenancy?
What happened?
In October 1946 the defendants, a firm of seven members, were let into possession of about one and a quarter acres of land at the intersection of Bourke Street and Botany Road, Waterloo, by Sears, the registered proprietor, as lessees or intending lessees (Dixon J at 60-62). Sears had said that he was willing to lease the land at a weekly rent but that a lease would be drawn up by his solicitor. The defendants paid rent, first weekly and then monthly, and never executed a lease (Dixon J at 62-63). They later occupied the whole five acres and paid 52 pounds a month in advance, which Sears accepted (Dixon J at 63-64).
Sears sold the land to York Motors Pty Ltd, which was registered as proprietor in October 1948 and accepted rent for a time (Dixon J at 64). It gave the defendants a notice to quit dated 21 March 1949, served on 23 March, expiring on 25 April 1949 and describing them as tenants at will, and issued a writ in ejectment on 2 May 1949 (Dixon J at 60-61; Kitto J at 87). The jury answered four questions, and Kinsella J entered judgment for York Motors. He treated the tenancy as one to which s 127 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) applied, and the Full Court of the Supreme Court took the same view (Williams J at 79).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed with costs, the order of the Full Court was discharged, and a verdict and judgment in the action were entered for the defendants (Dixon J at 77; Kitto J at 94). Williams J dissented (Williams J at 85). There were four judgments: Dixon J, Williams J, Webb J and Kitto J.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Dixon J. His Honour said that the second part of s 127(1), read alone, would govern every case in which a tenancy is implied from the payment of rent and there is no agreement as to duration, and that on a literal reading “there is much to be said for treating the second part as laying down a general rule to be applied universally”. But “unfortunately for the claimant that is not the way the provision has been read”: Burnham v Carroll Musgrove Theatres Ltd had “placed upon s. 127 (1) a construction which limits its application to states of facts in which a tenancy from year to year would at common law be implied from the payment of rent” (Dixon J at 70-71).
Here the rent “was fixed at a monthly rate as compensation for monthly periods”, so a yearly tenancy would not have been implied (Dixon J at 71). Rent paid and accepted monthly in advance for the whole area raised “a strong prima facie case in favour of a monthly tenure”, and a notice to end a monthly tenancy should expire on the day before, or perhaps on, a monthly date corresponding with that on which the tenancy began (Dixon J at 72-73).
Kitto J. His Honour said it was “settled by the decision of this Court in Burnham” that the second limb applies only to cases in which, but for the first limb, a tenancy from year to year would have been implied from payment of rent (Kitto J at 88). The payment and acceptance of a monthly rent for the whole five acres created a new monthly tenancy, to which s 127(1) “has no application”, and a month’s notice “expiring at any time” was not effective; the notice must expire at the end of a complete month of the tenancy (Kitto J at 91-92).
Webb J. His Honour agreed with Kitto J and added that “the tenancy in question is not a tenancy from year to year, and so s. 127 (1) had no application” (Webb J at 85-86).
Williams J, dissenting. His Honour also treated Burnham as deciding that s 127 has no application where no yearly tenancy would have been implied before the Act, so that notice under the section was not needed to end a tenancy at will (Williams J at 82). He dissented because he held that the defendants were let into possession pending the negotiation and execution of the lease, so that their rent payments were referable to their provisional use and occupation, and the payment of a periodical rent “is simply evidence” of a periodic tenancy and not conclusive of it (Williams J at 80-82). On that footing a demand for possession sufficed and the notice was valid.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Dixon J
Read judgment: pp 70–74 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon J adopted Burnham’s confined construction of s 127(1), then held that rent reserved for monthly periods did not imply a yearly tenancy. This excluded the statutory notice rule and was necessary to his conclusion that the monthly tenancy had not been determined.
Ratio · Kitto J; Webb J agreeing
Read judgment: pp 88–92 (opens in a new tab), pp 85–86 (opens in a new tab)
Kitto J applied Burnham’s construction to the monthly tenancy and required notice tied to a complete tenancy month. The claimant proved no basis for its chosen expiry date, so it failed to establish a right to possession. Webb J expressly agreed with Kitto J and independently applied the same reasoning at 85–86.
Separate reasoning · Williams J (dissenting)
Read judgment: pp 80–82 (opens in a new tab)
Williams J also accepted Burnham’s limit on s 127, but read the jury’s findings as leaving the defendants tenants at will pending a formal lease. On that distinct factual footing a demand for possession sufficed and the notice was effective. This supports his dissent, rather than the majority’s monthly-tenancy ground.
Classification unresolved · Dixon J; Kitto J
Read judgment: p 73 (opens in a new tab), pp 91–92 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon J required a notice tied to the monthly commencement date but qualified whether it must expire on the preceding day or could expire on that date itself. Kitto J expressly left the equivalent last-day versus first-day question open at 91–92. The necessary ground was the claimant’s failure to establish an effective expiry date, not a choice between those two dates.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Dixon J
Read judgment: pp 66–67 (opens in a new tab), pp 72–74 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon J treated the long acceptance of rent in advance, the enlarged holding and the expiry of the contemplated term as inconsistent with continuing provisional occupation at will. His application at 72–74 established a monthly tenancy and supplied the ground on which the notice failed; it does not make every payment of rent conclusive.
Ratio · Kitto J; Webb J agreeing
Read judgment: pp 89–92 (opens in a new tab), pp 92–93 (opens in a new tab), pp 85–86 (opens in a new tab)
On the reading that no binding lease agreement had been reached, Kitto J inferred a periodic tenancy and held that acceptance of the increased monthly rent for the whole area created a new monthly tenancy. That supported judgment for the tenants on this branch of his reasons. At 92–93 he also considered the alternative reading of the jury’s findings, under which an agreed three-month notice term independently defeated the claim. Webb J agreed and applied the monthly-tenancy ground at 85–86.
Separate reasoning · Williams J (dissenting)
Read judgment: pp 80–82 (opens in a new tab)
Williams J treated the rent as compensation for provisional occupation pending execution of the intended lease. He regarded periodic payment as evidence capable of being displaced by the parties’ intention and concluded that the tenancy remained at will. This was his dissenting route to upholding the notice, not a qualification adopted by the majority on these facts.
Why does this case matter?
Notice questions are easy to lose by reading the statute and stopping. This case is the reason an answer must also say what kind of tenancy the parties created and how the rent was reserved, and the dissent shows that the facts could be read the other way.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about notice to end a tenancy that has no agreed duration, identify how the tenancy arose and how the rent was reserved, and then say what kind of tenancy the common law would have implied before considering s 127(1). Name the Justice whose words you rely on and give the page ((1951) 85 CLR at the pages above).
The statutory text before the Court was s 127(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) as it stood in 1951, and the case was decided on the construction of that provision then; the current section has to be read before applying the case.
Check your understanding
1. How did Sears let the defendants into possession in October 1946, and what had been said about a lease (Dixon J at 62)?
2. What reading of s 127(1) did Dixon J say there was much to be said for, and why did he not adopt it (Dixon J at 71)?
3. Which earlier decision did Kitto J say settled the limit of the second limb (Kitto J at 88)?
4. Why was a yearly tenancy not implied on these facts (Dixon J at 71; Kitto J at 89-90)?
5. What kind of notice did Kitto J say was needed to end a monthly tenancy (Kitto J at 91-92)?
6. On what basis did Williams J dissent, and what did he say about s 127 (Williams J at 80-82)?