Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1985

PropertyLeases

Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 CLR 17

A tenant withheld rent for months on a baseless claim, and the landlord re-entered and sued for the rent the tenant would have paid. Could it recover damages for a lease that it had itself brought to an end?

Clarified by Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 10

In Gumland the High Court, in one joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, said that save for statutory requirements or rules of law general contractual principles apply to leases, so that an innocent promisee can terminate and recover loss of bargain damages for repudiation, fundamental breach or breach of a condition, that is of an essential term ([58]). The Court explained that Mason J in this case used ‘fundamental breach’ to mean ‘breach of a condition or breach of another term or terms which is so serious that it goes to the root of the contract’ ([52]). So Mason J’s account of when loss of bargain damages are recoverable should be read as covering breach of an essential term, including one the parties expressly made essential in very clear words ([47], [53]).

Qualified by Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 10

Gumland qualifies Brennan J’s statement that loss of the benefit of a lease is recoverable only where the lessee has repudiated. In Gumland the High Court, in one joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, accepted that there was no repudiation and no fundamental breach ([44]) and restored an award of loss of bargain damages, because the lease made the covenant to pay rent an essential term in very clear words and provided for damages on termination ([47], [53]). Reasoning from Mason and Wilson JJ in AMEV-UDC, the Court said that the restriction of recoverable loss to what flows from the breach applies where a lessor terminates under a contractual right for a non-fundamental breach, but ‘it is otherwise in the case of fundamental breach, breach of an essential term or repudiation’ ([52]). So the grounds are repudiation, fundamental breach, or breach of an essential term, including one the parties expressly made essential. The Court did not decide whether a bare label of essentiality would suffice ([47]).

What happened?

The respondent owned factory premises at Artarmon, in Sydney. It leased them to the appellant by an unregistered memorandum of lease dated 4 December 1978 for five years at a rent of $7,750 a month (Mason J). The lease contained a proviso for re-entry, which arose if rent remained unpaid for 14 days or if the lessee failed to remedy a breach of covenant within 30 days of notice, and which operated without prejudice to any claim the lessor might have for breach of covenant (Mason J).

The lessee paid rent from February to May 1979 and then stopped until October 1979, maintaining that the respondent’s work on the premises had not been properly certified and that no rent was owing until it had been completed, a claim Mason J found had no basis in the provisions of the lease. The lessee had also damaged the roof and the electrical system, sublet part of the premises without consent, and obstructed areas the development consent required to be kept clear (Mason J). The respondent sued for possession and damages. Lusher J gave leave to issue a writ of possession and awarded $85,000 for the loss of the benefit of the covenants to pay rent and outgoings, assuming about six months to relet; the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal (Mason J).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal to the High Court was dismissed with costs. The sole question was whether the lessor was entitled to damages for the loss of the benefit of the covenants after re-entry (Mason J). There were five judgments, those of Mason J, Wilson J, Brennan J, Deane J and Dawson J.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Mason J. His Honour held that “the balance of authority here as well as overseas, and the reasons on which it is based, support the proposition that the ordinary principles of contract law, including that of termination for repudiation or fundamental breach, apply to leases.” He rejected the argument that an express proviso for re-entry excludes other rights of termination: it is “not easy to see why the mere presence of an express power to terminate should be regarded as excluding the exercise of such common law rights as may otherwise be appropriate”, although the parties may regulate those rights by their contract.

A lessor’s right to damages for loss of bargain after repudiation or fundamental breach continues after re-entry unless the lease excludes it. Mere breaches of covenant by a lessee do not amount to repudiation or fundamental breach, and abandonment of possession is not necessary for repudiation. Here the lessee persisted in refusing to pay rent on a claim with no foundation in the lease, together with its other breaches, which was a repudiation or fundamental breach.

Wilson J and Dawson J. Wilson J agreed substantially with Mason J and added observations on whether completion of the works was a condition precedent to the obligation to pay rent, concluding that the lessee was in fundamental breach. Dawson J agreed with Mason J and with the additional observations of Wilson J and Deane J.

Brennan J. His Honour agreed that the lessee had repudiated the lease, and held that ordinary contractual principles apply to a lease, but that “the character of a lease as a demise distinguishes the consequences of their application from their application to a contract that is not also a demise”. He said:

“A lessor can recover damages for loss of the benefit of a lease only where the lessee has repudiated the lease before determination of the term. Such a repudiation is not necessarily established by proving a default in the payment of rent.”

Where the lessee repudiates but does not give up possession, the lessor must determine the lessee’s interest to accept the repudiation: “enforcing the forfeiture both determines the lessee’s interest in the land and constitutes the lessor’s election to accept the repudiation”. Once the interest is determined damages are recoverable provided the lessor has not elected to keep the lease on foot, and the re-entry clause did not limit damages to past breaches.

Deane J. His Honour described the duality of a lease as an executory contract and an executed demise and held that, subject to one qualification, the ordinary principles of contract law apply to contractual leases. The qualification is that the further a lease is from one defined in substance by executory covenant, and the closer it is to an estate in land, “the more difficult it will be to establish that the lease has been avoided or terminated” by those principles. A five-year lease at a commercial rental without a premium was at the contractual end. The landlord could rely both on the clause and on the common law right, and the clause did not preclude damages for loss of the future benefit of the covenant to pay rent.

Why does this case matter?

A problem about a lessor’s claim after termination is often answered from the property side alone, and this is the decision an examiner expects to see brought to it. The Justices did not all say the same thing, so an answer that gives every statement to “the High Court” will mislead.

A later decision of the whole Court has dealt with the damages limit.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a lessor’s claim after termination, take the Justices in turn: Mason J for the starting point, Brennan J and Deane J for what the character of a lease adds, and then test the ground of termination against Gumland ([52], [58]).

Cite Brennan J by name for the statement about repudiation before determination of the term, and cite each statement by the Justice who made it.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices agreed with Mason J’s reasons, and how did each express that agreement?

2. According to Mason J, did an express proviso for re-entry exclude the common law right to terminate for repudiation or fundamental breach?

3. What did Mason J say about whether a breach of the covenant to pay rent, without more, amounts to repudiation?

4. What limit on a lessor’s damages did Brennan J state, and what did he say about a default in the payment of rent?

5. How did Brennan J say a lessor who has re-entered accepts the lessee’s repudiation?

6. What qualification did Deane J place on the application of ordinary contract principles to leases?