Proportionality under the human rights charters: reasonable limits in Victoria, Queensland and the ACT
The general limitation clauses of the Victorian Charter (s 7(2)), the Queensland Human Rights Act (s 13) and the ACT Human Rights Act (s 28), how they differ, where the onus lies, and a factor-by-factor application in Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services [2021] QSC 273.
Learning outcomes
- State the general limitation clause of the Victorian, Queensland and ACT human rights instruments, identify the textual differences between them, and explain why a student must apply the clause of the jurisdiction concerned.
- Allocate the onus between the party alleging that a right is limited and the party relying on the limit, and state the standard of justification, as Martin J did in Owen-D’Arcy.
- Apply the s 13(2) factors to a decision of a Queensland public entity, separating the substantive limb of s 58(1) from the procedural limb, and state the intensity of judicial review that applies.
Three Australian jurisdictions have a human rights charter or Act with a general clause saying when a protected right may be limited: Victoria (s 7 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006), Queensland (s 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019) and the Australian Capital Territory (s 28 of the Human Rights Act 2004). Before asking whether a limit on a right is lawful, a student must ask which jurisdiction’s clause applies, because the three are similar but not identical, and who must prove what. This article states those clauses, the Queensland scheme in which one of them operates, and a worked application by the Supreme Court of Queensland. It is separate from the constitutional method described in Proportionality analysis, and it does not state the operation of the charters generally, which is in Human rights charters and Acts. It states the law of Victoria, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory only.
Three limitation clauses
Each clause permits a limit only if it is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and lists factors to be taken into account.
Victoria, s 7(2). A human right may be subject under law “only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors including” five matters: the nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose.1 Section 7(3) adds that nothing in the Charter gives a person, entity or public authority a right to limit, to a greater extent than the Charter provides, or destroy the human rights of any person.
Queensland, s 13. A human right may be subject under law “only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” (s 13(1)).2 Section 13(2) says that seven factors “may be relevant”: the nature of the right; the nature of the purpose of the limitation, including whether it is consistent with such a society; the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, including whether the limitation helps to achieve the purpose; whether there are less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose; the importance of the purpose; the importance of preserving the right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation; and the balance between those last two matters.
ACT, s 28. Human rights may be subject “only to reasonable limits set by laws that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” (s 28(1)), and in deciding whether a limit is reasonable “all relevant factors must be considered, including” five matters that correspond to the Victorian list (s 28(2)).3
The differences are textual and a student should state them rather than assume the clauses are interchangeable. The Queensland list is permissive (“may be relevant”), the ACT list mandatory (“must be considered”) and the Victorian list is introduced by “taking into account all relevant factors including”. Only Queensland lists an express balancing factor between the importance of the purpose and of preserving the right. The ACT clause omits the words “based on human dignity, equality and freedom” that appear in the other two, and refers to limits “set by laws” rather than “under law”.
How the clause operates in Queensland
An act, decision or statutory provision is compatible with human rights if it does not limit a human right, or limits a human right “only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section 13” (s 8). It is unlawful for a public entity to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights, or in making a decision to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right (s 58(1)), subject to the exceptions in s 58(2)-(4), including where the entity could not reasonably have acted differently because of a statutory provision. The first limb is substantive and the second procedural. Giving proper consideration, the second limb, includes (but is not limited to) identifying the human rights that may be affected and considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights (s 58(5)); it is a different exercise from the proportionality assessment under the first.
Onus, standard and the intensity of review
Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services [2021] QSC 273, decided by Martin J of the Supreme Court of Queensland, is a detailed application of s 13 to a decision of a public entity.4 It concerned successive maximum security orders and a no-association direction that kept a prisoner, convicted of murder, in effective solitary confinement. Martin J stated the following about the clause:
- Section 13 embodies a proportionality test, as its Victorian counterpart has been held to do, and that was the intention stated when the Bill was introduced (at [104]).
- The compatibility inquiry has two stages: whether the act or decision placed a limit on a human right, and if so whether the limit is justified under s 13 (at [126]).
- The applicant bears the onus of establishing that the decision limits a human right; if that is established, the respondent bears the onus of justifying the limit (at [128]-[129]). Martin J adopted the analysis of Warren CJ, in a Victorian decision, that the party seeking to uphold a limit must justify it, the standard of proof is high, requiring a “degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion”, and the evidence should be “cogent and persuasive” (at [108]-[110]).
- Judicial review for unlawfulness against human rights standards is supervisory and not substitutionary, and is not merits review, but it is more intensive than traditional grounds such as unreasonableness, because proportionality draws the court more deeply into the facts and the balance struck (at [147]-[149]).
The factors applied
Martin J applied s 13(2) factor by factor to the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty (s 30). The purpose, managing the prisoner’s risk of violence to others, was consistent with the protection of others’ rights, and the rational connection between the limitation and that purpose was not contested (at [246]-[247]). The decision-maker had said that she considered whether there was a less restrictive and reasonably available alternative and believed there was none, but gave no basis for that belief. Martin J held that it is not for the applicant to provide solutions, that the respondent must explain why there is no reasonable alternative, and that the heavy burden cannot be discharged by reciting a belief without a basis (at [249]-[250]). On the balance, the decision-maker had not given sufficient weight to the total length of the solitary confinement, which the new order extended beyond more than seven years of earlier orders, or to the fact that recommendations of a psychologist had not been implemented (at [252]-[253], [260]). The decision to issue the maximum security order was held not compatible with human rights (s 58(1)(a)) and unlawful (at [261]). The no-association decision was also held unlawful, for failure to give proper consideration under s 58(1)(b), because the decision-maker had not identified the right to humane treatment as relevant to it (at [265]-[266]).
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the jurisdiction and the instrument. Do not apply a Queensland factor to an ACT or Victorian problem without checking the text of the local clause.
- Ask first whether the act, decision or law limits a right, and who bears that onus (in Queensland, the applicant), then whether the limit is justified, and who bears that onus (the party relying on the limit).
- Work through the factors in the local clause, taking the purpose, its relationship to the limit, any less restrictive means and, in Queensland, the balance, and require evidence for each.
- Separate, where the Queensland Act applies, the substantive question under s 58(1)(a) from the procedural question under s 58(1)(b).
- State the intensity of review: supervisory and not merits review, but more intensive than unreasonableness.
- State that Owen-D’Arcy is the decision of a single judge on the Queensland Act, and that the Victorian authorities on which it draws are used in this article only as Martin J reports them.
Self-check
- Have I used the clause of the jurisdiction concerned, and stated that the three clauses differ in wording?
- Have I allocated the onus to the applicant on whether a right is limited and to the party relying on the limit on whether it is justified?
- Have I distinguished the substantive and procedural limbs of s 58(1)?
- Have I kept the constitutional method of structured proportionality separate from the charter clauses?