Ravbar v Commonwealth of Australia

High Court of Australia · 2025

Constitutional LawImplied Freedom Of Political Communication

Ravbar v Commonwealth of Australia (2025) 99 ALJR 1000

A union division was placed under an outside administrator, and its removed officers said the law silenced the division’s political voice. Does a court need a fixed set of steps to decide whether that burden is justified?

What happened?

The Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (the CFMEU) is an organisation of employees registered under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (the FWRO Act). It has three Divisions, one of which is the Construction and General Division (the C&G Division) ([2]). Its registered rules include, among its objects, to raise political levies and to donate to or affiliate with political parties ([10]), and the special case records that the C&G Division and its branches had incurred expenditure in federal, State and Territory elections, including by making donations to political parties and candidates ([69]).

The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment (Administration) Act 2024 (Cth) was enacted on 22 August 2024 and inserted Pt 2A of Ch 11 into the FWRO Act, which makes provision for the C&G Division and each of its branches to be placed under administration ([1]). From 23 August 2024 the administration was triggered by the Attorney-General’s determination of a scheme and the appointment of an administrator, Mr Mark Irving KC ([4]). It was to continue for five years unless the scheme was revoked earlier ([7]).

The Administrator has powers of control, management and disposition of CFMEU property previously used solely or predominantly for the purposes of the C&G Division or its branches ([8]), and must be satisfied that he is acting in the best interests of the members of the Division and its branches and have regard to the objects of the CFMEU as defined in its rules, so far as they are lawful ([9]). The revised explanatory memorandum identified the legislative purpose as “to end ongoing dysfunction within the Division and to ensure it is able to operate effectively in the interests of its members” ([3]).

The plaintiffs had been the Divisional Branch Secretary and the Divisional Branch Assistant Secretary of the Queensland-Northern Territory Divisional Branch until they were removed from those offices on 23 August 2024 as a result of the scheme. They began proceedings in the High Court’s original jurisdiction on 3 September 2024, and the parties agreed a special case, filed on 18 October 2024, stating questions of law for the Full Court ([13]). Two of the questions asked whether the legislation impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication and whether the scheme was invalid because it was not authorised by Pt 2A by reason of that freedom ([71]).

The plaintiffs argued that the legislation had an illegitimate purpose, the suppression of political donations and activity by the C&G Division, which they said could be found in statements made in the Senate debate ([49]-[51]), and that it was in any event not reasonably appropriate and adapted to a legitimate purpose ([306]).

What did the Court decide?

Seven Justices sat. The special case was argued on 10 and 11 December 2024 and judgment was delivered on 18 June 2025 (cover page; [13]). There were seven separate sets of reasons: Gageler CJ ([1]-[67]), Gordon J ([68]-[168]), Edelman J ([169]-[269]), Steward J ([270]-[304]), Gleeson J ([305]-[316]), Jagot J ([317]-[422]) and Beech-Jones J ([423]-[477]). Every Justice would answer the questions of law in the negative: Gageler CJ, Edelman J, Steward J, Gleeson J and Beech-Jones J expressly in the terms proposed by Gordon J ([67], [269], [304], [305], [477]), and Jagot J by answering each of the questions she summarised in the negative ([324], [422]). The Court answered each of Questions (1) to (6) “No” and, on Question (7), said that there should be no order as to costs (cover page; [71]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In her separate reasons on whether Pt 2A of Ch 11 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication, Jagot J recorded, quoting McCloy, that the approach labelled structured proportionality had been described from its inception as “an analytical tool rather than as a doctrine”. She held that, given its character as explanatory of when a law may be considered reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance its constitutionally legitimate purpose, “no description of the analysis which structured proportionality involves can or should be understood as requiring formulaic recitation of each of its three elements, still less recitation of the labels by which these elements have been described (suitability, necessity, and adequacy in balance)” ([343]).

She added that further resolution of the competing streams of thought was “not required in the present case” ([345]). Her own application asked whether Pt 2A was reasonably appropriate and adapted by reference to the nature of its legitimate ends, the place of the law between a law directed at political communication and a law with another legitimate object that incidentally restricts it, the absence of an obvious and compelling alternative with a clearly less restrictive effect, and the law’s in-built safeguards ([395]-[404]), and concluded that it “can be described as suitable, necessary and adequate in its balance” ([405]).

The statement is Jagot J’s own: Gageler CJ gave separate reasons of his own on the implied freedom ([16]), and no other Justice’s reasons in this case refer to her paragraph [343].

The Justices gave the same answer on the implied freedom (Gageler CJ [67]; Gordon J [149]; Edelman J [248]; Steward J [270]; Gleeson J [316]; Jagot J [406]; Beech-Jones J [475]), but not by one route. Gordon J held that the laws did not burden the freedom of political communication of the C&G Division or its members, and alternatively that any burden would be justified ([115], [141]); Steward J agreed with her reasons on that topic other than those concerning legitimate purpose and justification ([270], [295]). The other five Justices accepted that Pt 2A burdened the freedom and held the burden justified: Gageler CJ ([48], [66]), Edelman J ([230]-[231], [248]), Gleeson J ([307], [315]-[316]), Jagot J ([395], [405]) and Beech-Jones J ([474]-[475]).

On how to test whether the law was reasonably appropriate and adapted, Gageler CJ said that the lack of unanimity in and after McCloy about whether and when the third stage is informed by suitability, necessity and adequacy of balance did not detract from the orthodoxy of the inquiry or relieve the judicial duty to undertake so much of it as is required to determine the legal rights in issue ([28]), and he himself asked whether the form of administration was reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance its purpose ([48]).

Edelman J applied structured proportionality “as a matter of both precedent and respect for the submissions that were made”, despite reservations about its first and third aspects ([215]). Gleeson J, noting that the parties had framed their argument by reference to the approach in McCloy, worked through suitability, necessity and adequacy in the balance ([309]-[316]). Beech-Jones J, who had agreed with Gageler CJ and Jagot J on structured proportionality in Babet v Commonwealth [2025] HCA 21, applied it as a “tool of analysis” because the parties had framed their submissions solely by reference to McCloy, and observed that in this case the criteria reduce to the same point ([427], [470]-[475]).

Gordon J’s alternative reasons asked whether the laws were directly connected to the purpose and whether s 323 was an “equally practicable” alternative ([141]-[144]). Edelman J said, in observations that were not needed for the result, that after Babet there was “presently no majority view as to when structured proportionality should be applied” ([218]) and that the resolution of the issues would await another case ([225]); Steward J, who found no burden, said that when the option of using it must be exercised is “entirely unclear” ([291]).

Later authority. In Hopper v Victoria [2026] HCA 11, Edelman J, writing separately at [86]-[87], referred in a footnote to Ravbar at [29], [101], [343] and [427] as among the passages showing the antipathy now expressed by a majority of the Court towards any test based upon structured proportionality, and said that this may mean that such a test should now be treated as dead. Nothing in those paragraphs or their footnotes says that Jagot J’s statement at [343] is wrong. The position is stated as at 2 November 2026.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Separate reasoning · Jagot J

Read judgment: [343]–[345] (PDF p 141) (opens in a new tab), [395]–[405] (PDF p 158) (opens in a new tab)

Jagot J agrees in the result (the implied freedom did not invalidate Pt 2A) but the statement at [343] is her own account of how the analysis is to be described, quoting McCloy and citing Babet at [49]. It was not necessary to the answer: she said at [345] that further resolution of the competing approaches was not required, and her application at [395]-[405] reaches the same answer by reference to the nature of the ends, the place of the law on the spectrum, the absence of an obvious and compelling alternative and the safeguards. No other Justice’s reasons in this case refer to [343], so it is not a statement of the Court.

Proposition 2

Separate reasoning · Gordon J; Steward J

Read judgment: [115] (PDF p 50) (opens in a new tab), [141]–[146] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab), [270] (PDF p 112) (opens in a new tab), [295] (PDF p 121) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J held that there was no burden, with justification as an alternative ground ([115], [141]); Steward J agreed with her on burden and found it unnecessary to adopt her reasons on justification ([270], [295]). These Justices concur in the answers but do not accept that the laws burdened the freedom.

Separate reasoning · Gageler CJ; Edelman J; Gleeson J; Jagot J; Beech-Jones J

Read judgment: [28]–[29] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [48] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [66] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [215] (PDF p 90) (opens in a new tab), [309]–[316] (PDF p 126) (opens in a new tab), [405] (PDF p 162) (opens in a new tab), [427] (PDF p 170) (opens in a new tab), [470]–[475] (PDF p 184) (opens in a new tab)

Each of these Justices accepted a burden and held it justified, in separate reasons. Gageler CJ asked whether the law was reasonably appropriate and adapted without the subsidiary criteria; Edelman J, Gleeson J and Beech-Jones J worked through suitability, necessity and adequacy in balance, the first on precedent and the parties’ submissions and the other two because the parties framed the case that way; Jagot J gave her own account of the analysis. There is no single rationale on method shared by a majority in this case.

Obiter · Edelman J; Steward J

Read judgment: [216]–[225] (PDF p 91) (opens in a new tab), [286]–[293] (PDF p 118) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J’s criticism of the position after Babet and his remark that the issues await another case, and Steward J’s remarks about the lack of clarity of the tests of justification, were not needed to decide whether Pt 2A was invalid: Edelman J applied structured proportionality in any event and Steward J found no burden.

Why does this case matter?

Because every Justice wrote separately, a single paragraph of this decision tells a reader what one Justice said and nothing about the other six until the whole decision has been checked. The risk with a decision of this shape is that it is cited for what “the High Court” requires on a point of method when the statement is one Justice’s. The facts also reward careful reading. The law put a political organisation’s division under outside control, and, as Gordon J noted, nothing in its terms or in the scheme prohibited political communication ([106]). An examiner looks for an answer that says exactly what the law does to the ability of that organisation and its members to communicate before it asks whether the effect is justified.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a law said to restrict political communication, take the questions in the order they arise: whether the law effectively burdens the freedom, whether its purpose is legitimate, and whether it is reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance that purpose. At each point say what the law does, in its terms and in its operation, and give the paragraph and the Justice for each statement you rely on. When you reach the third question, say which approach to it you are applying and why, by reference to how the problem or the parties have put it, and identify the Justice whose words support that approach.

This is a decision of the High Court of Australia on a special case about Commonwealth legislation and a scheme made under it, and its answers concern Pt 2A of Ch 11 of the FWRO Act and the Determination. The account of the judgment is as decided on 18 June 2025; check later High Court decisions on the implied freedom, including Hopper v Victoria [2026] HCA 11, before relying on a point of method.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices found that the laws did not burden the freedom of political communication, and what did each say about the Division’s ability to communicate or about justification ([115], [270], [295])?

2. What did Jagot J say, in the paragraph in which she described structured proportionality as an analytical tool, about how the analysis is to be described, and what did she conclude about Pt 2A at the end of her reasons on the point ([343], [405])?

3. Why did Beech-Jones J address suitability, necessity and adequacy in balance, and what did he observe about those criteria in this case ([427])?

4. Which Justice said that there was presently no majority view as to when structured proportionality should be applied, and what did that Justice say about when the issue would be resolved ([218], [225])?

5. What answers did the Court give to the six constitutional questions and what order was made about costs (cover page; [71])?