Ravbar v Commonwealth of Australia
Ravbar v Commonwealth of Australia (2025) 99 ALJR 1000
A union division was placed under an outside administrator, and its removed officers said the law silenced the division’s political voice. Does a court need a fixed set of steps to decide whether that burden is justified?
What happened?
The CFMEU is an organisation of employees registered under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth). Its rules include objects of raising political levies and donating to political parties. Its Construction and General Division (the C&G Division) had spent money in federal, State and Territory elections.
The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment (Administration) Act 2024 (Cth) inserted Pt 2A of Ch 11. From 23 August 2024 the Attorney-General determined a scheme and appointed an administrator, Mr Mark Irving KC. It was to run five years unless revoked earlier.
The plaintiffs were removed from their Queensland–Northern Territory branch offices under the scheme. They sued in the High Court’s original jurisdiction. An agreed special case stated questions of law for the Full Court.
Two questions concerned the implied freedom of political communication. The plaintiffs argued the law had an illegitimate purpose. Consider how you would test that asserted burden.
What did the Court decide?
Seven judges heard this case. It was argued in December 2024 and decided on 18 June 2025.
Each judge wrote separate reasons, but all reached the same outcome.
Every question was answered “No.” No order was made for costs.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
This case concerns Pt 2A of Ch 11 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth). The issue was whether it impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication.
Jagot J gave separate reasons on this issue. Quoting McCloy, she noted that structured proportionality has been called “an analytical tool rather than a doctrine”, not a fixed test.
She held that no description of structured proportionality requires formulaic recitation of its three elements. These elements are suitability, necessity, and adequacy in balance. Courts need not even recite these labels.
She added that resolving disagreement between different judicial approaches was not required in this case. Applying her own approach, she considered the law’s legitimate purpose, whether it targeted political communication directly, whether a less restrictive alternative existed, and built-in safeguards. She concluded Pt 2A was suitable, necessary, and adequate in its balance.
This reasoning is Jagot J’s alone. Gageler CJ wrote separate reasons on the implied freedom, and no other Justice referred to Jagot J’s discussion.
All seven Justices reached the same result: the implied freedom was not infringed. But they took different paths.
Gordon J held the law did not burden the freedom at all. Alternatively, she held any burden was justified. Steward J agreed with her reasoning, except on legitimate purpose and justification.
The remaining five Justices—Gageler CJ, Edelman J, Gleeson J, Jagot J, and Beech-Jones J—accepted that Pt 2A did burden the freedom, but held that burden was justified.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Separate reasoning · Jagot J
Read judgment: [343]–[345] (PDF p 141) (opens in a new tab), [395]–[405] (PDF p 158) (opens in a new tab)
Jagot J agrees in the result (the implied freedom did not invalidate Pt 2A) but the statement at [343] is her own account of how the analysis is to be described, quoting McCloy and citing Babet at [49]. It was not necessary to the answer: she said at [345] that further resolution of the competing approaches was not required, and her application at [395]-[405] reaches the same answer by reference to the nature of the ends, the place of the law on the spectrum, the absence of an obvious and compelling alternative and the safeguards. No other Justice’s reasons in this case refer to [343], so it is not a statement of the Court.
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · Gordon J; Steward J
Read judgment: [115] (PDF p 50) (opens in a new tab), [141]–[146] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab), [270] (PDF p 112) (opens in a new tab), [295] (PDF p 121) (opens in a new tab)
Gordon J held that there was no burden, with justification as an alternative ground ([115], [141]); Steward J agreed with her on burden and found it unnecessary to adopt her reasons on justification ([270], [295]). These Justices concur in the answers but do not accept that the laws burdened the freedom.
Separate reasoning · Gageler CJ; Edelman J; Gleeson J; Jagot J; Beech-Jones J
Read judgment: [28]–[29] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [48] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [66] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [215] (PDF p 90) (opens in a new tab), [309]–[316] (PDF p 126) (opens in a new tab), [405] (PDF p 162) (opens in a new tab), [427] (PDF p 170) (opens in a new tab), [470]–[475] (PDF p 184) (opens in a new tab)
Each of these Justices accepted a burden and held it justified, in separate reasons. Gageler CJ asked whether the law was reasonably appropriate and adapted without the subsidiary criteria; Edelman J, Gleeson J and Beech-Jones J worked through suitability, necessity and adequacy in balance, the first on precedent and the parties’ submissions and the other two because the parties framed the case that way; Jagot J gave her own account of the analysis. There is no single rationale on method shared by a majority in this case.
Obiter · Edelman J; Steward J
Read judgment: [216]–[225] (PDF p 91) (opens in a new tab), [286]–[293] (PDF p 118) (opens in a new tab)
Edelman J’s criticism of the position after Babet and his remark that the issues await another case, and Steward J’s remarks about the lack of clarity of the tests of justification, were not needed to decide whether Pt 2A was invalid: Edelman J applied structured proportionality in any event and Steward J found no burden.
Why does this case matter?
Seven judges wrote separately, so one quote may not reflect the whole Court. The law placed a political organisation’s division under outside control. Gordon J noted it didn’t ban political communication. Students should first state the law’s effect, before asking if it’s justified.
Exam and application relevance
Take the questions in order: burden, legitimate purpose, then reasonably appropriate and adapted. Cite the paragraph and Justice. At the third question, say which approach you apply and why.
This High Court special case concerned Pt 2A of Ch 11 of the FWRO Act and the Determination, decided 18 June 2025. Check later decisions, including Hopper v Victoria [2026] HCA 11.