Momcilovic v The Queen
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1
A reverse-onus provision cannot be read compatibly with the presumption of innocence. What can a court actually do about it?
Clarified by Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [2024] HCA 32
In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [2024] HCA 32, Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ applied s 32(1). At [57] they noted the approach that prefers a rights-compatible interpretation where more than one interpretation is available on a plain reading. At [58] they reserved the general operation of the principle, while requiring “close attention to the particular rights said to be engaged by the statutory provision that falls for interpretation”. In separate reasons at [137]–[139], Edelman J suggested that s 32 might support severance or partial disapplication as statutory construction, including severing words not integral to a provision’s purpose and reconciling conflicting provisions. This raises a possible reach beyond choosing between available constructions. His reasons agreed in the result at [166], but did not establish that proposal as law. Students advancing the wider argument should identify it as his suggestion.
What happened?
Vera Momcilovic was convicted of trafficking in a drug of dependence contrary to s 71AC of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic). The Crown relied on s 5, which deems any substance to be in a person’s possession “so long as it is upon any land or premises occupied by him ... unless the person satisfies the court to the contrary” — a reverse onus. Section 25(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) guarantees the right to be presumed innocent.
The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal against conviction but did two other things: it resentenced her, and it made a declaration under s 36(2) of the Charter that s 5 of the Drugs Act cannot be interpreted consistently with s 25(1).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed and the conviction set aside; the Court of Appeal’s orders, including the declaration, were set aside. The Court divided on almost everything else, and its reasons run to more than seven hundred paragraphs across six judgments.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Under the Victorian Charter, s 32(1) directs that “[s]o far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights” — an interpretive direction bounded both by the purpose of the provision and by the constructional choices its language permits, not a remedial power. Where a provision cannot be so interpreted, the Supreme Court may (s 36(2)) declare that in the proceedings specified by s 36(1), but the declaration “does not ... affect in any way the validity, operation or enforcement” of the provision (s 36(5)(a)); the responsible Minister must respond to it and table the response within six months (s 37). The Charter confers no power to strike down the legislation, and a declaration does not make it inoperative.
The part that matters for the framework is what s 32(1) does. French CJ held that “[t]here is ... nothing in its text or context to suggest that the interpretation which it requires departs from established understandings of that process. The subsection limits the interpretation which it directs to that which is consistent with the purpose of the statutory provision under consideration. It operates upon constructional choices which the language of the statutory provision permits” ([50]). It “applies to the interpretation of statutes in the same way as the principle of legality but with a wider field of application” ([51]) — not as the United Kingdom’s s 3 remedial power has been applied.
On the declaration, his Honour described it as “a distinct non-judicial power”, a “mechanism by which the Court can direct the attention of the legislature, through the Executive Government of Victoria, to disconformity between a law of the State and a human right” ([95]). Making one “does no more than manifest, in a practical way, the constitutional limitations upon the Court’s role and the fact that it is Parliament’s responsibility ultimately to determine whether the laws it enacts will be consistent or inconsistent with human rights” ([96]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Separate reasoning · French CJ
Read judgment: [50]–[51] (PDF p 38) (opens in a new tab)
French CJ concurred in allowing the appeal. These passages give his reason for rejecting a remedial reading of s 32(1): interpretation remains within statutory purpose and the constructional choices the language permits. They identify his route through the Charter argument, rather than establish that every judge allowing the appeal adopted his reasoning.
Separate reasoning · French CJ
Read judgment: [88] (PDF p 54) (opens in a new tab), [101] (PDF p 62) (opens in a new tab)
French CJ explained that a declaration leaves the parties’ rights and the provision’s operation unaffected, while triggering ministerial obligations. That limited effect supported his characterisation of the power as non-judicial. Although concurring in allowing the conviction appeal, he opposed disturbing the declaration because he considered it outside the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This is his distinct reasoning, not a collective ratio that the declaration should be set aside.
Why does this case matter?
The case brings together a criminal trial, the presumption of innocence and the institutional roles of courts and Parliament under a statutory rights charter. Use it to identify which Charter question a problem raises and whose reasoning addresses it.
It is also a case to cite carefully. Six judgments, a Court divided on the operation of s 7(2), on the validity of s 36, and on s 109 inconsistency — “Momcilovic held” is a sentence that usually needs a judge’s name attached. The arrangement is often described as a “dialogue model”, but that description was itself criticised in the Court, so treat it as a label for the design rather than as something the Court adopted.
Exam and application relevance
When a problem raises an apparent conflict between a Victorian statute and a Charter right, identify the right, the disputed statutory language and the competing constructions. Analyse s 32(1) before considering whether the proceedings call for a declaration under s 36. Ask what each proposed order would mean for the client and what steps would follow it.
If a problem raises severance or partial disapplication, consult the later-authority note and distinguish the questions decided there from suggestions in separate reasons. Attribute the reasoning you use to the judges who gave it.
Check your understanding
Your client wins a declaration of inconsistent interpretation. What has she obtained, and what has she not?