Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services

Supreme Court of Queensland · 2021

Human Rights And Anti Discrimination LawProportionality Analysis

Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services [2021] QSC 273

A prisoner has spent over seven years in a maximum security unit on orders renewed every six months. The decision-maker wrote that she weighed his rights and found no less restrictive option. What must a court ask of that?

What happened?

Michael Owen-D’Arcy was convicted of murder on 7 December 2010 and sentenced to life imprisonment ([1]). He was later sentenced for serious assaults on corrective services officers and for the attempted murder of an officer, whom he slashed with a razor blade attached to paddle pop sticks ([2], [16]). He had been classified as a maximum security prisoner since 20 January 2011, a maximum security order (MSO) was first issued against him on or about 29 January 2013, and a new order had been issued roughly every six months since; he had been held in the Maximum Security Unit (MSU) of the Brisbane Correctional Centre since 29 January 2013 ([3], [15], [17], [18]).

On 17 June 2020 Ms Samantha Newman, an Executive Director in the Department of Corrective Services who held delegated powers, issued a consecutive MSO for 18 June to 16 December 2020, on the ground that there was a high risk of the applicant killing or seriously injuring other prisoners or other persons with whom he might come into contact ([7], [8], [19]). The order required a single cell and allowed two telephone calls of ten minutes and one non-contact visit of an hour each week ([21]).

On the same day she directed under s 62(1)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) that he was not to have contact associations with other prisoners in the MSU without the approval of the authorised delegate (the No Association Decision) ([20]). Her power was confined: it covered whether to make an MSO and the directions in s 62, not the terms of the Maximum Security Unit Management Plan or how a prisoner under an MSO was otherwise treated, although she could take the plan’s conditions into account ([9]-[12]).

The applicant’s last recorded adverse incident was in June 2014, Ms Newman acknowledged that he had “done everything that has been asked of him”, he remained subject to the most serious level of physical restraints, and he had not been given an MSU Pre-Association Assessment Report ([241]). Dr Madsen, a psychologist retained by Queensland Corrective Services, had reported between 2016 and 2020; he repeatedly recommended lesser restraints, weekly therapeutic interventions and a long-term progression strategy, and in 2020 said that the applicant’s risk of violence could be regarded as “low and non-imminent” ([165]-[171], [241]).

The applicant sought judicial review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) of both decisions and, in the alternative, relief under s 59 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ([4]-[5]). He relied on the rights in ss 17(b), 29 and 30 of that Act ([30]). The Attorney-General and the Queensland Human Rights Commission intervened, and the Chief Executive adopted the Attorney-General’s submissions ([94]). The evidence was brief and there was no expert evidence about the effect of the confinement on the applicant or in general ([150]-[154]); the respondent called no evidence ([175]).

What did the Court decide?

Martin J, sitting alone, held that the judicial review grounds failed on natural justice ([50]), unreasonableness ([64]), the consideration of the last recorded incident and of the absence of violence against prisoners ([70], [75]), the alleged irrelevant consideration ([83]) and error of fact ([90]-[91]), but succeeded on one ground, which concerned the No Association Decision ([81], [92]).

On the Human Rights Act application, he held that the decision to issue the MSO was unlawful under s 58(1)(a) ([261]) and that the No Association Decision was unlawful under s 58(1)(b) ([266]). He said that he would hear the parties on the appropriate form of orders ([267]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Martin J, a single judge, held that s 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) should be regarded, like its Victorian counterpart, as embodying a proportionality test: s 7 of the Victorian Charter had been held to do so, s 13(1) was relevantly indistinguishable from the first paragraph of s 7(2) of that Charter, and the Attorney-General’s first reading speech said that the s 13(2) factors were intended to align generally with proportionality ([104]-[105]). Adopting the reasoning of Warren CJ on s 7 in Re Application under the Major Crimes (Investigative Powers) Act 2004, he accepted that the onus of demonstrably justifying a limit lies on the party seeking to uphold it, that the standard of proof is high and requires a “degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion”, and that the evidence should be “cogent and persuasive” ([108]-[110]).

He described the substantive obligation in s 58(1)(a) as involving a two-stage inquiry under s 8: whether the act or decision placed a limit on the human right, and if so whether the limit is justified under s 13 ([126]). The applicant bears the onus of establishing that the decision imposes a limit ([128]); if that is established, the respondent bears the onus of justifying it ([129]). The Attorney-General submitted that the court should not set the decisions aside unless the decision-maker had manifestly weighed the considerations in an unreasonable or unjustifiable way; Martin J did not accept that Haigh v Ryan and Gardiner v Attorney-General (No 2) supported that submission ([144]-[146]).

He adopted Bell J’s statement in Patrick’s Case that the court’s jurisdiction on review for unlawfulness against human rights standards is supervisory and not substitutionary, so that relief cannot be granted simply because the court takes a different view of the merits ([147]), and Bell J’s explanation that such review is more intensive than review on Wednesbury unreasonableness grounds because proportionality draws the court more deeply into the facts and the balance struck, a risk of drifting into merits review that is addressed in part by affording weight and latitude to the acts and decisions of primary decision-makers ([148]-[149]).

Applying the s 13(2) factors to the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty in s 30(1), Martin J held that the respondent had not justified the limit that the maximum security order placed on that right, so that the decision to issue the order was not compatible with human rights and was unlawful under s 58(1)(a) ([243]-[261]). The Attorney-General accepted that s 30(1) was limited because the applicant was subject to hardship or constraint beyond that which all prisoners experience ([239]).

The purpose, managing the applicant’s risk of violence to others, was consistent with the protection of other people’s rights, and the rational connection between the limit and that purpose was not contested ([246]-[247]). On less restrictive means, Ms Newman had written that she did not believe there was an alternative that could adequately manage the risk, but gave no basis for that belief. Martin J said that it is not for the applicant to provide solutions, that the respondent must explain why there is no reasonable alternative, and that the burden “cannot be discharged simply by the decision-maker reciting that he or she held a particular belief without providing any basis for that belief” ([249]-[250]).

On the balance, he held that Ms Newman had not given enough weight to the continuing failure to take up Dr Madsen’s recommendations, or to the fact that the decisions extended a period of solitary confinement that had begun in January 2013, so that the total length of the confinement should have been considered ([252]-[253], [260]). He declined to treat the acceptance by other judges and courts of expert evidence about the effects of solitary confinement as evidence in the proceeding, saying that the view of another judge about evidence given in another court is not evidence in this proceeding, and that appropriate expert evidence should have been adduced if the applicant wished to show those effects ([158]-[161]).

The applicant’s other rights claims failed. On s 17(b), he held that the applicant had not satisfied the onus: in the absence of evidence of bodily injury or physical or mental suffering there was only his evidence of anxiety generated by the conditions of his confinement and by events, such as the suicide of other prisoners, that his confinement did not cause ([190]-[192]). On s 29, he held that the section was not engaged: preferring for the purposes of the application the reasoning of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Bennett, he said that reading it to reach the applicant’s claimed residual liberty would put the court in the position of substituting its decision for that of the relevant authority ([197]-[198], [234]).

On the procedural obligation in s 58(1)(b), Martin J did not accept that s 58(5) is a codification of the test that Emerton J stated in Castles v Secretary, Department of Justice and that Tate JA paraphrased in Bare v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission: s 58(5) describes two elements of giving proper consideration to a human right, identifying the rights that may be affected and considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights, but is not limited to them and, unlike the Victorian provision as Emerton J described it, includes identifying the human rights that may be affected ([135]-[136]).

He agreed with Emerton J that the identification of relevant rights must be approached in a common sense and practical manner, and that decision-makers like Ms Newman are not expected to achieve the level of consideration of a decision given by a judge ([137]). For the MSO, Ms Newman had identified the rights that may be affected ([266]). For the No Association Decision, she had identified only the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of association; Martin J held that the decision also engaged, at least, s 30, which she did not consider, and that it is not enough to refer to the impact on the applicant’s human rights and name only some of them, because the rights that may be affected must be identified ([265]).

She therefore could not have given proper consideration to a human right relevant to that decision, and he held it unlawful ([266]). The same omission was the basis of the one judicial review ground that succeeded, a failure to take into account, as a relevant consideration, the effect of the No Association Decision on the applicant’s human rights ([79]-[81], [92]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Martin J (single judge)

Read judgment: [104]–[110] (opens in a new tab), [126]–[129] (opens in a new tab)

Martin J applies the proportionality reading, the allocation of the onus and the high standard of justification to the s 30 limit when he finds the respondent has not discharged the onus ([243]-[250], [261]), so they are part of the reasoning that produced the result.

Ratio · Martin J (single judge)

Read judgment: [142]–[149] (opens in a new tab)

Martin J rejects the Attorney-General’s narrower standard of intervention and adopts Bell J’s statement of the court’s role ([144]-[149]) and then forms his own view of the balance ([251]-[260]), so the intensity of review he describes is the standard he applies.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Martin J (single judge)

Read judgment: [243]–[261] (opens in a new tab)

The conclusion that the maximum security order was not compatible with human rights and so unlawful under s 58(1)(a) rests on the findings that the respondent gave no basis for its belief about alternatives and that the balance was not properly struck ([250], [253], [260]-[261]).

Ratio · Martin J (single judge)

Read judgment: [190]–[192] (opens in a new tab), [234] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are Martin J’s reasons for holding that the s 17(b) onus was not satisfied and that s 29 was not engaged, so that the substantive complaint was decided under s 30 alone.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Martin J (single judge)

Read judgment: [134]–[137] (opens in a new tab), [262]–[266] (opens in a new tab)

The finding that the No Association Decision was unlawful under s 58(1)(b) rests on the reading of s 58(5) as requiring the decision-maker to identify the rights that may be affected, and on the finding that s 30 was not identified for that decision ([265]-[266]).

Why does this case matter?

Does a human rights challenge to an administrative decision ask the court anything different from an unreasonableness challenge, and does a decision-maker’s written statement that she weighed the person’s rights and found no alternative end the inquiry? This decision works through those questions for a prisoner in long solitary confinement, and shows how much turns on who has to prove each step, what evidence each side puts in, and which rights the applicant chooses to rely on.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a Queensland public entity’s decision that affects a person’s human rights, deal with the two obligations in s 58(1) separately. For the substantive obligation, say which stage of the s 8 inquiry is in issue, which party must address it, which of the s 13(2) factors the facts reach, and what evidence the parties and the decision-maker’s reasons actually supply. For the procedural obligation, ask which rights the decision-maker identified and whether the decision affected others she did not.

Attribute the reasoning to Martin J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland; its precedential force depends on the court hierarchy, and it is persuasive authority for courts not bound by its ratio; the Victorian cases it draws on are used as he reports them, and a Victorian or ACT problem needs the text of its own limitation clause checked. The decision was given on 22 October 2021 under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as then in force, so check the current text of the Act and any later decision on it before relying on a paragraph.

Check your understanding

1. Who made the two decisions under review, and what did Martin J say about the limits of her authority ([7]-[12], [19]-[20])?

2. Which three rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) did the applicant rely on ([30])?

3. What did Martin J say about the Attorney-General’s reliance on Haigh v Ryan and Gardiner v Attorney-General (No 2) ([144]-[146])?

4. What are the two stages of the inquiry under s 8, and who bears the onus at each ([126], [128]-[129])?

5. What did Martin J say about the acceptance by other judges and courts of expert evidence on the effects of solitary confinement, and what evidence did he say should have been adduced ([158]-[161])?

6. What did Ms Newman say about less restrictive alternatives, and why did Martin J hold that insufficient ([248]-[250])?

7. Which two matters did Martin J say Ms Newman had not weighed enough when balancing the purpose of the limit against the importance of the right ([252]-[253])?

8. Why did Martin J hold that s 29 was not engaged ([197], [234])?

9. Which rights did Ms Newman identify when making the No Association Decision, and which did Martin J say she should also have identified ([263], [265])?