Misrepresentation: proving inducement and who bears the onus
How a claimant proves that a misrepresentation induced the contract: the rebuttable inference of fact, the ultimate and evidentiary onuses, other influences and doubts, and reliance on the claimant’s own judgment, as stated in two High Court fraud cases.
Learning outcomes
- State the ultimate onus of proving inducement and distinguish it from the evidentiary onus that falls on a defendant, using Gould v Vaggelas.
- Identify the facts that support, and the facts that rebut, an inference that a misrepresentation induced a contract, using Gould v Vaggelas and Holmes v Jones.
- Explain, with attribution to the individual judges, how a claimant’s suspicion, other motives and own investigation bear on inducement, and state the limits of what the two cases decided.
A false statement does not give a remedy merely because it was made and the contract followed. The claimant must also show that the statement induced the contract, and the usual first question is who must prove that and by what route. This article states what the High Court of Australia said about inducement in two cases in which the claim was fraudulent misrepresentation, Holmes v Jones and Gould v Vaggelas. Both are decisions of the High Court, whose holdings bind all other Australian courts (the High Court itself can reconsider its own precedents), and both state the general law; State and Territory legislation about misrepresentation, and the Australian Consumer Law, are outside this article and are not stated here.
What this covers
The article covers one element of misrepresentation: inducement. It does not repeat the other elements, the categories of misrepresentation, or the bars to rescission, which are dealt with in Misrepresentation and Rescission for a vitiating factor: election, affirmation and the bars. Misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law, where causation is a separate question, is covered in Misleading or deceptive conduct: remedies and causation.
Both cases were actions for fraudulent misrepresentation, in Holmes v Jones an action for deceit. Neither case says that the same rules about onus and inference apply to a negligent or an innocent misrepresentation, and this article does not say so.
Inducement is a separate element
In Holmes v Jones the plaintiffs bought a pastoral property in Queensland with its stock, and sued in deceit on a statement in a letter from the vendors’ agents about the numbers of cattle. Isaacs J said that “even granting that a defendant has made a representation that is both false and fraudulent, it may be that the plaintiff has not relied upon it, and if he has not relied upon it then he has no case.”2 He also said that “The plaintiffs have the onus of proving that the representations they complain of were material, and that they were induced to act upon them.”2
O’Connor J put the same point this way: before the plaintiffs could succeed they must show “not only that the representation was fraudulent, but also that that fraudulent representation induced the contract which was afterwards entered into”.2 Griffith CJ added a point about timing. In order that the action may be maintained, he said, the representation “must have been continuing down to the time when the contract was entered into, and must have been believed by the plaintiffs at that time, so as to be at that time an inducement to enter into the contract.”2
The inference of inducement and the two onuses
In Gould v Vaggelas Mr and Mrs Gould had bought the assets of a tourist resort on an island, through a company they formed, after Mr Vaggelas made statements about its profitability. The trial judge found the statements were fraudulent, and the respondents did not challenge that finding in the High Court. They argued that the trial judge had wrongly put on them the onus of showing the Goulds were not induced.1
Wilson J accepted that the ultimate onus of proving inducement rests on the party seeking relief for the fraudulent misrepresentation, and he said this accorded with the principle that a plaintiff carries the burden of establishing every element of the cause of action. He then explained why a defendant may still be required to answer. Where the plaintiff shows that the defendant made false statements intending to induce the contract, the statements were of a kind likely to do so, and the plaintiff entered the contract and suffered damage, “common sense would demand the conclusion” that the statements played at least some part in inducing it. The defendant can obstruct that inference by pointing to other circumstances, and Wilson J gave as the examples commonly given that the plaintiff knew the true facts, or by words or conduct disavowed reliance on the representations.1
His Honour called the defendant’s obligation “no more than an evidentiary onus - an obligation to point to the existence of circumstances which tend to rebut the inference which would ordinarily be drawn from the primary facts”. When all the facts are in, the tribunal of fact decides on the balance of probabilities whether the misrepresentations contributed to the plaintiff’s entry into the contract, and “The onus to show that they did is a condition precedent to relief and rests at all times on the plaintiff.”1 Gibbs CJ and Dawson J each said they agreed with Wilson J on this question.1
Brennan J, in separate reasons, said that an inference of inducement may be drawn when a party enters a contract after a material representation has been made, but that it is no more than an inference of fact which may be rebutted on the facts of the case. He said that if the trial judge’s reasons were understood as placing an ultimate onus on the representor an error would have appeared, and he found that they did not.1 Isaacs J in Holmes v Jones quoted Jessel MR in Redgrave v Hurd as having called the inference one of law, and added that this “has been shown since to be wrong, it is an inference of fact, not of law”. That is Isaacs J reporting an English judgment; Redgrave v Hurd itself is not among the authorities cited here, so Jessel MR’s statement is reported only as Isaacs J quoted it.2
Other influences, doubts and the claimant’s own judgment
The representation need not be the only reason the claimant entered the contract. Wilson J set out four principles that the trial judge had drawn from the authorities, after saying that his Honour “correctly elucidated the law”. The fourth was that the representation “need not be the sole inducement” and is sufficient “so long as it plays some part even if only a minor part in contributing to the formation of the contract”. Brennan J asked whether the misrepresentation alone, or with or notwithstanding other things that accompanied it, “was a real inducement, or one of the real inducements to the plaintiff to do whatever caused his loss”.1
In Gould v Vaggelas Mrs Gould had suspected Mr Vaggelas and told her accountant she did not believe him. Brennan J held that this did not prevent a finding of inducement. If a representee gives some credence to part of what was said, he reasoned, the representor “does not escape liability because the representee did not believe the representation in full”, and “the representee’s self-induced gullibility is no defence to the representor. A knave does not escape liability because he is dealing with a fool.”1 The trial judge had also found that the Goulds’ accountant could obtain no information about the resort’s financial position other than what came from Mr Vaggelas, so that “There was simply no basis on which, in the critical area, an independent judgment could be formed”, a passage that Brennan J quoted.1
Holmes v Jones shows the opposite result on the facts. The plaintiffs did not accept the offer in the letter containing the statement. They sent their own representative to inspect the station, who asked for and was read the latest returns, and they then bought on different terms for a lump sum on “walk in and walk out” conditions. Griffith CJ said that on these facts the plaintiffs relied on their agent’s report, and that “when a purchaser chooses to rely upon his own judgment or upon that of his agent, he cannot afterwards say that he relied upon a previous representation made by the vendor.” Isaacs J thought the documents and the uncontradicted evidence “absolutely conclusive that the plaintiffs did not rely upon that misrepresentation”. The appeal was allowed and the verdict entered for the defendants on the count in deceit.2
The two cases can be compared this way; the comparison is a way of organising them, not a statement either judgment makes. In Holmes v Jones the claimants had their own source of information and used it. In Gould v Vaggelas the trial judge had found that there was no independent source on the critical matter, and the claimants’ suspicion did not defeat the inference. Neither judgment says that suspicion, or an investigation, always decides the question; each turned on its findings of fact.
Where the boundaries are
- Both cases were fraudulent misrepresentation cases. Whether the same inference and onus apply to negligent or innocent misrepresentation is not established by the authorities cited here.
- Gould v Vaggelas was an appeal in which the High Court dealt with onus because it was argued; Brennan J’s observations on suspicion and “gullibility” are his reasons alone, and Wilson J’s account of the two onuses is, on this question, agreed in by Gibbs CJ and Dawson J.
- Griffith CJ’s statement about a purchaser relying on his own judgment or his agent’s is his statement. O’Connor J and Isaacs J agreed in allowing the appeal and each wrote on reliance, but this article does not say they adopted that sentence.
- The statements of Jessel MR and Lord Halsbury LC that the High Court judges quoted are English and persuasive only; they are reported here as quoted in Holmes v Jones and Gould v Vaggelas; the English reports themselves are not among the authorities cited here.
- Legislation in each State and Territory, and the Australian Consumer Law, are not stated here.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the statement and ask whether the claim is framed as fraudulent misrepresentation. If it is not, say that the authorities in this article were fraud cases and that the High Court judgments cited here do not say the same onus rules apply to negligent or innocent misrepresentation.
- State the ultimate onus first: on the authority of Gould v Vaggelas and Holmes v Jones, it rests on the claimant to prove the misrepresentation induced the contract.
- Identify the facts from which a court could infer inducement: a material statement, apparently calculated to induce the contract, followed by entry into it. Say that the inference is one of fact and may be rebutted.
- Look for rebuttal evidence: knowledge of the true facts, a disavowal of reliance by words or conduct, or, as in Holmes v Jones, reliance on the claimant’s own inspection or an agent’s report. Treat the point about relying on one’s own judgment as Griffith CJ’s statement in a case decided on its facts.
- Test any doubts or suspicion the claimant had against Gould v Vaggelas: on Brennan J’s reasons they did not prevent inducement where the claimant gave some credence to the statement and had no independent means of checking the critical matter. Do not overstate this as a rule that suspicion is never relevant.
- Ask whether the statement was still operating when the contract was made, using Griffith CJ’s statement in Holmes v Jones, and say that the representation need not be the only reason for contracting.
- State what is not established by the authorities cited here: other types of misrepresentation, and legislation.
Self-check
- Have I stated that the claimant carries the ultimate onus of proving inducement, and that the defendant’s burden is only an evidentiary one?
- Have I described the inference as an inference of fact that can be rebutted, and given the examples of rebuttal that the judges gave?
- Have I attributed the “knave” and “gullibility” passages to Brennan J alone, and the own-judgment sentence to Griffith CJ alone?
- Have I said that both cases concerned fraudulent misrepresentation, so that I do not extend them to negligent or innocent misrepresentation?
- Have I said that English statements quoted in the judgments are persuasive only and that the English reports themselves are not among the authorities cited?