Privity of contract

Who may sue on a contract, why Trident did not abolish the rule, and the routes by which a third party can nonetheless be protected.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-national, au-commonwealth
Subjects
contract
Topics
contract-formation

Learning outcomes

  • State the privity rule and attribute it to the judgment that states it.
  • Explain why Trident did not establish a general right for third parties to sue, and what each group of judges held.
  • Distinguish an objection based on privity from an objection based on want of consideration.
  • Identify the recognised routes by which a person who is not a party may nonetheless be protected.

A contract binds the people who made it. As a general rule of the Australian common law, subject to recognised exceptions, someone who is not a party cannot sue on it directly to enforce its obligations — even where the contract was plainly made for their benefit and even where they have suffered the loss. That is the privity rule.

The exceptions matter as much as the rule. Trident qualified the position for liability insurance without establishing a general third-party right; statute has displaced the rule for general insurance; and a small number of recognised routes work around it. What the rule is not is one the High Court abolished — a point this article spends some time on, because the opposite belief is common and costly.

What this covers

The general rule and the judgment that states it; why an objection on privity is not the same as an objection that the plaintiff gave no consideration; what Trident decided and, more importantly, what it did not; and the routes by which a person outside a contract may still be protected.

It does not cover the third-party provisions in the property legislation of Queensland and Western Australia, which give a wider statutory right than anything discussed here.

The elements

The rule itself is short. In Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd,1 Barwick CJ put it this way: “It must be accepted that, according to our law, a person not a party to a contract may not himself sue upon it so as directly to enforce its obligations.”

Two things follow, and the second is the one students lose marks on.

Whether someone is a party is a question of construction, not of fairness. In Coulls itself the contract named the testator’s wife, and the question that decided the case was whether the promise was made to her as well as to her husband. Taylor and Owen JJ held it was made with the husband alone.

Privity is a different objection from want of consideration. Barwick CJ warned on the same page that “questions of consideration and of privity are not always kept distinct”, and that where lack of privity is the real reason a plaintiff fails, saying the plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration is “an unnecessary and irrelevant reason”. A person can be a party who gave no consideration, and a person can give consideration without being a party. Decide which objection the facts raise.

How it works in practice

Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd2 is where this doctrine is usually said to have changed, and it is where the care is needed. A liability policy taken out by a principal extended cover to its contractors. A contractor, McNiece, was sued, and claimed on the policy it had not signed. The appeal was dismissed, so McNiece succeeded.

But the Court divided on why, and no single ratio commands a majority. Seven judges produced six sets of reasons:

  • Mason CJ and Wilson J concluded “that the principled development of the law requires that it be recognized that McNiece was entitled to succeed in the action”.
  • Toohey J did both things a student needs to notice. He formulated a rule: where an insurer issues a liability policy identifying the assured in terms showing that both insurer and assured intended it to indemnify those with whom the assured contracts for the venture covered, and it is reasonable to expect such a contractor to order its affairs by reference to the policy, the contractor may sue the insurer — despite not being a party, and despite consideration not having moved from it. And he confined it in terms: “Other situations must await another day; the terms on which special leave to appeal was granted preclude a decision in wider terms than have been expressed in these reasons.”
  • Gaudron J reached the same result by a different route: having received the agreed premium, the insurer came under an obligation to McNiece to fulfil its promise to indemnify, which McNiece could enforce.
  • Deane J kept the privity rule intact and held that McNiece “must rely upon the existence of a trust to succeed”.
  • Brennan J dissented. McNiece, he said, “endeavours to turn aside from the familiar path of privity, trust, agency and estoppel. But there is no other path unless we retrace our steps back at least to 1861. That is a course we ought not follow.”
  • Dawson J dissented on institutional grounds: the Court “is neither a legislature nor a law reform agency”, and “it would do more harm than good to attempt to reach a right result by the wrong means”.

So Trident is authority that a third party succeeded on an insurance policy, and Toohey J’s formulation is the nearest thing in it to a statable rule. It does not establish a general right for third parties to sue on contracts. A proposition drawn from one of its judgments must be attributed to that judge, and must not be presented as a binding majority holding.

The statute matters to how the case is read. Section 48 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)3 gives a third party beneficiary under a contract of general insurance a right to recover from the insurer “even though the third party beneficiary is not a party to the contract”. The judgments record that s 48, “had it been in force at the time, would have covered the very circumstances of this case”, and that it “now authorizes the sort of action which the respondent brought”. The Act was already on the books when Trident was decided; it simply did not reach the policy in suit. One of the reasons given against developing the common law was precisely that s 48 “weakens rather than strengthens the proposition that a common law exception exists” — Parliament having acted, the courts had less reason to.

Where the boundaries are

Brennan J’s dissent referred to “the familiar path of privity, trust, agency and estoppel”. Read that as an organising framework and not as an exhaustive list: privity is the obstacle to direct enforcement, not a route around it, and trust, agency and estoppel are starting points for considering how a third party may be protected. Toohey J discusses further recognised qualifications. Two more follow from the material above:

  • Joint promisee. If the promise was made to two people, the second is a party and privity does not arise. That is the construction question from Coulls, and Windeyer J’s analysis of it. Note the limit Windeyer J drew, though: a promisee obtaining specific performance of a promise to pay a third person does not thereby give that third person “any right to enforce a contract to which he was not a party”. The party’s remedy is the party’s, not the stranger’s.
  • Statute. Section 48 for general insurance, and wider provisions in some States.
  • Privity is about enforcement, not about every form of relief. In Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council4 the High Court held that although lack of privity is “a factor relevant to standing and a reason for a court approaching the question of the standing of an outsider with considerable caution”, an outsider may in exceptional circumstances have a “sufficient” or “real” interest to seek a declaration as to a contract’s meaning and effect. Do not read that as a third party’s right to a declaration whenever they are interested: the test is standing, and the caution is part of it. But if a question asks what a non-party can do, “privity” is an answer about enforcement, and it does not by itself dispose of a claim for declaratory relief.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify who is suing, and ask first whether they are a party. Construe the contract before you reach for an exception — Coulls turned on exactly that.
  2. If they are not a party, say which objection the facts raise: privity, or absence of consideration. They are not the same, and conflating them is a marked error.
  3. Work through the recognised routes — trust, agency, estoppel, joint promisee, statute — rather than asserting that the rule has been relaxed.
  4. If you rely on Trident, name the judge whose reasoning you are using and say what that judge held. Do not write that Trident created a general third-party exception, or that Toohey J’s formulation was adopted as a binding majority test.

Self-check

  • Can I state the privity rule and say which judge stated it?
  • Can I explain what Trident decided without claiming a majority ratio for it, and state Toohey J’s formulation and its limit?
  • Do I know why s 48 did not apply in Trident even though the Act existed?
  • Can I say what a joint promisee’s position is, and why a promisee’s remedy is not a third party’s?

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