Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1988

ContractContract Formation

Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107

A cement company’s liability policy named all contractors and sub-contractors as insured. A contractor sued over a worker’s injury claimed on it, though it had not signed or paid for it. Can a stranger to a contract sue on it?

Qualified by legislation: Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48, from 1 January 1986

For contracts of general insurance the practical ground is now statutory. Section 48 gives a third party beneficiary a direct right to recover from the insurer even though not a party, subject to the insured’s obligations and the insurer’s defences. The section predates this decision and the judgments discuss it -- it did not apply to the policy in suit, and the reasons record that it ‘had it been in force at the time, would have covered the very circumstances of this case’. So the common-law reasoning here is chiefly of interest where the statute does not reach; it has not been overruled.

What happened?

Blue Circle Southern Cement Ltd took out a policy with Trident General Insurance Co Ltd covering contract works, liability to the public and maintenance for work at its limestone crushing plant at Marulan. The policy defined “The Assured” as Blue Circle, all its subsidiary, associated and related companies, “all Contractors and Sub-Contractors and/or Suppliers” (Mason CJ and Wilson J [2]). Under the heading “Public Liability” it indemnified the Assured against sums the Assured became legally liable to pay in respect of any person other than one engaged in the service of the Assured under a contract of service or apprenticeship ([3]).

McNiece Bros Pty Ltd was the principal contractor for the construction work at the plant. On 4 July 1979 Gary Hammond, who was employed by another firm but worked under the direction of McNiece’s site engineer, was seriously injured while driving a crane, and he recovered judgment against McNiece for $541,768.16, less workers’ compensation payments already received ([2], [4]). McNiece sued Trident for indemnity. McNiece was not a party to the policy. Yeldham J held that there was a contract between McNiece and Trident, on the footing that McNiece had provided consideration through Blue Circle and had ratified the policy, and gave McNiece judgment ([5]-[6]).

The Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Hope, Priestley and McHugh JJA) dismissed Trident’s appeal: McHugh JA found that McNiece was not a party to the policy, that it had not provided consideration and that it had not ratified the policy in time, but accepted that a beneficiary under a policy of insurance can sue on it although not a party and although it provides no consideration ([7]-[10]). Trident appealed to the High Court on the footing that the rules that only a party can sue on a contract and that consideration must move from the promisee are fundamental ([11]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs (Order). Seven Justices sat and six sets of reasons were given: Mason CJ and Wilson J jointly, and Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ separately. The decision was given on 8 September 1988.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

The ground of the result ([2]-[35]). The appeal was dismissed, but the Court divided on why, and no single ground of decision commanded the support of a majority. Toohey J formulated a proposition he considered the Court should endorse: when an insurer issues a liability insurance policy identifying the assured in terms that evidence an intention on the part of both insurer and assured that the policy will indemnify as well those with whom the assured contracts for the purpose of the venture covered, and it is reasonable to expect that such a contractor may order its affairs by reference to the policy, the contractor may sue the insurer on the policy, notwithstanding that consideration may not have moved from the contractor to the insurer and notwithstanding that the contractor is not a party ([27]).

His Honour said that the decision would give rise to questions, whether there are other situations in which a third party may sue when consideration has not moved from the third party and what defences are available to the promisor, which “do not now require an answer”, and that the terms on which special leave to appeal was granted precluded a decision in wider terms ([28]). Mason CJ and Wilson J (joint reasons) said that the limited question was whether the old rules of privity and of consideration moving from the promisee apply to a policy of insurance ([32]), that it is the responsibility of the Court to reconsider in appropriate cases common law rules which operate unsatisfactorily and unjustly ([31]), that the argument has even greater force for a liability insurance expressed to cover the insured and its sub-contractors ([33]), and concluded that the principled development of the law requires that it be recognised that McNiece was entitled to succeed in the action ([34]).

Gaudron J, who agreed generally with the reasons of Mason CJ and Wilson J but differed in two respects, held that a promisor who has accepted an agreed consideration for a promise to benefit a third party comes under an obligation to the third party to fulfil that promise, and that the third party’s right is not a right to sue on the contract but a right independent of, though ordinarily corresponding in content and duration with, the promisor’s obligation to the promisee ([2], [12]-[13]); on the basis that Trident received the agreed premium, it came under an obligation to McNiece to indemnify it as the policy provided ([14]).

Deane J held that the policy itself prima facie created a trust in McNiece’s favour of the benefit of Trident’s promise to indemnify ([20]), declined to take the final step of recognising a direct right of action in a third party assured against the insurer in the absence of legislation ([18]-[19]), and, because McNiece had not been permitted to put its case on a trust, proposed that McNiece be given leave to join Blue Circle and that the matter stand over, the appeal being dismissed if Blue Circle submitted and Trident could not show circumstances negating or modifying the trust ([20]).

The dissenting reasons ([9]-[26], [13]-[15]). Brennan J and Dawson J would have allowed the appeal. Brennan J held that privity is a doctrine both settled and fundamental ([9]-[10]), that the problems a third party right raises call for solutions of a kind the courts are ill-placed to devise ([16]-[19]), that the injustice said to flow from the doctrine is answered by the law of trusts, agency and estoppel ([24]-[25]), and that there is no other path “unless we retrace our steps back at least to 1861”, a course the Court ought not follow ([26]).

Dawson J held that the rejection of the doctrine of privity by judicial decision could not be confined to contracts of insurance and would require the elaboration of a number of matters without which the law would be left unacceptably confused and uncertain, which are beyond the purview of a court, that the Court “is neither a legislature nor a law reform agency”, and that it “would do more harm than good to attempt to reach a right result by the wrong means” ([13]-[14]).

Dawson J also said that s 48 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), which would have covered the circumstances of the case had it been in force at the time, was not made retrospective and proves too much as a basis for a common law exception.

Why does this case matter?

Cases in which a stranger to a contract wants to enforce it invite an answer that treats the order as showing what the law is. The case rewards an answer that is exact about what was decided, and by whom, and gives less to one that reads the order alone.

Exam and application relevance

Name the year and the contract. The policy was issued in 1977, before s 48 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) commenced, and the Court was asked about a liability policy that identified the class of persons insured.

Attribute each step to the Justice whose reasons it is, and say whether you are describing the result or a route to it. The paragraph numbers in square brackets restart for each Justice’s reasons, so name the Justice with each number.

Check your understanding

1. How did the policy describe “The Assured”, and why was McNiece not a party to the policy (Mason CJ and Wilson J [2], [6]-[9])?

2. What did Toohey J say about other situations in which a third party may sue, and why did he say the Court need not decide them ([28])?

3. In what respect did Gaudron J differ from Mason CJ and Wilson J about the nature of the third party’s right ([2], [12]-[14])?

4. Why did Deane J not simply dismiss the appeal, and what course did he propose ([18]-[20])?

5. What reasons did Dawson J give for saying that it would do more harm than good to attempt to reach a right result by the wrong means ([13]-[14])?