Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd
Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118
A newspaper libelled a Member of Parliament, and the judge told the jury they could award more than compensation. English law had just narrowed that power. Should an Australian court follow it?
Qualified by legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 35, 37
Uren was a defamation case. In New South Wales s 37 of the Defamation Act 2005 provides that a plaintiff cannot be awarded exemplary or punitive damages for defamation, so in that State the case is relevant for the distinction between aggravated and exemplary damages and for the common law of exemplary damages in other torts, not for an award of exemplary or punitive damages in New South Wales defamation proceedings. Section 35(2A) provides that the cap on damages for non-economic loss does not limit the court’s power to award aggravated damages if an award of aggravated damages is warranted in the circumstances, and Sch 4 cl 7 provides that an amendment made to the Act by the Defamation Amendment Act 2020 applies only in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the amendment. The other jurisdictions’ defamation legislation may differ.
Affirmed by Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1
In Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1 the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said that in Uren “this Court affirmed that in actions for tort exemplary damages may be awarded for conduct of a sufficiently reprehensible kind”, that “in so doing it rejected for Australia the restriction placed by the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard”, and that what Uren said was not restricted to libel.
Qualified by Austral v Northern Territory [2026] HCA 20
In Austral v Northern Territory [2026] HCA 20 the joint reasons of Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ said that “While a finding of ‘conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights’ may be sufficient it is not necessary for an award of exemplary damages”, that a contumelious disregard “may arise even if the disregard of the plaintiff’s rights is unintentional or occurs by conduct believed to be lawful” ([111]), and that all the circumstances need to be considered and not only the wrongdoer’s state of mind ([115]-[116]). Windeyer J’s statement in Uren that there must be evidence at least of conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard should be read with that.
What happened?
The plaintiff, Mr Uren, was a Member of the Federal Parliament. On 10 February 1963 the defendant’s Sunday newspaper, the Sun-Herald, published in two successive editions a report that allegations were expected to be made in Parliament that two Labor members had been duped by a Russian spy into asking questions about secret defence establishments, under headlines linking Labor with a “Red Spy” (McTiernan J at 121-122). At the trial the defendant abandoned its pleas denying liability, an apology was made, and the only issue left for the jury was the amount of damages (McTiernan J at 121). The plaintiff claimed aggravated and exemplary damages (McTiernan J at 122).
The trial judge told the jury that they might, if they thought fit, award exemplary damages in addition to compensation, and the jury returned verdicts of 5,000 pounds on one count and 8,000 pounds on the other (Menzies J at 142; Owen J at 157). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had before it the House of Lords’ decision in Rookes v Barnard, ordered a new trial limited to damages, and the plaintiff appealed to the High Court by leave (McTiernan J at 122; Owen J at 157).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Each of the five Justices gave separate reasons, and four of them declined to follow the limits the House of Lords had placed on exemplary damages in Rookes v Barnard: McTiernan J said “I am not prepared to follow the House of Lords” (at 123); Taylor J was “firmly of the opinion” that the observations in Rookes v Barnard “do not express the law of this country and that they should not be followed” (at 138-139); Menzies J did not think the decision of the House of Lords should force the Court to conclude that the law here is other than it had long been taken to be (at 147); and Owen J was “firmly of opinion that that case should not be followed” (at 161).
Windeyer J accepted what he took to be the broad principle in Lord Devlin’s judgment and said that “If that were the effect of what the House of Lords has said I would only say, with respect, that we ought not to follow it”, because it would restrict the general principle that exemplary damages may be given to make it clear that tort does not pay (at 149). Taylor J described the law before Rookes v Barnard as being that exemplary damages “might be awarded if it appeared that, in the commission of the wrong complained of, the conduct of the defendant had been high-handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious or had in some other way exhibited a contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights” (at 130).
Windeyer J said that the decision should not be treated as excluding exemplary damages from any of the forms of wrongdoing for which the Court had said they might be given (at 153-154).
Windeyer J said that, whatever the position in other torts, the distinction between aggravated and exemplary damages “is not easy to make in defamation, either historically or analytically; and in practice it is hard to preserve” (at 149). The formal distinction is that aggravated damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done, while exemplary damages are intended to punish the defendant, and presumably to serve one or more of the objects of punishment, moral retribution or deterrence (at 149).
Taylor J likewise said that aggravated damages are given by way of compensation for injury to the plaintiff resulting from the circumstances and manner of the defendant’s wrongdoing, whereas exemplary damages are awarded to punish and deter, although in many cases the same circumstances might justify either (at 129-130). These are the formulations of two Justices in separate reasons.
Taylor J, Windeyer J and Owen J held that the jury should not have been told that they could award exemplary damages: Taylor J agreed with the members of the Full Court who had held that the case was not one in which the jury was at liberty to award them (at 129); Windeyer J said that there must be “evidence of some positive misconduct to justify a verdict for exemplary damages”, at least evidence of “conscious wrong-doing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights”, and that “Epithets without evidence will not suffice” (at 153-154); and Owen J held that the trial judge had misdirected the jury (at 161).
McTiernan J and Menzies J held the direction was correct, because the jury could find that each publication was made in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s right to his good name, and would have restored the verdicts (McTiernan J at 123-128; Menzies J at 143, 147-148).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ (separate reasons)
Read judgment: p 123 (opens in a new tab), pp 129–130 (opens in a new tab), pp 138–139 (opens in a new tab), pp 147–148 (opens in a new tab), p 149 (opens in a new tab), pp 153–154 (opens in a new tab), p 158 (opens in a new tab), p 161 (opens in a new tab)
The rejection of the restrictive reading of Rookes does not have the same role in all five reasons. McTiernan and Menzies JJ needed the wider Australian rule to allow the appeal, but dissented in the result. Taylor J held the direction erroneous under either approach, yet considered the Rookes question necessary to settle for the new trial. Windeyer J accepted a broad principle while rejecting the narrow reading urged by counsel. Owen J expressly said the appeal could be decided without resolving Rookes and addressed it because it might arise on retrial; his rejection is obiter on his stated ground. The shared rejection of narrow limits should therefore not be presented as an undifferentiated ratio of the judges who dismissed the appeal.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Taylor J
Read judgment: pp 129–130 (opens in a new tab)
The distinction between compensation for aggravated injury and punishment identifies the additional element the jury had been permitted to award. It underpins Taylor J’s conclusion that the exemplary-damages direction was erroneous and that the new trial should stand. His reference to punishment and deterrence adopts Lord Devlin’s description of purpose without adopting the restrictive categories.
Ratio · Windeyer J
Read judgment: p 149 (opens in a new tab), pp 152–154 (opens in a new tab)
The formal distinction supplies the basis for Windeyer J’s conclusion that aggravating circumstances do not by themselves justify a punitive addition. Despite the practical difficulty of separating the awards in defamation, he held that an exemplary direction required evidence warranting punishment and that its absence required a new trial. This is reasoning supporting his concurrence in dismissal, rather than a joint formulation by the Court.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ (separate reasons)
Read judgment: p 129 (opens in a new tab), pp 153–154 (opens in a new tab), p 158 (opens in a new tab), p 161 (opens in a new tab)
Each of these Justices dismissed the appeal because the evidence did not justify leaving exemplary damages to the jury. The erroneous direction was the ground for preserving the new trial. Windeyer J’s requirement of evidence of positive misconduct explains his application of that ground; the quoted conscious-wrongdoing formulation is his reasoning, subject to the later qualification recorded with this proposition.
Separate reasoning · McTiernan and Menzies JJ (dissenting in the result)
Read judgment: pp 123–125 (opens in a new tab), pp 127–128 (opens in a new tab), p 143 (opens in a new tab), pp 147–148 (opens in a new tab)
These Justices dissented in the result: each found a sufficient evidentiary basis for exemplary damages and would have restored the verdicts. McTiernan J relied on the wanton publications and circumstances supporting malice; Menzies J considered that the jury could find a reckless and arrogant attack on reputation to attract newspaper custom. Their assessment of the evidence is the opposing route, not part of the majority ground requiring a new trial.
Why does this case matter?
Uren is the source of a formulation of the distinction between aggravated and exemplary damages that later High Court judgments quote, and an answer that uses that distinction is relying on one Justice’s words from a defamation appeal.
Exam and application relevance
Attribute each statement to the Justice who made it, with the page, and remember that the Justices were not united on the result.
For exemplary damages in defamation in New South Wales, read s 37 of the Defamation Act 2005.
Check your understanding
1. What did the trial judge tell the jury about exemplary damages, and what order did the Full Court make (McTiernan J at 122; Owen J at 157)?
2. Which Justices declined to follow Rookes v Barnard, and how did Windeyer J put his position (at 123, 138-139, 147, 149, 161)?
3. How did Windeyer J distinguish aggravated from exemplary damages, and what did he say about the distinction in defamation (at 149)?
4. What did Windeyer J say there must be evidence of before a verdict for exemplary damages (at 153-154)?
5. Which Justices would have restored the jury’s verdicts (McTiernan J at 128; Menzies J at 148)?