Lamb v Cotogno

High Court of Australia · 1987

TortsTort Damages

Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1

A man threw himself across the bonnet of a car, and the driver swerved down the road to shake him off, then drove away. The driver’s compulsory insurer would pay any award. Could a court still order exemplary damages?

Affirmed by Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1

In Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ declined to reopen Lamb v Cotogno, describing it as a recent judgment of the Court in which the five Justices who heard the matter gave a single set of reasons ([33]), and said that the fact that the tortfeasor was insured under a compulsory scheme of insurance against liability for exemplary damages would not bar the award ([34]). Kirby J applied Lamb v Cotogno as binding authority ([81]-[83]).

Qualified by legislation: Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) s 4.20

Lamb states the common law position that compulsory insurance does not bar exemplary damages where no statute says otherwise. Section 4.20 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) now provides that exemplary or punitive damages cannot be awarded to a person in respect of a motor accident.

Qualified by legislation: Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 113A, from 29 October 1998

Section 113A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), in force from 29 October 1998, provides that an insurer is not liable to pay any aggravated damages or exemplary or punitive damages awarded in an action against the insured person in respect of death or bodily injury caused by or arising out of the use of a motor vehicle insured under that Part, and that the insured person is not entitled to be indemnified by the insurer in respect of such an award.

Qualified by Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1

In Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that where the criminal law has been brought to bear on the wrongdoer and substantial punishment inflicted for what is substantially the same conduct as that in the civil proceeding, exemplary damages may not be awarded ([40]), and the joint reasons in Austral v Northern Territory [2026] HCA 20 restated that holding ([113]). The availability of exemplary damages that Lamb v Cotogno describes is therefore subject to that bar. Gray noted that the defendant in Lamb v Cotogno had been convicted of an offence arising out of the incident, but that no point was made of that fact on the appeal to this Court (footnote to [50]).

What happened?

The defendant went to a property owned by the plaintiff in the evening to serve a summons. The plaintiff refused to accept it, the defendant walked back to his car and dropped the summons on the ground, and as he backed the car out of the driveway the plaintiff ran towards it shouting that he would kill the defendant. The defendant began to drive away. The plaintiff threw himself across the bonnet and held on, and the defendant drove about 400 metres at 35 to 40 kilometres an hour, veering from side to side to dislodge him, then braked sharply.

The plaintiff was propelled across the bonnet and fell to the roadway, and the defendant drove off. About half an hour later a neighbour found the plaintiff lying on the road, with fractures in the bones of both feet and other injuries. The defendant was recovering from an operation on his left leg and said that he feared injury to it.

The master of the Supreme Court of New South Wales awarded damages for trespass to the person of $203,570, which included $5,000 in exemplary damages. By majority the Court of Appeal (Kirby P dissenting) dismissed the defendant’s cross-appeal on exemplary damages and increased the general damages. The defendant appealed to the High Court by special leave, confined to the exemplary damages. The plaintiff died before the hearing and the administratrix of his estate was substituted as respondent.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. The five Justices gave a single joint judgment.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

In the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, the fact that the defendant was insured against liability for the injury under the compulsory third-party insurance scheme in the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW) did not preclude an award of exemplary damages for trespass to the person. The Court said of the argument that “Clearly there is strength in that submission”, that since the object of exemplary damages is to punish and deter it is inappropriate to award them where the wrongdoer is insured, “but in our view it cannot succeed”.

The object or effect of exemplary damages is not wholly punishment, and “the deterrence which is intended extends beyond the actual wrongdoer and the exact nature of his wrongdoing” (at 9); exemplary damages also serve to assuage any urge for revenge felt by victims and to discourage self-help (at 9-10). Even if the defendant does not bear the cost, an award “does serve to mark the court’s condemnation of the defendant’s behaviour” . The argument was in substance that exemplary damages are unavailable as a matter of law where the defendant is indemnified under the Act, and “That Act, of course, says nothing about exemplary damages”: a statute may abrogate a rule of law expressly or impliedly, but it was not suggested that this one did, and nothing in it suggested an intention to disturb the common law position.

The joint judgment said that in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd this Court “affirmed that in actions for tort exemplary damages may be awarded for conduct of a sufficiently reprehensible kind”, and that “in so doing it rejected for Australia the restriction placed by the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard”, which had limited exemplary damages to three kinds of case. The Court said that the well-settled approach in Australia extended exemplary damages to a wider range of torts than libel, and that the Court had proceeded on that basis for trespass to the person and trespass to land.

It also distinguished aggravated damages from exemplary damages: “Aggravated damages, in contrast to exemplary damages, are compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, go beyond compensation” and are awarded to punish and deter. The Court did not need to differentiate them further because the plaintiff had neither claimed nor been awarded aggravated damages.

The Court held that the master’s finding that the defendant acted without malice did not disentitle the plaintiff to exemplary damages: “the intent or recklessness necessary to justify an award of exemplary damages may be found in contumelious behaviour which falls short of being malicious” (at 12-13). Abandoning the injured plaintiff on a dark road could be seen as a cruel or reckless disregard for his welfare, colouring the whole of the defendant’s conduct, so that the tort was committed in circumstances amounting to an insult (at 12-13).

The Court added that “With exemplary damages, unlike compensatory damages, provocation may operate to prevent an award or to reduce the amount which might otherwise be awarded”, but the master had accepted the defendant’s version of events and was not to be supposed to have ignored the plaintiff’s conduct. The Court dismissed the appeal: “Whilst it is far from clear that this case called for such an award, we are not persuaded that we would be justified in departing from the order of the master” in circumstances where his conclusion was essentially based on an assessment of fact and was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Why does this case matter?

The decision is a starting point for a problem in which the party who will pay an award is not the wrongdoer, and in which a statute may or may not displace the common law position.

Exam and application relevance

Give the page for each passage you rely on, and say that the decision was made under the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW). Where a problem is set in a jurisdiction with its own provision on insurance and exemplary damages, read that provision before relying on Lamb v Cotogno.

Check your understanding

1. What was the defendant’s argument about compulsory insurance and the purposes of exemplary damages?

2. What did this Court do about the restriction on exemplary damages placed by the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard?

3. How did the Court distinguish aggravated damages from exemplary damages?

4. Did the master’s finding that the defendant acted without malice defeat the award, and why not?

5. How did the Court say provocation affects exemplary damages, compared with compensatory damages?