Cheng v Farjudi

Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal · 2016

TortsTort Damages

Cheng v Farjudi [2016] NSWCA 316

A man who pleaded guilty to assault was given a 12 month good behaviour bond. His victim then sued for damages, including exemplary damages. Does the criminal sanction settle whether he can recover them?

What happened?

At about 9.30pm on 15 September 2011, Jeffrey Cheng and Rostam Farjudi were each playing poker machines, with their wives, in the Reno Gambling Room at the Parramatta Leagues Club (Beazley P at [1], [3]). After an exchange of words between Mr Cheng and Mrs Farjudi about noise, Mr Farjudi walked towards the Chengs, raised his left arm and said something; Mr Cheng stood up and fought him ([4]). The trial judge found that Mr Cheng assaulted Mr Farjudi, delivering at least two blows to his face, and that Mr Cheng had not acted in defence of his wife ([6], [12]). Mr Farjudi suffered a fracture to the floor of the right orbit and post-traumatic stress disorder ([7]). He was 68 years old, and the trial judge described Mr Cheng as younger, bigger, stronger and fitter ([46]).

Mr Cheng had been the subject of criminal charges. He pleaded guilty to a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and a 12 month good behaviour bond was imposed under s 9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ([48]). In Mr Farjudi’s civil claim in the District Court, Mr Cheng’s amended defence admitted the guilty plea but pleaded that it was a plea of convenience, and denied that he had struck Mr Farjudi or committed a battery ([8], [94], [95]). He also pleaded self-defence under s 52 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and, alternatively, the damages limitation in s 53 ([9]). Sidis ADCJ found him liable and awarded general damages of $100,000 and exemplary damages of $10,000, among other sums ([13]). Her Honour dealt with the bond, and with the position Mr Cheng took in the civil proceedings, when deciding to award exemplary damages ([47]-[48]).

On appeal Mr Cheng challenged the findings of fact, the award of exemplary damages and the award for future out-of-pocket expenses ([14]). He contended that there was no proper basis for the award of exemplary damages ([44]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Beazley P, Ward JA and Harrison J) dismissed the appeal, corrected an arithmetical error in the judgment sum under the slip rule, from $210,927 to $200,099, and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal ([126]-[128]). The challenges to the trial judge’s findings of fact failed, s 52 was not engaged and s 53 did not apply ([20], [37], [42]-[43]), and the ground challenging the award for future out-of-pocket expenses failed ([125]). The ground challenging the award of exemplary damages was dismissed ([113]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Beazley P (with whom Ward JA and Harrison J agreed: [129], [130]) said that the position in Australia is that exemplary damages may not be awarded where substantial criminal punishment has been imposed, but that the High Court in Gray v Motor Accident Commission did not preclude an award where something other than substantial punishment was imposed, so that exemplary damages may be awarded in some circumstances notwithstanding that a criminal sanction has been imposed ([87]). Gray itself did not decide what is substantial punishment, a question its joint reasons raised ([63]-[66], [99]).

Beazley P said that it is a different thing to say that a penalty such as a bond carries serious consequences and to say that it was substantial punishment, that there may be limits in the evidence before a civil court ([101]), and that there are further significant reasons why a civil court should not engage with the question whether a sentence was substantial: judicial comity, the presumption that a sentence, unless appealed, is correct, the assumption that the sentencing officer had regard to the purposes of sentencing in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), and the likeness of such a finding to a collateral attack ([102]-[103]).

She was “not prepared to find that a conviction recorded and the imposition of a bond was not a substantial penalty”: there was no evidence why a bond was imposed rather than a sentence of imprisonment, and it must be assumed that the sentencing officer had regard to all relevant circumstances and to the purposes of sentencing in s 3A ([105]). She thereby differed from the trial judge, who had accepted that the 12 month bond was minimal and unlikely to meet the objectives of an award of exemplary damages ([106]; see [48]).

Because she was not prepared to find that the penalty was not substantial, Beazley P asked whether exemplary damages ought to have been awarded “for some unusual reason”, which in this case could be, “if at all”, only the manner in which the appellant conducted the litigation ([107]). She held that his conduct in denying the assault and in swearing a defence that he had pleaded guilty only “for convenience” demonstrated “a continuing contumelious disregard for the respondent’s rights”, including by requiring the respondent to engage in a seven day trial to vindicate his civil right to damages, in circumstances where the CCTV footage made the denial of the assault and the claim of unlawful conduct by the respondent untenable ([110]).

The manner in which the appellant defended the claim was unusual in the sense used in Gray ([111]). She considered this an appropriate case for exemplary damages, albeit for reasons not entirely in accord with the trial judge’s, and did not disturb the $10,000 awarded, whose amount the appellant had not challenged ([44], [112]). In doing so she noted the observation, in a defamation case, that an award of exemplary damages is not confined to the conduct surrounding the commission of the tort and may be made for reprehensible conduct by the defendant subsequent to the publication, while observing that in that case the later conduct was not considered to reach the threshold of contumelious and conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights ([55]-[56]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Beazley P (Ward JA and Harrison J agreeing)

Read judgment: [87] (opens in a new tab), [104]–[106] (opens in a new tab)

Beazley P’s statement of the position after Gray ([87]) and her refusal to find that a recorded conviction and a bond was not a substantial penalty ([105]) are the steps that lead her to ask whether some unusual reason supported the award ([107]); the order dismissing the exemplary damages ground depends on them.

Classification unresolved · Beazley P (Ward JA and Harrison J agreeing)

Read judgment: [101]–[103] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs give general reasons why a civil court should not engage with whether a sentence was substantial, and [103] says a finding that it was not would seem to be a collateral attack. The conclusion at [105] is put on the absence of evidence and an assumption about the sentencing officer, and the appeal was resolved on the separate ground ([107]-[112]), so a binary ratio or obiter label would conceal that the general reasoning is wider than the step it supports.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Beazley P (Ward JA and Harrison J agreeing)

Read judgment: [107]–[110] (opens in a new tab), [112] (opens in a new tab)

Having declined to find the penalty insubstantial, Beazley P upheld the $10,000 award only on the ground of the manner in which the civil proceedings were conducted ([107], [110], [112]); that ground is necessary to the dismissal of the exemplary damages part of the appeal.

Obiter · Beazley P (Ward JA and Harrison J agreeing)

Read judgment: [111] (opens in a new tab)

The second sentence of [111], that the position would have been different had the case been conducted on the basis that the respondent was put to proof of his damages claim, describes facts that did not occur and is not needed for the result.

Why does this case matter?

After a criminal sanction a plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages is often treated as finished, or a lenient sanction is treated as an invitation to look behind the sentence. This decision shows how an intermediate appellate court handled a claim for exemplary damages after a non-custodial sanction, and what it looked at in deciding the appeal.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about exemplary damages where the defendant has also faced criminal proceedings, set out the sanction actually imposed (a conviction, a custodial term, a bond, a fine), how closely the criminal charge matches the conduct sued on, and what evidence a civil court would have about why that sanction was imposed. Then ask whether anything in the defendant’s conduct of the civil proceedings is relied on as showing disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, and take that from the pleadings and the evidence as the judgment does ([94]-[95], [108], [110]).

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales: it binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive, not binding, elsewhere. The judgment applies the High Court’s decision in Gray v Motor Accident Commission, so the bar and what Gray left open are to be taken from Gray itself.

Check your understanding

1. Where and when did the assault happen, how many blows did the trial judge find Mr Cheng delivered at least, and what injuries did Mr Farjudi suffer ([1], [6], [7])?

2. What criminal sanction was imposed on Mr Cheng, and what did the trial judge say about the bond ([48])?

3. What did Mr Cheng plead in the civil proceedings about his guilty plea, and what did he deny ([8], [94], [95])?

4. What did Beazley P say the High Court held in Gray about the award of exemplary damages where substantial punishment has been imposed, and what did she say Gray did not preclude ([57], [87])?

5. Which reasons did Beazley P give for saying that a civil court should not engage with whether a sentence was substantial ([101]-[103])?

6. What did Beazley P say was not known about why a bond rather than imprisonment was imposed ([105])?

7. What orders did the Court make ([128])?