Aggravated and exemplary damages

How Australian tort law treats aggravated damages (compensatory) and exemplary damages (punitive): when exemplary damages are available, the effect of insurance and criminal punishment, and the limit in section 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, sa
Subjects
torts
Topics
tort-damages

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish aggravated damages from exemplary damages by purpose, and say which questions the High Court has addressed for exemplary damages.
  • State when exemplary damages are available at common law, including the effect of insurance and of earlier criminal punishment, attributing each proposition to the court and the Justices who stated it.
  • Apply section 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and section 3B to a personal injury claim, and say which statutes are not covered for other jurisdictions.

Compensatory damages answer the plaintiff’s loss. Two further awards respond to how the defendant behaved and do different work: aggravated damages compensate, and exemplary damages punish. A student must first ask which is claimed, because the High Court’s decisions on conscious wrongdoing, insurance and earlier criminal punishment were decided for exemplary damages, and a statute may treat the two together. This article states the common law as the High Court has stated it; those decisions bind lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. The only civil liability statute stated here is the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), with the other statutory provisions named below. The legislation of the other jurisdictions is not covered here and may differ. It builds on Damages, which covers the compensatory heads.

Two awards with different purposes

In Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 1181, a defamation appeal in which five Justices wrote separately, Windeyer J said that the formal distinction is that “aggravated damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done”, whereas exemplary damages “are intended to punish the defendant” (at 149). He added that in practice the distinction “is hard to preserve” in defamation (at 149). In New South Wales a plaintiff cannot now be awarded exemplary or punitive damages for defamation (Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 377), although s 35(2A) preserves the power to award aggravated damages if warranted (for publications after the 2020 amendment commenced), so Uren is used there for the distinction and not for an exemplary award.

The joint judgment in Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 12 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) said that aggravated damages “are compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like”, while exemplary damages “go beyond compensation”. The joint reasons in Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 13 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) added that for exemplary damages the first focus is “upon the wrongdoer, not upon the party who was wronged”, whereas the wronged party’s reaction to high-handed conduct “may well be a reason for awarding aggravated damages”. In Gray a claim for aggravated damages first raised on appeal came too late, because it had not been pleaded and no evidence had been given in support of it.

When exemplary damages are available

Lamb records that Uren affirmed that “in actions for tort exemplary damages may be awarded for conduct of a sufficiently reprehensible kind”, and rejected for Australia the House of Lords’ restriction of such awards in Rookes v Barnard. The joint reasons in Gray said that exemplary damages are “awarded rarely”, that fault alone is not enough (“Something more must be found”), and that Knox CJ’s phrase, “conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights”, describes “at least the greater part of the relevant field”.

The High Court restated the position in June 2026 in Austral v Northern Territory [2026] HCA 204. Four detainees at the Don Dale Youth Detention Centre had been exposed to CS gas deployed by prison officers, and the High Court had earlier held that this was an unlawful battery of them. On the remitter the assessing judge awarded each $200,000 in exemplary damages against the Northern Territory, and the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory set the awards aside. In the joint reasons of Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ the High Court held that the Court of Appeal had treated the officers’ inferred belief that the conduct was lawful as effectively determinative, which was “wrong in principle, as a wrongdoer’s state of mind does not cover the field of circumstances which might justify an award of exemplary damages” ([115]). Their Honours said that exemplary damages share the purposes of punishment, including moral retribution, deterrence and denunciation ([110]), and that while a finding of “conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights” may be sufficient, “it is not necessary” ([111]). They also said that a contumelious disregard may arise even where the disregard is unintentional or occurs by conduct believed to be lawful ([111]). Gageler CJ and Steward J dissented on the appeals, finding no error in the Court of Appeal’s reasons, and said that they would have joined the joint reasons on the cross-appeal.

On the cross-appeal the joint reasons held that the quantum of an exemplary award “must be proportionate to the wrongdoing in the sense of being moderate and not excessive” ([141]), held that a total of $800,000 substantially exceeded what moral retribution, deterrence and denunciation required, and apportioned $200,000 equally, so that each award became $50,000 ([146], [148]).

Lamb itself concerned a motorist who drove off with the plaintiff clinging to the bonnet, braked so that he fell, and left him injured on a darkened road. The master found nothing malicious in the defendant’s conduct but called his abandonment of the plaintiff callous, and awarded $5,000. The joint reasons held that “the intent or recklessness necessary to justify an award of exemplary damages may be found in contumelious behaviour which falls short of being malicious”, said it was “far from clear that this case called for such an award”, and declined to disturb a conclusion resting on an assessment of fact.

Insurance and earlier criminal punishment

In Lamb the defendant argued that exemplary damages cannot serve their purpose where compulsory third-party insurance means that an insurer pays. The joint reasons accepted that “there is strength in that submission” but held that it could not succeed: the deterrence intended “extends beyond the actual wrongdoer”, and an award “does serve to mark the court’s condemnation of the defendant’s behaviour”. They found nothing in the insurance statute then in force restricting the remedy. In Gray the joint reasons declined to reopen Lamb and held that the tortfeasor’s compulsory insurance would be no bar. Legislation has since restricted this in places: in New South Wales exemplary or punitive damages cannot be awarded in respect of a motor accident (Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) s 4.208), and in South Australia the insurer is not liable for them and the insured is not indemnified (Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 113A9). Read with those statutes, Lamb states a common law position that applies where no statute displaces it.

In Gray a driver deliberately drove at the 16-year-old appellant, was convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. The joint reasons held that where “the criminal law has been brought to bear upon the wrongdoer and substantial punishment inflicted”, exemplary damages “may not be awarded”, because substantial punishment for substantially the same conduct “is a bar to the award”, not a matter of discretion. They did not decide whether the punishment must be substantial, how close the conduct must be, or the position after an acquittal, while a prosecution is pending, or where only a non-custodial penalty is imposed. The joint reasons in Austral restated the bar ([113]). Kirby J and Callinan J gave separate reasons in Gray treating criminal punishment as relevant within a discretion.

In Cheng v Farjudi [2016] NSWCA 3165, the New South Wales Court of Appeal applied Gray to a defendant who had pleaded guilty to assault and been given a 12-month good behaviour bond. Beazley P, with whom Ward JA and Harrison J agreed, was not prepared to find that this was not substantial punishment, but upheld exemplary damages on a separate ground: the defendant’s denial of the assault on oath in the civil proceedings was “a continuing contumelious disregard for the respondent’s rights”. That is an intermediate appellate decision, not binding on the High Court.

Negligence and the New South Wales statute

The joint reasons in Gray said that “exemplary damages could not properly be awarded in a case of alleged negligence in which there was no conscious wrongdoing by the defendant”, although there can be cases framed in negligence where the defendant acted consciously in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. That was said before Austral, which held that conscious wrongdoing is not necessary; Austral concerned battery and does not address negligence claims.

In New South Wales, s 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)6, read in the version current from 30 July 2026, provides that in an action for personal injury damages where the act or omission that caused the injury or death was negligence, “a court cannot award exemplary or punitive damages or damages in the nature of aggravated damages”. Section 11A applies Part 2 to awards of personal injury damages whether the claim is in tort, contract or statute, except awards excluded by s 3B.

Section 3B(1)(a) excludes the whole Act, with listed exceptions that do not include s 21, for the civil liability of a person in respect of an intentional act done by that person with intent to cause injury or death, or sexual assault or other sexual misconduct committed by that person. Section 21 therefore does not generally apply to that liability, and the common law described above is the starting point there, subject to any other statute. One exception is s 53(2)(a), which reapplies Part 2 other than Division 3 despite s 3B(1)(a) where damages are awarded under s 53(1) for conduct that would have been self-defence but was not a reasonable response; s 21 is in Division 6, and whether its negligence condition is met is a separate question. Section 3B(1) also excludes awards under specified motor accident and workers compensation provisions, and s 3B(2), which lists the provisions continuing to apply to motor accidents, does not list s 21. This article does not address how s 21 applies to a claim framed both in negligence and in an intentional tort, or to conduct that is reckless but not done with intent to cause injury.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the cause of action and the award claimed. Keep aggravated damages (compensation for injury to feelings from the manner of the wrong, which Gray shows should be pleaded and supported by evidence) separate from exemplary damages (punishment).
  2. Fix the jurisdiction and look at the statutes before the common law: in New South Wales, ss 3B and 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 for a personal injury claim, s 4.20 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 for a motor accident, and s 37 of the Defamation Act 2005 for defamation. For another jurisdiction, find its legislation, which is not covered here.
  3. For exemplary damages, ask whether the conduct showed conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, which Austral (joint reasons) says may be sufficient but is not necessary. Do not treat a belief that the conduct was lawful as determinative.
  4. Ask whether the defendant has been convicted and substantially punished for substantially the same conduct. If so, say that the four-Justice joint reasons in Gray treat that as a bar, note that Kirby J and Callinan J treated it as relevant within a discretion, and identify which questions the joint reasons left open your facts raise. Cite Cheng v Farjudi as a New South Wales Court of Appeal decision only.
  5. Do not treat the defendant’s insurance as a bar at common law (Lamb; Gray, joint reasons), and check whether a statute such as those in step 2 or South Australia’s s 113A displaces that.
  6. If exemplary damages are available, ask whether the amount is proportionate to the wrongdoing and not excessive (Austral, joint reasons).

Self-check

  • Have I kept the compensatory purpose of aggravated damages apart from the punitive purpose of exemplary damages?
  • Have I attributed the criminal punishment bar to the joint reasons in Gray, and said what Kirby J and Callinan J did instead?
  • Have I named the jurisdiction, and said which statutes were read?

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