Aggravated and exemplary damages

Two awards with different purposes

Aggravated and exemplary damages serve different purposes. In Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd, Windeyer J explained the distinction. Aggravated damages compensate a plaintiff when a wrongful act’s harm was made worse by how it was done. Exemplary damages instead punish the defendant. He noted this distinction is hard to maintain in defamation cases.

In New South Wales, the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 37 now bars exemplary or punitive damages for defamation. However, s 35(2A) still allows aggravated damages where warranted, for publications after the 2020 amendment. So Uren is still used there, but only for explaining the distinction, not for awarding exemplary damages.

Lamb v Cotogno described aggravated damages as compensatory. They cover injury to feelings from insult or humiliation. Exemplary damages go further than compensation.

Gray v Motor Accident Commission explained that exemplary damages focus on the wrongdoer, not the wronged party. A plaintiff’s reaction to high-handed conduct may instead support an award of aggravated damages. In Gray, a claim for aggravated damages raised only on appeal failed. It had not been pleaded, and no evidence supported it.

Insurance and earlier criminal punishment

In Lamb, the defendant argued exemplary damages are pointless if an insurer pays through compulsory third-party insurance. The court accepted this had some force, but rejected it. It reasoned that deterrence extends beyond the actual wrongdoer, and an award still condemns the defendant’s behaviour. No statute then in force restricted this.

In Gray, the court declined to reopen Lamb and held compulsory insurance is no bar. Since then, legislation has restricted this in places. In New South Wales, exemplary or punitive damages cannot be awarded for a motor accident (Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) s 4.20). In South Australia, the insurer is not liable for them and the insured is not indemnified (Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 113A). Lamb therefore states the common law position, applying only where no statute displaces it.

In Gray, a driver deliberately drove at the 16-year-old appellant. He was convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. The court held that where the criminal law has already inflicted “substantial punishment” for substantially the same conduct, exemplary damages may not be awarded. This is a strict bar, not something left to the court’s discretion.

The court left several questions open: how substantial the punishment must be, how closely the conduct must match, and what happens after an acquittal, during a pending prosecution, or where only a non-custodial penalty was imposed. Austral later restated this bar. Kirby J and Callinan J, in separate reasons in Gray, treated criminal punishment as relevant to discretion, not as an absolute bar.

In Cheng v Farjudi [2016] NSWCA 316, the NSW Court of Appeal applied Gray. The defendant had pleaded guilty to assault and received a 12-month good behaviour bond (a court order requiring good conduct, without further penalty). Beazley P was not willing to say this was not substantial punishment.

But her Honour upheld exemplary damages on a different basis: the defendant had falsely denied the assault on oath in the civil case. This was found to be a continuing contumelious disregard for the respondent’s rights — persistent, contemptuous defiance of the respondent’s legal rights. This is only an intermediate appellate decision.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by identifying the cause of action and the damages claimed. Keep aggravated damages (compensation for hurt feelings caused by the manner of the wrong) separate from exemplary damages (damages meant to punish). Gray says aggravated damages should be pleaded and supported by evidence.

Next, check the jurisdiction and apply relevant statutes before common law. In New South Wales: ss 3B and 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 for personal injury, s 4.20 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 for motor accidents, and s 37 of the Defamation Act 2005 for defamation. Other jurisdictions have their own legislation, not covered here.

For exemplary damages, ask whether the conduct was conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights (deliberate conduct showing contempt for those rights). Austral (joint reasons) says this may be enough, but it isn’t a strict requirement. A belief that the conduct was lawful does not settle the question.

Then check whether the defendant has already been convicted and substantially punished for the same conduct. If so, the four-Justice joint reasons in Gray treat this as a bar to exemplary damages. Kirby J and Callinan J instead treated it as relevant to a discretion. Identify which questions the Gray joint reasons left open that your facts raise. Cite Cheng v Farjudi only as a New South Wales Court of Appeal decision.

At common law, the defendant’s insurance is not a bar to exemplary damages (Lamb; Gray, joint reasons). Check whether a statute, such as those mentioned above or South Australia’s s 113A, displaces that position.

Finally, if exemplary damages are available, ask whether the amount is proportionate to the wrongdoing and not excessive (Austral, joint reasons).

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