Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1966

TortsTort Damages

Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118

A newspaper libelled a Member of Parliament, and the judge told the jury they could award more than compensation. English law had just narrowed that power. Should an Australian court follow it?

Qualified by legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 35, 37

Uren was a defamation case. In New South Wales s 37 of the Defamation Act 2005 provides that a plaintiff cannot be awarded exemplary or punitive damages for defamation, so in that State the case is relevant for the distinction between aggravated and exemplary damages and for the common law of exemplary damages in other torts, not for an award of exemplary or punitive damages in New South Wales defamation proceedings. Section 35(2A) provides that the cap on damages for non-economic loss does not limit the court’s power to award aggravated damages if an award of aggravated damages is warranted in the circumstances, and Sch 4 cl 7 provides that an amendment made to the Act by the Defamation Amendment Act 2020 applies only in relation to the publication of defamatory matter after the commencement of the amendment. The other jurisdictions’ defamation legislation may differ.

Affirmed by Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1

In Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1 the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said that in Uren “this Court affirmed that in actions for tort exemplary damages may be awarded for conduct of a sufficiently reprehensible kind”, that “in so doing it rejected for Australia the restriction placed by the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard”, and that what Uren said was not restricted to libel.

Qualified by Austral v Northern Territory [2026] HCA 20

In Austral v Northern Territory [2026] HCA 20 the joint reasons of Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ said that “While a finding of ‘conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights’ may be sufficient it is not necessary for an award of exemplary damages”, that a contumelious disregard “may arise even if the disregard of the plaintiff’s rights is unintentional or occurs by conduct believed to be lawful” ([111]), and that all the circumstances need to be considered and not only the wrongdoer’s state of mind ([115]-[116]). Windeyer J’s statement in Uren that there must be evidence at least of conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard should be read with that.

What happened?

Mr Uren, a federal MP, was defamed by the Sun-Herald’s “Red Spy” reports in February 1963. The defendant later admitted liability; only damages went to the jury, which awarded exemplary and compensatory sums. The NSW Full Court, considering the House of Lords’ Rookes v Barnard, ordered a new trial on damages. Uren appealed to the High Court. What should the High Court decide about exemplary damages here?

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

All five Justices wrote separate reasons. Four of them refused to follow the House of Lords’ limits on exemplary damages set in Rookes v Barnard. McTiernan J, Taylor J, Menzies J and Owen J each said that case should not be followed here.

Windeyer J took a different path. He accepted the broad principle he found in Lord Devlin’s judgment. But he said that if it restricted exemplary damages in the way suggested, it should not be followed either.

Taylor J described the pre-Rookes law: exemplary damages might be awarded where the defendant’s conduct was high-handed, insolent, vindictive, malicious, or showed contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. Windeyer J said the decision should not be read as excluding exemplary damages from any wrongdoing the Court had previously allowed them for.

Windeyer J also noted that in defamation, distinguishing aggravated from exemplary damages is difficult, both historically and analytically. Formally, aggravated damages compensate the plaintiff where the wrongful act’s manner aggravated the harm. Exemplary damages instead punish the defendant, serving retribution or deterrence. Taylor J gave a similar distinction, though he noted the same facts might often support either award.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ (separate reasons)

Read judgment: p 123 (opens in a new tab), pp 129–130 (opens in a new tab), pp 138–139 (opens in a new tab), pp 147–148 (opens in a new tab), p 149 (opens in a new tab), pp 153–154 (opens in a new tab), p 158 (opens in a new tab), p 161 (opens in a new tab)

The rejection of the restrictive reading of Rookes does not have the same role in all five reasons. McTiernan and Menzies JJ needed the wider Australian rule to allow the appeal, but dissented in the result. Taylor J held the direction erroneous under either approach, yet considered the Rookes question necessary to settle for the new trial. Windeyer J accepted a broad principle while rejecting the narrow reading urged by counsel. Owen J expressly said the appeal could be decided without resolving Rookes and addressed it because it might arise on retrial; his rejection is obiter on his stated ground. The shared rejection of narrow limits should therefore not be presented as an undifferentiated ratio of the judges who dismissed the appeal.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Taylor J

Read judgment: pp 129–130 (opens in a new tab)

The distinction between compensation for aggravated injury and punishment identifies the additional element the jury had been permitted to award. It underpins Taylor J’s conclusion that the exemplary-damages direction was erroneous and that the new trial should stand. His reference to punishment and deterrence adopts Lord Devlin’s description of purpose without adopting the restrictive categories.

Ratio · Windeyer J

Read judgment: p 149 (opens in a new tab), pp 152–154 (opens in a new tab)

The formal distinction supplies the basis for Windeyer J’s conclusion that aggravating circumstances do not by themselves justify a punitive addition. Despite the practical difficulty of separating the awards in defamation, he held that an exemplary direction required evidence warranting punishment and that its absence required a new trial. This is reasoning supporting his concurrence in dismissal, rather than a joint formulation by the Court.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ (separate reasons)

Read judgment: p 129 (opens in a new tab), pp 153–154 (opens in a new tab), p 158 (opens in a new tab), p 161 (opens in a new tab)

Each of these Justices dismissed the appeal because the evidence did not justify leaving exemplary damages to the jury. The erroneous direction was the ground for preserving the new trial. Windeyer J’s requirement of evidence of positive misconduct explains his application of that ground; the quoted conscious-wrongdoing formulation is his reasoning, subject to the later qualification recorded with this proposition.

Separate reasoning · McTiernan and Menzies JJ (dissenting in the result)

Read judgment: pp 123–125 (opens in a new tab), pp 127–128 (opens in a new tab), p 143 (opens in a new tab), pp 147–148 (opens in a new tab)

These Justices dissented in the result: each found a sufficient evidentiary basis for exemplary damages and would have restored the verdicts. McTiernan J relied on the wanton publications and circumstances supporting malice; Menzies J considered that the jury could find a reckless and arrogant attack on reputation to attract newspaper custom. Their assessment of the evidence is the opposing route, not part of the majority ground requiring a new trial.

Why does this case matter?

Uren is the source of a formulation of the distinction between aggravated and exemplary damages that later High Court judgments quote, and an answer that uses that distinction is relying on one Justice’s words from a defamation appeal.

Exam and application relevance

Attribute each statement to the Justice who made it, with the page, and remember that the Justices were not united on the result.

For exemplary damages in defamation in New South Wales, read s 37 of the Defamation Act 2005.

Check your understanding

State the trial judge’s direction on exemplary damages, and the Full Court’s order (at 122, 157).

Which Justices declined to follow Rookes v Barnard? Who would have restored the verdicts (at 128, 148)?

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.