Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW

High Court of Australia · 2018

Administrative LawJudicial Review

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30

A judge held it legally unreasonable for a Tribunal to proceed after two applicants did not answer its hearing letter, and the Full Court deferred. Why did the High Court say it should not have?

What happened?

SZVFW and his wife applied for protection visas on 3 December 2013 and gave a Roselands address for correspondence ([99]). They did not attend an interview with a delegate of the Minister and the applications were refused ([101]-[102]). They applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for review ([103]). They did not respond to a Tribunal letter inviting written material ([104]). On 15 August 2014 the Tribunal invited them to appear on 10 September 2014, by a letter sent by ordinary post to the Roselands address, warning that if they did not attend it might decide without taking further action ([105]). They neither contacted the Tribunal nor attended ([105]). Acting under s 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Tribunal decided the review and affirmed the delegate’s decision ([106]).

On judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court, Judge Barnes held that the Tribunal’s decision to proceed was legally unreasonable ([6]). The Minister appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court (Griffiths, Kerr and Farrell JJ), which asked whether the primary judge had made an error of the kind required on appeals from discretionary judgments, and dismissed the appeal ([17], [114]-[115]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed. The Full Court’s order dismissing the appeal was set aside; in its place the appeal to the Full Court was allowed, the Federal Circuit Court’s order was set aside and the application for judicial review was dismissed. The Minister was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs ([125]-[126]).

There were four sets of reasons: Kiefel CJ at [1]-[18], Gageler J at [19]-[72], Nettle and Gordon JJ at [73]-[126] and Edelman J at [127]-[156].

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The appeal court decides for itself. Kiefel CJ agreed with Nettle and Gordon JJ that no question of the application of the principles in House v The King “arises in cases of this kind” ([18]). Nettle and Gordon JJ held that the only question for the Full Court was whether the Tribunal’s exercise of power was beyond power because it was legally unreasonable, a question with one answer, “yes” or “no” ([76]). A primary judge’s conclusion that a decision-maker acted unreasonably “does not depend upon the exercise of any discretion by the primary judge”, and calling the task evaluative does not entitle an appeal court to hold that the decision was valid and yet that the opposite view was open to the primary judge ([85]-[87]).

Gageler J reached the same result by a different route. An appeal by way of rehearing is a procedure for the correction of error ([30]); the House v The King standard applies where the legal criterion “tolerates a range of outcomes”, and the correctness standard where it “demands a unique outcome” ([49]). Legal unreasonableness is a question about the limits of statutory authority, so the primary judge’s conclusion “can only be either right or wrong” and the appeal court must decide for itself which ([54]-[56]). Edelman J likewise held that the Full Court should not have exercised judicial restraint on the appeal, because assessing legal unreasonableness is a legal question concerned with the boundaries of the Tribunal’s authority ([154]-[155]).

The content of legal unreasonableness. Kiefel CJ said that a decision is unreasonable in a legal sense “when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification”, and that the test is “necessarily stringent” because the courts “will not lightly interfere” with a statutory power involving an area of discretion ([10]-[11]). Nettle and Gordon JJ said that unreasonableness is not limited to the manifestly unreasonable or the irrational, if not bizarre, and may be outcome focused ([82]); it is fact dependent, reasons are a focal point, and “[i]t would be a rare case” to find a discretion unreasonably exercised where the reasons demonstrated a justification ([84]).

Gageler J said that reasonableness is an implied condition of the conferral of the power ([53]) and that, except to the extent specifically permitted by statute, a court must not form its own view of whether power was exercised in a way that was lawful but might be characterised as an abuse ([58]).

Application. Kiefel CJ held that, the s 425 invitation having been given by a s 441A method and nothing suggesting it was not received, the Tribunal was entitled to consider s 426A, and it was difficult to see how deciding without further contact could be unreasonable given the applicants’ non-responsiveness ([8]-[9]); the primary judge’s reasoning implied an obligation found nowhere in the statute ([16]). Gageler J said the Tribunal would ordinarily act reasonably in proceeding in those circumstances ([69]). Nettle and Gordon JJ said the primary judge paid no regard to the deeming effect of s 441C, to the applicants’ failure to attend before the delegate, or to the absence of any attempt to rebut the statutory presumption, and the decision was not beyond power ([120]-[123]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [85]–[87] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

This reasoning was necessary to reject the Full Court’s deferential approach: the primary judge determined legality without exercising a discretion, so describing the task as evaluative could not justify leaving an incorrect conclusion undisturbed. Their explanation distinguishes review of administrative discretion from an appeal against a judicial discretion.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [54]–[56] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J concurred in the result through the constitutional role of courts in determining the limits of statutory authority. Because that question requires a unique answer, the appellate court had to decide whether the primary judge was right or wrong. This identifies his distinct route to the same appellate standard.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J

Read judgment: [154]–[155] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J concurred in the result, explaining the absence of appellate restraint by reference to a legal question about the Tribunal’s authority and the Australian constitutional tradition of deciding such questions for correctness. His discussion supplies his own basis for rejecting the Full Court’s restraint; agreement in the orders does not merge the separate reasons.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [82]–[84] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)

These principles supplied the standard applied to decide whether the Tribunal had exceeded its power. The focus on justification and the particular facts explains why the Tribunal’s reasons and the applicants’ conduct mattered to the rejection of unreasonableness. The passage adopts principles from Li for this decision; the embedded quotation remains attributed to Gageler J in Li, quoting Dunsmuir, rather than becoming original words of Nettle and Gordon JJ.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [118]–[124] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab)

This was the factual and statutory ground for upholding the Tribunal’s decision and dismissing judicial review: deemed receipt, compliance with the invitation requirements and the history of non-attendance justified proceeding under s 426A. The conclusion depended on those circumstances; it does not make every decision to proceed after an unanswered invitation reasonable.

Why does this case matter?

The error corrected here was in the appeal court’s own approach, so the case belongs in a problem that moves from the decision-maker to the court hearing an appeal. A student who analyses only whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably, and says nothing about how the appeal court was to approach the primary judge’s conclusion, misses the question Gageler J called one of public importance ([19]).

It is also easy to attribute a statement to the Court when it belongs to one set of reasons: there is no single joint judgment.

Exam and application relevance

Keep the two levels apart in an answer: how an appeal court reviews a primary judge’s conclusion of unreasonableness ([18], [20], [76]), and what legal unreasonableness requires of the decision itself ([10]-[11], [82]-[84]). Give each statement to the Justice or Justices who made it, using the paragraph numbers above.

On the application, test the Tribunal’s decision against the history of the review and the statutory scheme, as each set of reasons did, rather than against a general duty to chase an applicant.

Check your understanding

1. What did the Full Court require the Minister to show on his appeal, and what did Kiefel CJ say at [18] about that approach?

2. Why did Gageler J say that the primary judge’s conclusion of unreasonableness could only be right or wrong ([54]-[56])?

3. Which Justices said that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent, and which said that it would be a rare case to find unreasonableness where the reasons demonstrate a justification ([11], [84])?

4. How did Nettle and Gordon JJ describe unreasonableness that is outcome focused ([82])?

5. What factors did Nettle and Gordon JJ say the primary judge paid no regard to ([120]-[122])?

6. What did Edelman J say about judicial restraint on the appeal ([154]-[155])?