Legal unreasonableness as a ground of judicial review
Explains legal unreasonableness as a condition of statutory power, the formulations in Li and SZVFW and who stated them, how reasons bear on it, how an appeal court reviews a finding of it, and the statutory paragraph in the ADJR Act.
Learning outcomes
- State the legal standard of unreasonableness and attribute each formulation of it to the Justices who stated it.
- Explain why unreasonableness is a limit on a statutory power and not a review of the merits, and apply the ground by asking whether a decision has an evident and intelligible justification.
- Explain how an appeal court reviews a primary judge’s conclusion that a decision was legally unreasonable, and when materiality has to be shown.
Judicial review asks whether an administrative decision lay within the power the statute conferred, not whether it was the best decision. Unreasonableness is the ground on which that line is hardest to hold, because a court that calls a decision unreasonable can sound as though it is substituting its own view. The prior question for a student is therefore what the court is actually asked, which is whether the decision-maker stayed inside a power that Parliament is taken to have conferred on condition that it be exercised reasonably. This article states Commonwealth law as it appears in High Court decisions, most of them about decisions under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and does not state State or Territory law.
A condition of the power, not a view of the merits
A discretionary power conferred by statute is presumed to carry a condition that it be exercised reasonably. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 181 that the legislature is taken to intend a statutory discretion to be exercised reasonably ([63]), and that the legal standard of reasonableness “must be the standard indicated by the true construction of the statute” ([67]). Gageler J described the same idea in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 302 as an implied condition of the conferral of the power, arising from a common law presumption of statutory interpretation, so that a decision made in breach lies beyond the authority the power conferred ([53]). He added that the presumption can be displaced: a statute may demand a higher standard or be satisfied by a lower one ([53]).
Because the question is about the limits of a power, it is not a question about which outcome is preferable. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that a standard of legal reasonableness, properly applied, does not involve substituting a court’s view of how a discretion should be exercised for that of the decision-maker ([66]). French CJ said in the same case that the requirement is not a vehicle for attacking a decision because the decision-maker gave insufficient or excessive consideration to some matters, or made an evaluative judgment with which the court disagrees but which is rationally open ([30]). Kiefel CJ added in SZVFW that the implied requirement does not mean the decision must be one that is advantageous to the person affected ([15]).
What counts as unreasonable
Li produced three sets of reasons on the content of the ground, and SZVFW four. Neither case produced a joint judgment of the whole Court, so a student should attribute each formulation to the Justices who stated it. The High Court’s decisions bind lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions.
- The limiting case (French CJ in Li). A decision-maker that has kept within the matters it should consider may still reach a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, and the freedom Parliament leaves cannot be read as permitting arbitrary or capricious decisions or the abandonment of common sense ([28]). His Honour added that a disproportionate exercise, “taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut”, may be characterised as unreasonable ([30]).
- No evident and intelligible justification (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Li). The ground should not be limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision, and an inference of unreasonableness may be drawn even where a particular error in reasoning cannot be identified ([68]). Their Honours said that unreasonableness may be applied to “a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification” ([76]).
- The stringent test (Gageler J in Li). The standard is that the exercise of power is so unreasonable that no reasonable repository of the power could have so exercised it ([108]). His Honour added that judicial determination of this kind of unreasonableness has in practice been rare, and that nothing in his reasons should encourage greater frequency ([113]).
SZVFW kept both emphases. Kiefel CJ applied the “evident and intelligible justification” formulation and said that the test is necessarily stringent because courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion ([10]-[11]). Nettle and Gordon JJ said that the ground is not limited to a manifestly unreasonable or irrational decision, that a conclusion of unreasonableness may be outcome focused, and that a court that had to identify a particular error before finding unreasonableness could lose part of the lens for assessing it ([82]-[83]). The two accounts can be read as overlapping: each starts from the limits of the statutory power and treats a decision with no evident justification as the central case. They differ mainly in how much weight they give to the stringency of the test. That comparison is an interpretation of the passages cited, not a statement the Court makes.
The ground also sits beside the more specific errors. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that taking an irrelevant consideration into account or failing to take a relevant one into account may also be seen as encompassed by unreasonableness ([71]-[72]). Edelman J said in SZVFW that his discussion concerned unreasonableness as an independent ground, not as a label for those specific errors ([131]).
Two applications: Li and SZVFW
In Li a Migration Review Tribunal refused to adjourn a review so that an applicant could await the outcome of a review of her skills assessment, a favourable assessment being a necessary condition of the visa she sought. The Tribunal said she had been given enough opportunities to present her case and that it was not prepared to delay further. The Minister’s appeal was dismissed, and each set of reasons treated the refusal as unreasonable. French CJ found an arbitrariness in the decision ([31]). Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said it was not apparent what pressing need for a conclusion the Tribunal had weighed against the purpose of the hearing provision, that it could not be said which error was made, and that “the result itself bespeaks error” ([80], [85]). Gageler J relied on the review having been on foot for nearly a year without delay by the applicant, the specific purpose and articulated reasons for the adjournment sought, and the absence of any consideration favouring an immediate decision ([122]-[124]).
In SZVFW applicants for protection visas did not respond to the Tribunal’s invitation to appear, and the Tribunal exercised a power in the Migration Act to decide the review without taking further action to enable them to appear. The primary judge held that decision legally unreasonable, but the High Court held that it was not. Kiefel CJ said the decision was “perfectly explicable given the history of the respondents’ non-responsiveness” ([9]), and that the primary judge’s reasoning implied an obligation that would apply in most, if not all, cases of non-response and that is not found in the statute ([16]). Gageler J said that where the statutory invitation procedure has been followed and an applicant fails without explanation to appear, the Tribunal would ordinarily act reasonably in proceeding ([69]). Put together, Li shows a decision whose basis could not be seen and SZVFW shows one whose basis could.
Reasons, and an appeal from a finding of unreasonableness
Reasons matter because the ground asks whether justification is evident. Nettle and Gordon JJ said that legal unreasonableness is invariably fact dependent, that reasons are a focal point of the assessment, and that it would be a rare case to find a discretionary power unreasonably exercised where the reasons demonstrated a justification for it ([84]).
SZVFW also decided how an appeal court deals with a primary judge’s conclusion on the ground. The Full Court of the Federal Court had asked whether the primary judge’s conclusion was attended by appealable error of the kind relevant to an appeal from a discretionary judgment. The High Court allowed the Minister’s appeal, and each of the four sets of reasons rejected that approach. Kiefel CJ, agreeing with Nettle and Gordon JJ, said the principles governing appeals from discretionary judgments do not arise in cases of this kind ([18]); Nettle and Gordon JJ said there is one answer to whether the decision was legally unreasonable, and the primary judge exercises no discretion in giving it ([76], [85]-[87]); Gageler J said an appeal court must reach its own conclusion ([20]); and Edelman J said the question is one on which there is one right answer, so that no judicial restraint is exercised on appeal ([154]-[155]).
The statutory counterpart and what follows from a finding
For decisions to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) applies, s 5(1)(e) makes it a ground that “the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment”, and s 5(2)(g) says that this includes an exercise of a power that is “so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power”4. Section 5(2)(j) adds “any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power”. The Act applies to the decisions it covers, and State and Territory decisions are outside this article.
A decision beyond power is affected by jurisdictional error. Whether a further showing of materiality is needed depends on the error. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 123 the joint reasons of six Justices said that in some cases the potential for an effect on the decision is inherent in the nature of the error, and gave unreasonableness in the final result as an example ([6]). That is a statement about the result of a decision, not about every step in the process. Gageler J in Li treated unreasonableness in the performance of a procedural duty or power as a failure to perform the Tribunal’s duty to review where it was also material to the outcome of the review ([98]). The wider rules on materiality are in the article on jurisdictional error and materiality.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the decision and the statutory power, and read the statute for its scope, its purpose and any stated criteria. State whether the decision is a Commonwealth or State or Territory decision, because this article states the Commonwealth position.
- Ask first whether a more specific error is available, such as an irrelevant or overlooked consideration, an improper purpose or a denial of procedural fairness. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Li treated these as capable of being encompassed by unreasonableness.
- Look at the reasons for the evident and intelligible justification. Identify what the decision-maker weighed, and what, if anything, is left unexplained, as the “enough opportunities” reasoning left the refusal to adjourn unexplained in Li.
- State the formulation you rely on and the Justices who stated it, say that the test is stringent, and keep the argument on the limits of the power. Do not argue that the decision was wrong, harsh or less beneficial than another.
- If the problem concerns an appeal from a finding of unreasonableness, say that the appeal court decides the question for itself, and does not ask whether the primary judge’s view was open.
Self-check
- Have I attributed each formulation of the ground to the Justices who stated it, rather than to “the High Court”?
- Have I framed the ground as a limit on the power, and not as a complaint about the outcome?
- Have I said whether the decision is a Commonwealth decision and which review regime applies?
- Have I dealt with materiality separately, and not assumed it follows automatically from unreasonableness?