Legal unreasonableness as a ground of judicial review
A condition of the power, not a view of the merits
When a statute gives a decision-maker discretion, the law presumes it must be used reasonably. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said the legislature intends this, and the standard of reasonableness depends on how the statute is properly interpreted.
In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW, Gageler J called this an implied condition on the power itself. A decision breaching it goes beyond what the power allows. But this presumption can be displaced: some statutes demand a stricter standard, others a more relaxed one.
This ground of review concerns the limits of the power, not whether the court prefers a different outcome. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that applying this standard properly does not mean replacing the decision-maker’s choice with the court’s own preference.
French CJ agreed. He said unreasonableness cannot be used just because a decision-maker weighed factors in a way the court disagrees with, if that judgment was still reasonably open to them.
Kiefel CJ added in SZVFW that this requirement does not mean the decision must actually benefit the person it affects. It only concerns whether the decision was reasonable, not whether it was favourable.
What counts as unreasonable
In Li, three different judges explained what “legal unreasonableness” means, and in SZVFW four judges did. Neither case has one joint judgment, so each explanation belongs to the judges who gave it. The High Court’s rulings bind lower courts, but the High Court itself can change its mind later.
French CJ said a decision can be unreasonable even if the decision-maker only considered relevant matters. It is unreasonable if no reasonable authority could have reached it, or if it is arbitrary, capricious, or ignores common sense. He also said a response that is wildly out of proportion to the problem, like “taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut,” can count as unreasonable.
Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ took a slightly different approach. They said the ground is not limited to decisions that are irrational or bizarre. A court can infer unreasonableness even if it cannot pinpoint a specific error. They described the core idea as a decision that “lacks an evident and intelligible justification.”
Gageler J set a stricter test. He said unreasonableness exists only where no reasonable holder of the power could have exercised it that way. He added that courts have rarely used this ground, and said his reasons should not encourage them to use it more often.
In SZVFW, Kiefel CJ reused the “evident and intelligible justification” test. She said the test must be strict, because courts should not readily interfere with decisions involving real discretion.
Nettle and Gordon JJ said the ground is not limited to manifestly unreasonable or irrational decisions. They said a court can focus on the outcome itself, and that insisting on finding one specific error might miss other signs of unreasonableness.
These two approaches overlap. Both start from the limits of the decision-maker’s power, and both treat a decision lacking evident justification as the key example. They mainly differ on how strict the overall test should be. This comparison is the article’s own reading of the cases, not something the courts said directly.
Reasons, and an appeal from a finding of unreasonableness
Why reasons matter: they show whether a decision is justified. Nettle and Gordon JJ said unreasonableness always depends on the facts. Reasons are central to deciding the issue. They said it would be rare to find a power unreasonably used if the reasons show it was justified.
The case also decided how an appeal court reviews a trial judge’s finding on this ground. The Full Court had asked whether the trial judge made an appealable error, using the test for appeals from discretionary decisions. The High Court rejected that approach and allowed the Minister’s appeal.
All four judgments agreed, though for different reasons. Kiefel CJ said the usual rules for appeals from discretionary decisions do not apply here. Nettle and Gordon JJ said there is only one correct answer to whether a decision was legally unreasonable, so the trial judge has no discretion in deciding it.
Gageler J said an appeal court must form its own view on the question. Edelman J agreed there is one right answer, so appeal courts need not defer to the judge below.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by identifying the decision and the statutory power. Read the statute for its scope, purpose and any stated criteria. Say whether the decision is Commonwealth or State or Territory, since this article covers the Commonwealth position only.
Check first whether a more specific error fits better, such as an irrelevant consideration, improper purpose or denial of procedural fairness. In Li, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ treated these as things unreasonableness can cover.
Look at the decision-maker’s reasons for an “evident and intelligible justification” — meaning reasoning that actually explains the outcome. Note what was weighed, and what was left unexplained, as happened with the refusal to adjourn in Li.
Name the formulation you use and the Justices who stated it. Say the test is stringent (a high bar), and argue only about the limits of the power. Do not argue the decision was wrong, harsh, or less generous than another option.
If the problem involves an appeal from a finding of unreasonableness, note that the appeal court decides the question itself. It does not simply ask whether the primary judge’s view was open to them.
Self-check
Before finishing, check your work.
Different judges have described legal unreasonableness in different ways. Make sure you credit the actual judges who said it, not just “the High Court” generally.
Check that you have described unreasonableness as a limit on the decision-maker’s power. Do not simply complain that the outcome seems wrong.
Say clearly whether the decision was made under Commonwealth law, and which review rules apply to it.
Finally, treat materiality as a separate question. Do not assume that because a decision was unreasonable, it also made a material difference to the result.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.