Summers v Qantas Airways Limited
Summers v Qantas Airways Limited [2021] FCA 391
A captain is given notice of termination at 65 while his age discrimination complaint is still with the Commission. What must he show a court to hold the dismissal off, and how far does the employer’s earlier High Court pilot case help it?
What happened?
Paul Summers was a pilot employed by Qantas Airways Ltd from 26 July 1988 and a captain from 2003 ([16]). Since 10 July 2016 he had flown A330 aircraft as captain, both domestically and internationally ([30]). He turned 65 on 17 February 2021. On 18 December 2020 Qantas informed him that, as a long haul pilot subject to mandatory retirement on attaining the age of 65, he was unable to carry out the inherent requirements of his position, and in effect invited him to show cause why his employment should not be terminated.
On 5 March 2021 it advised that it had decided to terminate his employment on 9 April 2021 ([2]). A clause of the Flight Administration Manual stipulated that a flight crew member who had reached their 65th birthday was not to operate or be rostered to operate as an A380, A330, B747 or B787 pilot crew member ([24]). Its genesis appeared to be a rule of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which most of the countries to which Qantas flew had adopted as part of their domestic law ([25], [26]).
In the 12 months to 30 March 2020, about 77 per cent of the hours he flew were international ([42]). He was stood down on 30 March 2020, was assigned some domestic flying for four weeks in May and June 2020, was stood down again on 22 June 2020, and was still stood down at the hearing ([44], [47], [129]). On 8 March 2021 he lodged a complaint of age discrimination with the Australian Human Rights Commission and applied under s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) for an interim injunction restraining Qantas from giving effect to its decision until the complaint was withdrawn or terminated ([3]). Qantas resisted the application ([3], [77]).
What did the Court decide?
Katzmann J, a single judge of the Federal Court, granted the interim injunction. On the applicant’s undertakings, she ordered that Qantas be restrained from terminating his employment until his complaint was withdrawn under s 46PG, terminated by the President under s 46PF(1)(b) or s 46PH, or the Court otherwise ordered (order 1). For the duration of that order the applicant was to remain stood down unless Qantas could redeploy him to short haul flights or to some other position for which he was qualified (order 2). Qantas was to pay his costs, and either party had liberty to apply on 24 hours’ notice on a significant change of circumstances or significant delay by the Commission (orders 3 and 4; [134], [135]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Katzmann J said that ordinarily the applicant for an interim injunction must demonstrate a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience is in the applicant’s favour, citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622-623, and that usually it is also necessary to demonstrate that damages would not be an adequate remedy ([69]). To show a prima facie case an applicant need not show that success at trial is more probable than not; her Honour, quoting Gummow and Hayne JJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65] and [71], said that all the applicant need show is “a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending trial” ([69]).
The two questions are inter-related, because the apparent strength of the respective cases is weighed in the balance of convenience ([70]). But “the usual tests must be applied having regard to the particular statutory context”, citing Carlsson v Ford [2019] FCA 584 and Daccache v BOC Limited [2020] FCA 485 ([71]).
Section 46PP, her Honour said, is intended to give the relevant courts the power to grant relief in an appropriate case to an applicant who has a pending complaint with the Commission and by reason of that is unable, at least in the ordinary case, to bring a substantive proceeding in the court ([72]). Citing McKerracher J in Daccache, she said that the purpose of the power is to protect the process of “complaint-making and resolution”, and that the status quo to which it is directed is “the employment status quo”, so that it is immaterial whether duties were still being undertaken ([72]).
In these circumstances, she said, “it may be doubted whether an applicant for an interim injunction under s 46PP needs to demonstrate that damages would not be an adequate remedy”; Besanko J and McKerracher J seemed to have recognised this but both proceeded, without deciding the question, on the assumption that they would ([73]). Her Honour was satisfied that the applicant had a prima facie case but was “unable to conclude that it is a strong one” ([121]), and concluded that the balance of convenience favoured him ([122]).
She was not persuaded that damages would be an adequate remedy: the chances of a 65 year old pilot obtaining alternative work in the airline industry or elsewhere were likely to be poor in the then climate, and he would still suffer the “personal and psychological impact” of forced unemployment before the merits were determined or conciliation had begun ([123], [124]). She considered the detriments Qantas claimed to face to be overstated ([127]-[129]) and was unimpressed by its arguments about the discretion, including delay ([130]-[133]).
On the prima facie case, her Honour said it was unnecessary to consider the merits of the applicant’s discrimination submissions since Qantas did not engage with them. Qantas proceeded on the assumption that it had discriminated against him on the ground of his age but that this was not unlawful because of the exemption in s 18(4) of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), and relied on Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280, which it claimed was relevantly indistinguishable, to argue that his case had no reasonable prospects of success ([77]).
She set out what was decided in Christie ([78]-[90]). Both parties treated s 170DF(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), which referred to the inherent requirements of “the particular position”, as relevantly indistinguishable from s 18(4), which refers to “the particular employment”; she called that approach “questionable”, because Kirby J had remarked in X v The Commonwealth that the word “employment” is “somewhat broader” ([79]). She recorded that the Court in Christie was of the unanimous view that an inherent requirement is one which is essential, intrinsic or indispensable to the position, and that each member except Gaudron and Kirby JJ held the termination lawful, though their reasons differed ([85]).
She stated that the burden of proving that Captain Summers is unable to carry out the inherent requirements of his employment rests with Qantas; none of the cases she cited concerned s 18(4), but all concerned similarly worded provisions ([96]).
Her Honour identified difficulties in the applicant’s submissions ([104]-[109]) but held that “this case is not on all fours with Christie”. Unlike Mr Christie, Captain Summers was not engaged solely in international flying and, as an A330 captain, had undertaken a significant amount of domestic flying. The A330 is flown on limited international routes, and the evidence indicated that he is physically, mentally and legally capable of flying the majority of routes serviced by the A330 fleet. The inherent requirements of his position, according to information Qantas posted on the pilots’ website, include operating to the majority of ports to which Qantas operates, and on the evidence there was “at least a prima facie case” that he could meet them ([110]).
The significance of the differences, and of any greater flexibility in the roster system, was “a matter for determination at any trial” ([111]). Her Honour added that the observations of French CJ and Gummow J in Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28 about summary dismissal, though made in a different context, were apposite where the respondent asserts that there is no prima facie case because the applicant has no reasonable prospects and there was a disparity in the reasons of the majority judges in the authority on which it relied, while calling the analogy imperfect ([112], [113]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Katzmann J (single judge)
Read judgment: [69]–[72] (opens in a new tab), [121]–[134] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the approach her Honour took to the application and her reasons for granting the interim injunction on the balance of convenience and in the exercise of the discretion, which is the ground of the orders made on 21 April 2021.
Obiter · Katzmann J (single judge)
Read judgment: [73] (opens in a new tab)
Her Honour said it may be doubted whether an applicant under s 46PP must show that damages would not be an adequate remedy but did not decide the question; at [123]-[124] she considered whether damages would be adequate and was not persuaded that they would be.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Katzmann J (single judge)
Read judgment: [96] (opens in a new tab), [110]–[111] (opens in a new tab)
Her Honour stated that the burden rests with Qantas and held that the applicant had at least a prima facie case that he could meet the inherent requirements of his position. That finding is the first element of the approach she applied ([69]) and a ground of the injunction.
Obiter · Katzmann J (single judge)
Read judgment: [79] (opens in a new tab), [112]–[113] (opens in a new tab)
Her Honour called the parties’ equation of s 170DF(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) with s 18(4) questionable without deciding the point, and her observations on Spencer v Commonwealth are an added consideration introduced by the word besides, described as an imperfect analogy. Neither was necessary to the finding of a prima facie case at [110].
Why does this case matter?
A student asked about a mandatory retirement age can jump from the retirement rule to a conclusion that the dismissal was lawful or unlawful, without asking at what stage of a dispute a decision was made and what the court had to decide at that stage. Examiners reward the answer that says what stage the decision belongs to, who decided it, and what remains open after it.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the stage of the proceedings first: an application for an interim injunction under s 46PP while a complaint is pending, or the final determination of the complaint. Summers is a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court at the interim stage. It is persuasive, not binding, and it does not decide whether the termination was lawful under s 18(4).
For a problem about a worker who reaches an age at which the employer says he or she can no longer do the job, set out s 18(4) and (5) of the Age Discrimination Act, identify the particular employment from its terms and the way the work is arranged, and compare the facts with those of Christie as Katzmann J did ([84], [85], [110]). Sections 18(4) and 46PP are stated here as the judgment quotes them in 2021 ([5], [11]); their present text should be checked before it is relied on, as should the complaint period the judgment recites at [10]. Later decisions on s 46PP, including Millar v FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1331 and Smith v A High School [2025] FCA 1432, should be read before the approach in Summers is put as the settled test.
Check your understanding
1. What did Qantas tell Captain Summers on 18 December 2020 and on 5 March 2021, and what did he then do ([2], [3])?
2. What two questions did Katzmann J say are ordinarily asked on an application for an interim injunction, and what did she say about how they relate ([69], [70])?
3. What did her Honour say s 46PP is intended to do, and to which status quo is it directed ([72])?
4. On whom did her Honour say the burden of proving inability to carry out the inherent requirements lies, and what did she say about the cases she cited for that ([96])?
5. Identify two differences between Captain Summers’s position and Mr Christie’s that her Honour relied on in saying the case was not on all fours with Christie ([110]).
6. What did her Honour say, at [111], about the significance of those differences?
7. What did order 2 require of the applicant for the duration of the injunction ([134])?