Age discrimination in employment: the Age Discrimination Act and the inherent requirements exemption

How the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) defines direct and indirect age discrimination, applies to employment under s 18, and limits that protection by the inherent requirements exemption in s 18(4), with Qantas v Christie, the interim decision in Summers v Qantas, and the route from a complaint to court.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
health-disability-and-elder-law, human-rights-and-anti-discrimination-law
Topics
disability-and-age-discrimination, commonwealth-anti-discrimination-acts

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish direct discrimination (s 14) from indirect discrimination (s 15) under the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), state where the burden of proof lies on reasonableness, and apply s 16 as it now reads.
  • Apply s 18 to an employment decision, identify which paragraphs of s 18(4) the inherent requirements exemption reaches, and state what the statements of the Justices in Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie contribute to the meaning of an inherent requirement.
  • State what Summers v Qantas Airways Ltd decided and what it left undecided, and describe the route from a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission to an application in court.

The Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) makes discrimination on the ground of age unlawful in defined areas of public life, including employment. Before asking whether an employer’s decision about an older (or younger) worker was lawful, a student must ask two prior questions: does the conduct amount to discrimination “on the ground of age” as the Act defines it, and, if it does, does an exemption take it outside the prohibition? In employment a central exemption is the one for the inherent requirements of the particular employment, and the leading High Court discussion cited here concerned a differently worded provision. This article states Commonwealth law, which has effect throughout Australia subject to the Act’s constitutional provisions (s 9(2), s 10). It does not state the age discrimination legislation of the States and Territories. The disability counterpart is in Disability discrimination and reasonable adjustments.

What age discrimination is

The Act defines two forms. Direct discrimination (s 14) occurs where the discriminator treats or proposes to treat the aggrieved person less favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or not materially different, it treats or would treat a person of a different age, and does so because of the aggrieved person’s age, a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of that age, or a characteristic generally imputed to persons of that age.1 Indirect discrimination (s 15) occurs where the discriminator imposes or proposes to impose a condition, requirement or practice that is not reasonable in the circumstances and has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons of the same age as the aggrieved person. For the reasonableness element the burden of proof lies on the discriminator (s 15(2)).

Section 16 deals with an act done for two or more reasons. If one of the reasons, “whether or not it is the dominant or a substantial reason”, is the person’s age or a characteristic of the kind in s 14(b), the act is taken to be done because of age. The text of s 16 as stated here does not require age to be the dominant reason, and a student should check the wording of s 16 in any older decision that applies it.

Employment

Section 18(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the ground of age in the arrangements for deciding who is offered employment, in deciding who is offered it, and in the terms or conditions on which it is offered. Section 18(2) makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee in the terms or conditions of employment, by denying or limiting access to promotion, transfer, training or other benefits, by dismissing the employee, or by subjecting the employee to any other detriment.

Two exemptions follow. Section 18(3) exempts discrimination in connection with employment to perform domestic duties on the premises where the discriminator lives, from the hiring paragraphs. Section 18(4) provides that paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b) and (2)(c) do not make it unlawful to discriminate against another person on the ground of age “if the other person is unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the particular employment because of his or her age”. Section 18(5) directs that the decision-maker take into account the person’s past training, qualifications and experience, the person’s performance as an employee (if already employed), and all other relevant factors that it is reasonable to take into account. The exemption is limited to the three paragraphs named: on its terms it does not reach discrimination in terms or conditions of employment, in access to promotion or other benefits, or by subjecting an employee to another detriment (s 18(2)(a), (b), (d)).

The inherent requirements cases

The principal High Court authority is Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280, decided under s 170DF of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), which excluded from the prohibition on termination by reason of age a reason “based on the inherent requirements of the particular position”.2 Qantas had a policy that its pilots did not continue in employment beyond 60, and the captain’s employment ended on his 60th birthday; the justification relied on was the “Rule of 60”, which many of the countries to and over which Qantas flew enforced. Brennan CJ, McHugh J and Gummow J would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the appeal to the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court, which is the order made; Gaudron J would have allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to that Court; and Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal. The statements most often used in later cases are these:

  1. An inherent requirement is something essential to the position. Gaudron J said that an employer cannot create one by stipulating for something not essential, but that a requirement that is in truth essential is not made irrelevant by deriving from the employment contract (at [34]), and offered a practical test: whether the position would be essentially the same if the requirement were dispensed with (at [36]). Gummow J described “inherent” as suggesting an essential element rather than something inessential or accidental (at [114]).
  2. The question is answered by reference not only to the contract but to the function the employee performs in the employer’s undertaking and, unless that undertaking is organised in a way that impermissibly discriminates against the employee, to that organisation (Brennan CJ, at [1]). On that basis Brennan CJ held that the ability to participate effectively in the bidding system for flights on an equal footing with other pilots of similar seniority was an inherent requirement of the position (at [3]).
  3. McHugh J held that it was an inherent requirement of the position of captain of international B747-400 flights that the holder be able to fly to any part of the world, so that being under 60 was an essential incident of that requirement, while leaving open whether the captain must be able to fly to every Qantas destination (at [86]-[87]), and Gummow J that availability for worldwide service was an inherent requirement, to which termination at 60 was incidental (at [117]).

The statute in Christie spoke of “the particular position”. Section 18(4) of the Age Discrimination Act speaks of “the particular employment”, and the extent of any difference was not decided in the case discussed next.

Summers v Qantas: an interim decision

Summers v Qantas Airways Ltd [2021] FCA 391 applied the Act to a long-haul captain whose employment Qantas proposed to terminate at 65.3 Katzmann J, a single judge, granted an interim injunction under s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) restraining termination until the complaint to the Commission was withdrawn or terminated. The reasons are limited to whether there was a prima facie case and where the balance of convenience lay. Qantas had not engaged with the direct and indirect discrimination arguments and relied on s 18(4) and Christie, claiming that case was relevantly indistinguishable (at [77]). Katzmann J noted that the burden of proving that the employee is unable to carry out the inherent requirements rests with the employer (at [96]), citing decisions on similarly worded provisions, and found at least a prima facie case that the captain could meet the inherent requirements of his position, because the case was not on all fours with Christie: he had not been engaged solely in international flying and the aircraft he flew operated on limited international routes (at [110]). Whether he could be accommodated in the roster system was left to trial (at [111]). The decision is therefore authority for the interim test and for how Christie was approached, not for the outcome of the substantive claim.

Getting a claim to court

A person aggrieved lodges a written complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission (Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46P).4 The President may terminate a complaint on a ground including that it was lodged more than 24 months after the alleged acts took place (s 46PH(1)(b)); the decision in Summers records a six-month period at [10], whereas s 46PH(1)(b) as stated here provides for 24 months. After termination and notice, an application alleging unlawful discrimination may be made to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) within 60 days after the notice is issued, or within further time the court allows (s 46PO(1)-(2)), and unless the complaint was terminated under s 46PH(1)(h) or (1B)(b) the application needs the court’s leave (s 46PO(3A)). While a complaint is pending, either court may grant an interim injunction to maintain the status quo or the rights of a party (s 46PP(1)).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the area of the Act engaged and the act complained of. For work, identify which limb of s 18(1) or (2) it falls in.
  2. Decide whether the conduct is direct discrimination (s 14: less favourable treatment than a person of a different age, because of age or a characteristic of that age) or indirect (s 15: a condition, requirement or practice that is not reasonable and disadvantages persons of the same age).
  3. State the burden: for indirect discrimination the discriminator must prove reasonableness (s 15(2)). Apply s 16 as it now reads: age need not be the dominant or a substantial reason.
  4. Check the exemption. Section 18(4) names paragraphs (1)(a), (1)(b) and (2)(c) and no others. Identify the particular employment, then the requirements that are essential to it, using Christie and the s 18(5) factors, and say who bears the burden.
  5. Treat Christie as a case on a differently worded provision and Summers as an interim decision of a single judge. Do not state that a mandatory retirement age is lawful or unlawful under s 18(4) on the strength of either.
  6. State the process: complaint, termination, then application within 60 days, with the interim injunction power while the complaint is pending.

Self-check

  • Have I applied s 16 in its current form, not a dominant-reason test?
  • Have I limited the s 18(4) exemption to the three paragraphs it names, (1)(a), (1)(b) and (2)(c)?
  • Have I attributed the Christie statements to the Justice who made them, and noted that Kirby J dissented?
  • Have I said that Summers was a decision on an interim injunction?

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