Age discrimination in employment: the Age Discrimination Act and the inherent requirements exemption
What age discrimination is
The Act sets out two types of age discrimination. Direct discrimination (s 14) happens when someone is treated less favourably than a person of a different age would be, in the same or similar circumstances. This must be because of their age, or a characteristic linked to that age.
Indirect discrimination (s 15) happens when an unreasonable condition, requirement or practice disadvantages people of the aggrieved person’s age. The discriminator, not the aggrieved person, must prove the condition was reasonable (s 15(2)).
Section 16 covers acts done for multiple reasons. If age, or an age-related characteristic under s 14(b), is one reason, the act counts as age discrimination. It need not be the main or substantial reason. Students should check how older cases read s 16, since this may differ from the current wording.
The inherent requirements cases
Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280 is the main High Court case on this topic. It was decided under s 170DF of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). That section said age-based termination was not unlawful if the reason was based on “the inherent requirements of the particular position”.
Qantas had a policy that pilots could not keep working past 60. A captain’s employment ended on his 60th birthday. Qantas relied on the “Rule of 60”, enforced by many countries it flew to or over.
The judges split. Brennan CJ, McHugh J and Gummow J would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the earlier appeal to the Full Court — this was the actual order made. Gaudron J would have allowed the appeal but sent the matter back to that Court. Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal entirely.
Later cases mainly rely on three points from the judgments. First, an “inherent requirement” (meaning something essential to the job) must be genuinely essential. Gaudron J said an employer cannot manufacture one by demanding something unnecessary, but a truly essential requirement is not disqualified just because it comes from the employment contract. She suggested a test: would the position be essentially the same without that requirement? Gummow J added that “inherent” means an essential element, not something merely incidental or accidental.
Second, Brennan CJ said the question depends not just on the contract, but on the function the employee actually performs within the employer’s organisation — provided that organisation is not structured in a way that unfairly discriminates against the employee. Applying this, he held that being able to compete fairly in the flight-bidding system, alongside similarly senior pilots, was an inherent requirement of the position.
Third, McHugh J held that an inherent requirement of being captain on international B747-400 flights was the ability to fly anywhere in the world. Being under 60 was treated as an essential part of that requirement, though he left open whether a captain must be able to fly to every Qantas destination. Gummow J similarly held that worldwide availability was the inherent requirement, with the retirement age being merely incidental to it.
The Christie legislation used the phrase “the particular position”. The Age Discrimination Act, in s 18(4), uses different wording.
Summers v Qantas: an interim decision
Summers v Qantas Airways Ltd [2021] FCA 391 involved a long-haul captain Qantas wanted to retire at 65. Katzmann J granted an interim injunction under s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), stopping termination until his complaint was withdrawn or ended.
This was only an interim decision. Katzmann J considered just two things: whether there was a prima facie case, and where the balance of convenience lay. A prima facie case means the evidence looks strong enough on its face to proceed, without finally deciding the matter.
Qantas relied on s 18(4) and the case of Christie, arguing it was relevantly indistinguishable. Katzmann J noted the employer bears the burden of proving the employee cannot meet the inherent requirements of the job.
She found at least a prima facie case that the captain could meet those requirements. This was because his case differed from Christie: he had not flown solely international routes, and his aircraft operated on limited international routes.
Whether he could actually be accommodated within the roster system was left for trial. The decision is therefore authority only on the interim test and the treatment of Christie, not on the final outcome of the discrimination claim.
Getting a claim to court
A person affected first lodges a written complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission (s 46P). The President may terminate a complaint on various grounds, including if it was lodged more than 24 months after the acts occurred (s 46PH(1)(b)). Note that Summers mentions a six-month period, which differs from this 24-month rule.
After termination and notice, a court application may follow. It must go to the Federal Court or Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) within 60 days of notice, or longer if the court allows (s 46PO(1)-(2)).
Court leave is usually needed too, unless termination was under s 46PH(1)(h) or (1B)(b) (s 46PO(3A)).
While a complaint is still pending, either court may grant an interim injunction. This preserves the status quo or protects a party’s rights (s 46PP(1)).
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