Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie

High Court of Australia · 1998

Health Disability And Elder LawAge Discrimination

Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280; [1998] HCA 18

Qantas ended a pilot’s employment on his 60th birthday because many countries would not admit pilots over 60. Was being under 60 an inherent requirement of his position as captain of its international B747-400 aircraft?

What happened?

John Christie was employed by Qantas from 1964 until his 60th birthday on 21 September 1994. He was a captain of B747-400 aircraft on Qantas international flights, and his employment ended because of a Qantas policy that its pilots should not continue beyond 60 ([7]). His letter of appointment engaged him “as a Pilot for duty as required by the Company in any part of the world”, and the industrial agreements that governed his employment provided that Qantas pilots would serve “in any part of the world where [Qantas] may from time to time be operating” ([14], [18]).

Qantas relied on what is called the Rule of 60. An international standard provides that States may not permit a pilot who has attained 60 to act as pilot in command of an international air service, and allows a State to exclude from its airspace an aircraft flown by such a pilot. The rule did not apply in Australia but was enforced by many of the countries to and over which Qantas flew ([26]). Wilcox CJ found that, after 60, Captain Christie could fly only to and from New Zealand, Denpasar and Fiji ([28]).

Captain Christie claimed in the Industrial Relations Court that Qantas had terminated his employment in breach of s 170DF(1)(f) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), which forbade termination for reasons that included age. Section 170DF(2) provided that subsection (1) did not prevent age from being a reason for terminating employment “if the reason is based on the inherent requirements of the particular position” ([8], [10]). Wilcox CJ found for Qantas. The Full Court (Gray and Marshall JJ, Spender J dissenting) held that Captain Christie was entitled to succeed and remitted the matter to consider relief ([9]). Qantas appealed to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ each gave reasons. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs, that the orders of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court be set aside, and that in their place the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

The issues were whether Qantas had terminated Captain Christie’s employment, and, if it had, whether the reason for the termination was based on the inherent requirements of his particular position ([11]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The meaning of “inherent requirements”. There were no joint reasons on the meaning of s 170DF(2), and the Justices differed in how the contract of employment bears on it. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ each treated an inherent requirement as one that is essential to the position. Gaudron J said that an inherent requirement is “something that is essential to the position”. An employer cannot create one by stipulating for something that is not essential, but if a requirement is “in truth, essential, it is irrelevant that it derives from the terms of the employment contract”.

A practical method is to ask “whether the position would be essentially the same if that requirement were dispensed with” ([34], [36]). Brennan CJ, in agreement with Gaudron J except on the final question of fact, said the question is answered by reference to the terms of the contract, the function the employee performs as part of the employer’s undertaking and, unless the undertaking is organised on a basis that impermissibly discriminates against the employee, that organisation ([1]), and spoke of the “essential requirements” of Captain Christie’s position ([2]).

McHugh J, Gummow J and Kirby J. McHugh J held that what is essential to the performance of a particular position must be regarded as an inherent requirement of it, and that the employer may define the position through the contract, though a contractual requirement does not necessarily equate to an inherent one ([74], [80], [86]). Gummow J treated the position as the particular bundle of contractual rights and obligations, supplemented by statute, and “inherent” as suggesting “an essential element of that spoken of rather than something inessential or accidental” ([114]). Kirby J, dissenting, said the inherent requirements must be those that are permanent and integral, essential to the very nature of the position, and not those that are transient, subject to change, geographically limited or otherwise temporary; operational requirements are not an excuse ([164] points 1 and 4-5).

Applying the phrase. Brennan CJ, McHugh J and Gummow J held that the termination was based on the inherent requirements of Captain Christie’s position, and the Court’s order allowing the appeal and dismissing the appeal to the Full Court follows their reasons. Brennan CJ held that the ability to participate effectively, equally with other pilots of similar seniority, in the system by which Qantas allocated flights was an inherent requirement ([2]-[3], [5]). McHugh J held that it was an inherent requirement of the position of captain of Qantas international B747-400 flights that the holder be able, physically, mentally and legally, to fly to any part of the world; because pilots over 60 could not fly the greater portion of Qantas routes, it was an essential incident of that requirement that the holder be under 60 ([86]-[87]).

He left open whether the captain must be able to fly to every Qantas destination and what the conclusion would be if only a small number of countries imposed the age ban ([86]-[87]). Gummow J held that availability for service in any part of the world where Qantas operated gave the captain’s duties their particular character, and that the termination for age was incidental to that requirement ([116]-[117]).

Gaudron J and Kirby J. Gaudron J also allowed the appeal but would have remitted ground 3 of Captain Christie’s appeal to the Full Court. A contractual stipulation for service anywhere in the world was not itself an inherent requirement, because the roster system required only that he fly the destinations necessary to comply with it ([37]). Compliance with the roster system was not itself an inherent requirement, but inherent requirements could be discerned from it, such as working a minimum number of hours in an eight-week period on trips scheduled by Qantas and chosen without preference over other captains ([38]-[39]).

Whether Wilcox CJ erred in finding that Captain Christie would need to use a large proportion of short flights had not been decided ([40]-[41]). Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal, because being under 60 was not a permanent requirement of the position and the disqualification was connected with geography and rostering ([164] points 3-4).

Termination. McHugh J also held that Qantas had not terminated the employment, which ended by agreement at 60 ([61]-[69]). Gaudron J and Kirby J held that it was terminated at Qantas’s initiative ([21]-[25], [153]-[161]). Gummow J proceeded on the footing that it was, without deciding the contract point ([100]-[101]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · Brennan CJ, Gaudron J, McHugh J and Gummow J (separate reasons)

Read judgment: [1]–[2] (opens in a new tab), [34]–[36] (opens in a new tab), [74] (opens in a new tab), [114] (opens in a new tab)

The four Justices who allowed the appeal wrote separately. Brennan CJ agreed with Gaudron J’s reasons except on the final question of fact ([1]), while McHugh J and Gummow J gave their own reasons without adopting another Justice’s on this question. Each treats an inherent requirement as essential to the position, so there is a common thread, but they differ in how far the contract and the employer’s organisation define the position, and no single formulation is the reasoning of a majority. The label ‘ratio’ for any one of them would conceal that.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [162]–[165] (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal. He read ‘inherent’ as permanent and integral, not temporary or geographically limited, and separated inherent requirements from operational ones. His reasons are not part of the Court’s order.

Proposition 2

Classification unresolved · Brennan CJ, McHugh J and Gummow J (separate reasons for allowing the appeal)

Read judgment: [2]–[5] (opens in a new tab), [86]–[87] (opens in a new tab), [116]–[117] (opens in a new tab)

The order allowing the appeal rests on three separate routes: the bidding system (Brennan CJ), capacity to fly worldwide with age as an essential incident (McHugh J) and availability for worldwide service with age incidental to it (Gummow J). On the application of the phrase, none of the three adopts another’s reasoning, so no one route is the ratio of a majority.

Separate reasoning · Gaudron J (allowing the appeal and remitting)

Read judgment: [37]–[41] (opens in a new tab)

Gaudron J joined in allowing the appeal but would have remitted the question whether Mr Christie could comply with the roster system. She concurs in the allowing of the appeal and differs from the others on the form of order and the reason.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [162]–[165] (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal and agreed with the Full Court majority. His reasons are not part of the Court’s order.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J (on termination); Gaudron J and Kirby J (contra)

Read judgment: [61]–[69] (opens in a new tab), [21]–[25] (opens in a new tab), [153]–[161] (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J alone held that Qantas did not terminate the employment because it ended by agreement. Gaudron J and Kirby J held that it was terminated at Qantas’s initiative. The question was not necessary to the order for the Justices who decided the case on s 170DF(2), so McHugh J’s view is his own and is not the Court’s holding.

Why does this case matter?

Cases about when a workplace requirement can justify differential treatment are often reduced to a single quotation about “essential” requirements. Without the case, students give that quotation as the Court’s test without saying whose it is. An examiner expects the formulation to be attributed to a particular Justice.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about whether a requirement is justified by the nature of a job, identify the requirement, the position it is said to belong to, and the source from which the employer derives it (contract, industrial agreement, practice or the employer’s system). Say whose formulation of the test you use and why it suits the facts in the problem.

Christie was decided under s 170DF(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), which spoke of “the particular position”. McHugh J distinguished a “position” from a “job” ([72]-[73]) and Gummow J said that the phrase “the particular position” is directed to the precise case, not to a general class of persons ([101]). A problem under a different statute needs that statute’s words and the authorities decided under it.

Check your understanding

1. What did Gaudron J say about an employer’s stipulating for a requirement in the contract of employment, and how did McHugh J’s statement differ?

2. On what ground did Brennan CJ conclude that the termination was based on an inherent requirement of Captain Christie’s position?

3. Why would Gaudron J have remitted the matter rather than allowed the appeal outright?

4. Which Justice held that Qantas had not terminated the employment, and which Justices held that it had?