Commissioner of the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission v Oak Tasmania
Commissioner of the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission v Oak Tasmania [2026] FCA 7
A registered disability provider admits it told the regulator about hundreds of serious incidents late, and both sides put a penalty figure to the Federal Court. Is the judge’s role then just to sign off?
Qualified by legislation: National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), from 9 April 2026
Schedule 1 (items 36 and 37) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Act 2026 (Cth), commencing on 9 April 2026, replaced the penalties for ss 73J and 73V(3) of the Act with a two-tier penalty: 10,000 penalty units for a serious contravention (for s 73V(3), a serious contravention by an NDIS provider) and 250 penalty units in any other case, and s 11B defines a serious contravention. The decision’s references to a maximum of 1,250 penalty units a contravention for a body corporate describe the provisions as they stood before that date.
What happened?
The Commissioner of the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission started a Federal Court proceeding against Oak Tasmania (Oak), a registered charity and not-for-profit organisation that had been a registered NDIS provider since 1 July 2019. The Commissioner alleged that between 1 July 2019 and 1 December 2023 Oak contravened ss 73J and 73V of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ([1]-[2]). Oak admitted the contraventions. On 14 August 2025 the parties filed a statement of agreed facts and they jointly proposed declarations, a penalty of $1.1 million and costs of $200,000 ([3]-[4]).
The admitted conduct was of two kinds. On 474 occasions Oak did not notify a reportable incident to the Commissioner within the required time: 104 times outside 24 hours and 370 times outside 5 business days ([24]). On six occasions, concerning five NDIS participants, Oak did not comply with the NDIS Code of Conduct and the NDIS Practice Standards ([25]). The judge accepted the agreed facts as proof of the facts they contain ([26]), and recorded the Commissioner’s submission, which Oak accepted, that the conduct was very serious ([28]).
Since the conduct, Oak’s parent company had merged with another group, and from 1 September 2025 all of Oak’s directors had been replaced ([60]). Oak also put material before the Court about the corrective measures it had taken ([58]).
What did the Court decide?
McEvoy J, sitting alone, made seven declarations. The first was that Oak contravened s 73J on 474 occasions by notifying reportable incidents late (104 and 370 occasions under the two notification periods respectively). The other six were that Oak contravened s 73V, and in three of them also s 73J, in providing supports to the five participants (Declarations 2-7). His Honour ordered Oak to pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty of $1,100,000, made up of $250,000 for the 104 failures to notify within 24 hours, $100,000 for the 370 failures to notify within 5 business days, and between $100,000 and $150,000 for each of the other six matters. He also ordered Oak to pay the Commissioner’s costs, fixed at $200,000 (Orders 1-2; [73]-[74]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
McEvoy J explained how late notification of a reportable incident becomes a civil penalty contravention. The conditions of a registered NDIS provider’s registration include compliance with the applicable requirements about reportable incidents in the Reportable Incidents Rules, and a registered provider that breaches a condition contravenes s 73J ([11]-[12]). Section 20 of the Rules requires notification of specified categories of reportable incident within 24 hours and s 21 requires written notification of other reportable incidents within 5 business days, so that a failure to comply with the notification requirements in Pt 3 of the Rules breaches a condition of registration and so s 73J ([20]-[21]).
His Honour identified the purposes of the notification requirement as including enabling the Commissioner to collect, correlate, analyse and disseminate information to identify trends or systemic issues, to take action on a specific incident, and to build the capacity of providers to respond to and prevent incidents ([22]). He accepted the Commissioner’s submission that delay and lack of transparency in notifying deprives the Commissioner of information and compromises the Commissioner’s ability to keep participants safe ([50]). He made the declarations because they concerned live issues, the Commissioner is charged with ensuring compliance with the regime, Oak accepted them, and they would have utility by identifying contravening conduct, a matter of public importance, and recording the Court’s disapproval of it ([32]-[33]).
On the penalty, McEvoy J said that, although the penalty was agreed, the Court was not bound to accept it ([48]). The question was whether the agreed penalty falls within the range of appropriate penalties and is an appropriate penalty, rather than the appropriate penalty, since fixing the quantum of a civil penalty is not an exact science ([49]). He noted the High Court’s endorsement of acting on agreed penalty submissions, provided the court is persuaded that what is proposed is appropriate ([72]). He treated deterrence, specific and general, as the primary purpose of pecuniary penalties ([38]), and said the Court is not generally assisted by a comparison of penalties in other cases, because of the widely differing circumstances of each case ([47]).
The maximum for a single contravention by a body corporate was 1,250 penalty units, which was between $262,500 and $391,250 over the period ([63]-[64]). Because there were 474 notification contraventions, the notional total of the maxima for them was $129,202,500, and for the six other contraventions $1,797,500 ([66], [68]). The Commissioner submitted that with so many contraventions an arithmetical aggregation may be an “arid exercise” ([69]). His Honour described the Court’s approach in such cases as determining the penalty by reference to all relevant considerations, in particular deterrence, and taking a broad view of the course or courses of conduct, with regard to totality ([70]).
He took account of the serious harm or risk of harm to the five participants ([51]); the absence of evidence that Oak intended to breach the law, and the avoidability of the contraventions with adequate reporting processes ([52]); the fact that Oak’s not-for-profit status did not obviate the significance of specific deterrence ([55]); its cooperation and early admissions ([57]); its corrective measures, accepting that the efficacy of a policy depends on its implementation ([58]-[59]); and the merger and change of board and senior management, which could moderate specific deterrence ([60]-[62]). He was satisfied that the aggregate penalty of $1.1 million was appropriate in the circumstances ([73]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · McEvoy J
Read judgment: [20]–[22] (opens in a new tab), [26]–[27] (opens in a new tab), [32]–[33] (opens in a new tab), [50] (opens in a new tab)
The declarations followed from McEvoy J’s acceptance of the agreed facts and his account of how late notification breaches a condition of registration and so s 73J; the importance of timely notification is part of his reasons for treating the contraventions as serious.
Proposition 2
Ratio · McEvoy J
Read judgment: [47]–[49] (opens in a new tab), [63]–[64] (opens in a new tab), [69]–[70] (opens in a new tab), [72]–[73] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs are the reasons by which McEvoy J accepted the agreed aggregate penalty, and are the ground of the penalty order.
Why does this case matter?
Students tend to meet this decision through its headline figure of $1.1 million, and the risk is taking that figure out of its setting. The decision was made by a single judge on admitted facts, about conduct between 2019 and 2023, under penalty provisions that were later amended. What it adds to an answer is the way the Court reached its conclusion about a penalty that the parties had already settled, and the way it connected a missed deadline to a civil penalty provision.
Exam and application relevance
Start with the obligation and the clock: which instrument imposes the duty to notify, which period applies to the incident described, and whether the facts show the period was missed. Then name the provision that is contravened, and say whether the problem asks about liability, declarations, penalty or all three.
Where a problem says the parties have agreed a penalty, state what the Court has to be satisfied of and what it does with the figure the parties put to it, and give the paragraph ([5], [48]-[49], [72]). Attribute the points to McEvoy J of the Federal Court, sitting alone, on admitted facts and an agreed penalty.
Check the date of the conduct before stating a maximum. This decision applied the maximum of 1,250 penalty units for a body corporate ([63]), and the Act’s penalties for ss 73J and 73V(3) were replaced from 9 April 2026 by a two-tier penalty with a separate meaning for a serious contravention. This decision, made on 19 January 2026, does not deal with that change.
Check your understanding
1. Over what period did the Commissioner allege contraventions, and what did Oak admit ([1], [3], [24]-[25])?
2. What are the two notification periods in play, and how many contraventions of each were declared ([20]-[21], [24])?
3. What three matters did McEvoy J say the Court had to be satisfied of ([5])?
4. What orders were made, and how was the $1.1 million made up (Orders 1-2; [70])?
5. Which maximum for a single contravention did McEvoy J record at [63], and why must it be checked against the date of the conduct?