Shanahan v Scott

High Court of Australia · 1957

Legal Research And MethodResearchDelegated LegislationReading Legislation And Delegated Legislation

Shanahan v Scott [1957] HCA 4; (1957) 96 CLR 245

A Victorian regulation forbade anyone to put eggs into cold storage without the Egg Board’s consent. The Act let the Board market eggs vested in it. Could a general power to make regulations reach eggs the Board never owned?

What happened?

The Marketing of Primary Products Acts 1935-1953 (Vict) let producers of a rural product petition for a marketing board to be set up for it, and let the Governor in Council provide that the product, as a “commodity”, be vested in the board, so that the board could market it collectively and distribute the proceeds. The Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board was established under that machinery (pp 250 to 253). Regulation 44 of the Board’s regulations made it an offence for any person, without the Board’s consent, to place eggs in cold storage premises or to subject eggs to preservative treatment, apart from a quantity not exceeding thirty dozen kept for the person’s own domestic requirements (pp 248 to 249).

Henry Shanahan was charged under reg 44. On the joint reasons’ account he was the manager of a firm carrying on business in New South Wales who had caused eggs, which may be supposed to have been produced in New South Wales, to be placed in cold storage (p 249). The magistrate dismissed the information on the ground that the regulation invaded s 92 of the Constitution. Lowe J of the Supreme Court of Victoria made the order nisi to review absolute, taking the view that reg 44 was a valid exercise of the regulation-making power in s 43(1), and Shanahan appealed to the High Court by special leave. The joint reasons record that there was no attempt to support the magistrate’s decision under s 92, so the question was whether reg 44 was within the power the Victorian Acts conferred (p 249).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) allowed the appeal with costs by a majority, discharged the Supreme Court’s order and ordered that the order nisi to review be discharged with costs. Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ, in joint reasons (pp 248 to 255), held that reg 44 was invalid. Kitto J dissented (pp 255 to 260).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint reasons of Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ began from the terms of s 43(1) of the Marketing of Primary Products Acts 1935-1953 (Vict), which let the Governor in Council make regulations providing for purposes “necessary or expedient for the administration of the Act or for carrying out the objects of the Act”. They said that cases of this Court on powers of this kind show that such a power “does not enable the authority by regulations to extend the scope or general operation of the enactment but is strictly ancillary”.

It will authorise “subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is enacted in the statute itself” and what is incidental to executing its specific provisions, but it “will not support attempts to widen the purposes of the Act, to add new and different means of carrying them out or to depart from or vary the plan which the legislature has adopted to attain its ends” (p 250).

Applying that, the joint reasons first described the plan of the Acts as machinery for collective marketing: producers could cause a marketing board to be set up for a commodity, and the commodity could be vested in the board (pp 250 to 252). They then gave two answers to the argument that the particular power to make regulations “regulating” storage supported reg 44. One was that a prohibition of cold storage subject to a power of consent is not regulating storage, because it operates as a complete prohibition unless consent happens to be obtained. The other was that the context suggests that the particular power relates to the conditions, manner and occasion in which the listed things are done rather than to the possibility of doing them at all (p 253). The validity of the regulation therefore depended on the general words.

On those words the joint reasons said that it is impossible to reduce the “indefinite test” to precision, but that the words are not unlimited and that the Court’s earlier decisions “afford some guidance” (p 253). A regulation concerned only with eggs vested in the board, while vested, would raise no objection: it would be “nothing but filling in a detail of the plan which the Acts describe”. Regulation 44 went further. It extended to eggs with which the board had and could have nothing to do, to eggs the board had sold unconditionally and to eggs brought from another State (p 253).

That made it an attempt “not to complement but to supplement the plan of the legislation”, in a phrase of Isaacs J repeated in Carbines v Powell (p 254). The board’s argument was that effective marketing of the eggs vested in it needed control of cold storage generally, so that chilled or preserved eggs outside its control could not upset its scheme. The joint reasons answered that this treated the legislation as having a purpose beyond, and different from, the collective marketing of a rural product of Victoria, and that imposing the restriction on part of the commodity falling outside the board’s marketing powers was “to extend the legislative plan not to carry it into effect” (pp 254 to 255). Regulation 44 was ultra vires.

In his own reasons Kitto J read the power as authorising any regulation that “may fairly be considered necessary or expedient either for the administration of the Act or for carrying out the objects of the Act”, and said that what is necessary or expedient is “a question requiring a separate answer in respect of each product” for which a board is established (pp 255 to 256). On his reading the scheme of the Act is the regulation by each board of the marketing generally in Victoria of its commodity, and the characteristics of eggs, which deteriorate quickly and are produced in fluctuating volumes, meant that a board needed a discretionary control over the diversion of fresh eggs into chilling or preserving, including eggs it did not own (pp 256 to 259). He thought that the regulation’s application to eggs not vested in the board was “a conclusive reason for holding it valid” (p 260).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: p 250 (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab), pp 253–255 (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab)

The statement of what a power to make regulations necessary or expedient for the administration or objects of the Act authorises (p 250), and its application to reg 44 (pp 253 to 255), are the reasoning that decided the appeal: the Court held the regulation ultra vires because it extended the plan of the Acts, and that is the ground of the order allowing the appeal.

Separate reasoning · Kitto J (dissenting)

Read judgment: pp 255–260 (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)

Kitto J applied the same power on a different reading of what is necessary or expedient for a particular commodity and would have dismissed the appeal. He dissents from the result and from the joint reasons’ view that reg 44 extended the legislative plan, so his reasoning is not part of the Court’s holding.

Why does this case matter?

A student who has read a regulation closely and found that it plainly covers the facts has done part of the work. An examiner looks for the student who then identifies the statutory power under which the instrument was made, reads that power against the Act as a whole, and says what the regulation adds to the scheme the Act sets up.

Exam and application relevance

Cite Shanahan for what the joint reasons said about the reach of a regulation-making power expressed in the “necessary or expedient” form, and attribute Kitto J’s different view to him as a dissent. Say that the joint reasons themselves described the test as indefinite and reached their conclusion by reading the particular Victorian Acts, so the application to another Act depends on that Act’s own plan and on the exact words of its regulation-making power. The case was decided in 1957 on the Acts as they then stood. Check the current text of the enabling provision and the current version of the regulation on the official legislation site, and check for later authority on the kind of power in issue, before relying on it for a present-day regulation.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices wrote the joint reasons, who dissented, and what was the order?

2. Which categories of eggs did the joint reasons say reg 44 reached beyond the eggs vested in the board, and why did that matter to its validity?

3. How did Kitto J’s treatment of the fact that the regulation applied to eggs not vested in the board differ from the joint reasons’, and what did he say about the question of what is necessary or expedient?