Williams v Melbourne Corporation

High Court of Australia · 1933

Legal Research And MethodResearchDelegated LegislationReading Legislation And Delegated Legislation

Williams v Melbourne Corporation [1933] HCA 56; (1933) 49 CLR 142

A Melbourne by-law let cattle be driven through nine named streets at any hour and forty-four more between midnight and 8 a.m., and no others. The power was to make by-laws “regulating traffic”. Regulation, or prohibition?

What happened?

Clause 37 of by-law no. 204 of the City of Melbourne, a by-law about street traffic, had restricted the hours at which cattle intended for sale, slaughter or shipment, or passing from one part of the country to another, could be driven through the city (Dixon J, p 151). On 9 March 1931 the Council made by-law no. 205, which repealed clause 37 and put a new one in its place (pp 143, 151 to 152). Under the new clause 37 no person was to drive, or cause to be driven, into or through any portion of the city any cattle of those kinds, except on the streets listed in two schedules.

The nine streets in the first schedule could be used at any time, and the forty-four in the second only between midnight and 8 a.m. (Starke J, p 149; Dixon J, p 152). “Cattle” included sheep, swine and goats as well as horses and oxen (Dixon J, p 151). The Council owned and controlled the sheep and cattle saleyards at Newmarket, close to the live stock siding of the railway station, and most of the first-schedule streets were in the vicinity of the saleyards (p 144).

Michael Sydney Williams obtained a rule nisi in the Supreme Court of Victoria calling on the Council to show cause why by-law no. 205 should not be quashed, on the grounds that it was ultra vires and beyond the powers conferred by the Local Government Act 1928, that it was unreasonable and that it was against public policy (p 143). To show that it was unreasonable he led evidence that it was impossible, especially in winter, to get sheep and cattle to the saleyards without using some second-schedule streets during the prohibited hours, impossible to get them away without infringing the by-law, and that the by-law was continually infringed with the knowledge of the Council’s officers (p 144).

The Council denied any general failure to enforce it (Dixon J, p 154). The Full Court of the Supreme Court held that the by-law was within the powers conferred by s 197(1) of the Act and was not unreasonable, and Williams appealed to the High Court by special leave (p 144).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) dismissed the appeal (pp 147 to 159). No Justice dissented.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The power on which the Justices rested the by-law was s 197(1)(xix) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vict), which let a municipality make by-laws “regulating traffic and processions” (Starke J, p 147; Dixon J, p 153). Starke J, Dixon J, Evatt J and McTiernan J each treated cattle driven through the streets as traffic (Starke J, p 148; Dixon J, p 156; Evatt J, p 157; McTiernan J, p 158). The appellant’s case, as Evatt J put it, was that the power assumes that all traffic must be free at all times to come and go, so that a by-law containing so drastic a prohibition could not be a regulation (p 157).

On that argument Starke J said that a power to regulate traffic “does not warrant an absolute prohibition of all traffic, but it does involve more than restrictions upon the conduct of persons in traffic, and extends in my opinion to the regulation of the times when, and the streets, roads or routes in which, traffic may proceed” (pp 148 to 149). He read Melbourne Corporation v Barry as not to the contrary, and as depending on “the particular form of by-law adopted in that case” (p 149).

Dixon J said that the Court “has insisted upon the limited nature of a power to regulate traffic” and that the power does not extend to “absolute control over the subject” (p 155). But the doctrine that a power to regulate does not authorise the prohibition of the subject matter “does not altogether exclude the prohibition of particular acts or things which may be contained within the subject matter”, and “[t]he nature, operation, and apparent purpose of the restraints imposed must be considered and, if they fairly answer the description of a regulation of the subject matter, the power will sustain them” (pp 155 to 156).

Evatt J said that “prohibition of some character must be authorized by a power to regulate” traffic, because any regulation excludes an absolute right of each person and vehicle to pass without restriction at any time and along any street selected, and that the power “necessarily includes the power to stop particular movement so that general movement may proceed” (pp 157 to 158). The cattle driver was not prevented altogether from traversing the city; the by-law regulated “the time and manner of his coming and going” (p 158).

McTiernan J said that the doctrine invoked by the appellant was not offended, because the prohibition in clause 37 “serves the order and convenience of traffic as a whole”, so that the clause was a regulation of traffic, and that the streets and hours allowed, “though somewhat severely restricted”, were not so inadequate “as virtually to close the entire city against this form of traffic altogether” (p 159).

On the argument that the by-law was unreasonable, Starke J said that “the Court is not entitled to form its own opinion as to the reasonableness of a by-law and if it thinks it unreasonable, though within the scope of the powers granted, to declare it invalid” (pp 149 to 150). He said that Slattery v Naylor recognises that “a merely fantastic and capricious by-law, such as reasonable men could not make in good faith” would be bad, because such a by-law could not in any proper sense be regarded as an exercise of the power (p 150).

Dixon J said that although in some jurisdictions unreasonableness “is still considered a separate ground of invalidity”, “in this Court it is not so treated” (p 154). He added that it is not always enough to ask whether a by-law appears on its face to relate to the subject of the power: the true nature and purpose of the power must be determined, and it “must often be necessary to examine the operation of the by-law in the local circumstances to which it is intended to apply” (p 155).

Where, despite an apparent connection with the subject of the power, the true character of the by-law is such that it “could not reasonably have been adopted as a means of attaining the ends of the power”, then “the by-law will be invalid, not because it is inexpedient or misguided, but because it is not a real exercise of the power” (p 155).

Evatt J said that unreasonableness did not arise except as criticism of the expediency of the exercise of the power; the appearance of unfairness “compels a closer scrutiny of its validity”, but he could not see how unreasonableness could be a separate ground for challenging this by-law (p 158). McTiernan J agreed with Dixon J that the ground “does not raise a question which is separate from the question whether the clause is within the power”, and put the material question as whether “the operation of the by-law is such that it can have no reasonable relation to the purpose for which the power to make by-laws was granted, namely, the order and convenience of the traffic of the city” (p 159).

Applying that, Starke J said the by-law “has appointed streets and roads along which this traffic may proceed, and the times when it may proceed”, that compliance “is simply a question of degree”, and that “It is not the by-law that is unreasonable, but those who assert the right to drive mobs of cattle or flocks of sheep through a large and modern city” (pp 150 to 151). Dixon J took the effect of the by-law in the circumstances of Melbourne into account (p 153): a prima facie rule that no cattle should pass through the streets, with exceptions for a very few streets near the saleyards at any hour and a larger but very limited number of streets between midnight and 8 a.m.

The “ultimate question”, he said, was whether, when applied to the conditions of Melbourne, the by-law “involves such an actual suppression of the use of the streets for the purposes of the necessary transit of an important and ordinary commodity as to go beyond any restraint which could be reasonably adopted for the purpose of preserving the safety, convenience and proper facility of traffic in general”, and he felt “unable to say that the by-law does have such an operation” (p 156).

Evatt J treated the evidence that the by-law could not be obeyed as amounting “to no more than an assertion that it is very inconvenient so to restrict the size of the mobs or to increase the number of men employed in driving them, as to ensure compliance with the by-law” (pp 156 to 157).

The Justices did not rest on the other powers in s 197 in the same way. Dixon J held that clause 37 exceeded the power given by par 44 of Part I of the Thirteenth Schedule, applied through s 197(1)(ii), and that par (xxiv), which concerns the regulation of the driving of cattle in or along any specified street, would authorise restricting the hours for the second-schedule streets but did not extend to “the prohibition of driving in all streets other than those specified in the first and second schedules”, so that the validity of the clause had to “rest upon” par (xix) (pp 152 to 153).

Starke J found it unnecessary to delimit the Schedule power in view of par (xix) (p 148), and Evatt J said that the power for “regulating traffic” is not limited in its natural meaning and operation by the presence of other regulation-making powers in the Act (p 158).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Starke J, Dixon J, Evatt J and McTiernan J (each in separate reasons; no joint reasons)

Read judgment: pp 148–149 (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), pp 155–156 (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), pp 157–158 (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), p 159 (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

Each of the four Justices decided the appeal on the ground that clause 37, which confined the droving of cattle to named streets and hours, was a by-law for the purpose of regulating traffic within s 197(1)(xix): Starke J (pp 148 to 149) because a power to regulate traffic extends to the times and routes of traffic, Dixon J (pp 155 to 156) because the restraints fairly answered the description of regulation of the subject matter, Evatt J (pp 157 to 158) because regulating traffic necessarily includes some prohibitions, and McTiernan J (p 159) because the clause served the order and convenience of traffic as a whole. They wrote separately, so the common ground is the ground on which each reached the order, not a shared set of reasons.

Ratio · Starke J, Dixon J, Evatt J and McTiernan J (each in separate reasons)

Read judgment: pp 149–150 (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), pp 154–155 (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), p 158 (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), p 159 (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

The appellant’s second ground was that the by-law was unreasonable. Rejecting it as a separate ground of invalidity was necessary to dismissing the appeal, and each Justice did so in his own terms: Starke J (pp 149 to 150), Dixon J (pp 154 to 155), Evatt J (p 158) and McTiernan J (p 159, expressly agreeing with Dixon J). Each treated what was left of the complaint as a question whether the by-law was within, or a real exercise of, the power.

Separate reasoning · Dixon J (concurring in the result)

Read judgment: pp 152–153 (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), pp 155–156 (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

Dixon J took a route the others did not: he held that clause 37 went beyond par 44 of Part I of the Thirteenth Schedule and that par (xxiv) would not support the prohibition of driving in the other streets, so the clause had to rest on par (xix) (pp 152 to 153), and he stated the test of a real exercise of the power in his own words (p 155). Starke J found it unnecessary to delimit the Schedule power (p 148) and Evatt J said par (xix) is not limited by the other regulation-making powers (p 158). All four concur in dismissing the appeal; Dixon J’s formulation is his own, with McTiernan J’s express agreement on the unreasonableness point only.

Why does this case matter?

Questions about the validity of a by-law or regulation are often answered in one line: that a power to regulate does not include a power to prohibit, or that the instrument is unreasonable and so invalid. An examiner looks for more. The exact words of the enabling power matter, and so does what the instrument does in practice, and so does what a court may and may not ask about the instrument. This case gives a student a worked example of how to build that kind of answer.

Exam and application relevance

Cite Williams as four separate judgments, and attribute each statement to its Justice: Starke J at pp 148 to 150, Dixon J at pp 154 to 156, Evatt J at pp 157 to 158 and McTiernan J at pp 158 to 159. Say what each said about the power in s 197(1)(xix) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vict), and treat the statements as being about that power: Starke J noted that s 197 gives power in some paragraphs of “prohibiting or regulating” and in others of “regulating” (p 147), so the words of the particular power are the starting point.

Dixon J said that the operation of the by-law in the local circumstances may need to be examined (p 155), and McTiernan J asked whether the streets and hours allowed were so inadequate as virtually to close the city to this form of traffic (p 159), so the application turns on the facts of the instrument in question and not on the result alone.

Later High Court judgments cite the case for both points. In Yanner v Eaton [1999] HCA 53 at [37], the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ said that regulation may shade into prohibition and that the line between the two may be difficult to discern, citing Starke J at pp 148 to 149 and Dixon J at pp 155 to 156. In Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3, French CJ described Dixon J’s passage as a high threshold test applied to a purposive by-law-making power ([56]), and Hayne J, quoting Fullagar J in Clements v Bull, said that Williams discredited the idea that a by-law could be held invalid because it appeared to a court to be an unreasonable provision ([117]).

Crennan and Kiefel JJ said in the same case that Dixon J’s statement of a test of reasonableness bears an obvious affinity with a test of proportionality ([201]). The case was decided in 1933 under the Victorian Act of 1928, so check the current enabling provision for any present-day by-law.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justice said that a power to regulate traffic does not warrant an absolute prohibition of all traffic, and what did he say that such a power does extend to?

2. How did Dixon J say a court should decide whether a by-law is a real exercise of a power, and what did he say about a by-law that is merely inexpedient or misguided?

3. Which Justice expressly agreed with Dixon J that unreasonableness raised no separate question, and what did that Justice say the material question was?