Saleh v Romanous
Saleh v Romanous [2010] NSWCA 274
Before exchange a vendor promised the buyers their money back if the neighbouring owner would not build, yet the signed contract was unconditional and said it was the whole agreement. Can the promise still be relied on?
What happened?
Michael and Rose Saleh (the vendors) were developers who owned 163 Kissing Point Road, Dundas; Michael’s brother Edmond, who lived in Adelaide, owned the property next door at 165 ([3]). On 30 July 2003 they obtained development consent for eight two-storey strata-titled townhouses on the two properties together ([3]). On 13 May 2004 the vendors contracted to sell 163 Kissing Point Road to Harris Romanous, a plumber and builder, and his wife Philomena (the purchasers) for $670,000, with a 10 per cent deposit and completion due within 42 days ([4]). The price had been negotiated on the assumption that the two properties would be developed together under the consent ([4]). The purchasers’ solicitors tried without success to add special conditions to the contract and did not try to have the pre-contractual promise described below included in it ([5], [8]). The contract included an entire agreement clause, cl 10.1.5 ([23]).
The trial judge, Forster J, found ([7]) that in April 2004, before exchange, Michael said to Harris: “Leave Eddie up to me. I’m taking responsibility for Eddie. If Eddie doesn’t want to build you don’t have to buy and you’ll get your money back.” He found that Michael confirmed that promise a few days later; Michael denied making it, but the judge accepted the evidence of Harris and his son Joe ([8]). The purchasers were unable to negotiate a satisfactory joint venture with Edmond ([23]).
The completion date of 24 June 2004 passed without steps towards completion ([9]), and on 26 July 2004 Michael collected from Philomena a cheque for $200,000, which was met on presentation, after asking on 2 July for what the judge found was a loan ([10]-[12]). On 23 March 2006 the purchasers purported to rescind under s 66L of the Conveyancing Act (NSW) because the house had been demolished, and on 30 August 2006 they sued to recover the deposit, the loan and a building debt ([20], [30]).
The judge upheld the purchasers’ claim that a promissory estoppel based on the pre-contractual promise prevented the vendors from enforcing the contract, and ordered them to repay the deposit and loan and to pay the balance of the building debt ([23]). The vendors appealed, challenging both the finding that the promise was made and the availability in law of an estoppel based on a pre-contractual promise ([2], [23], [24]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Giles JA, Handley AJA and Sackville AJA) dismissed the appeal with costs ([84]). The Court declined to disturb the finding that Michael made the pre-contractual promise, because the vendors had not established that the finding was glaringly improbable or contrary to incontrovertible facts ([50]). The judge’s orders were affirmed ([81]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The vendors submitted that the parol evidence rule and cl 10.1.5 of the contract, an entire agreement clause, excluded any pre-contractual promissory estoppel, and that a collateral promise which could not be enforced as a contract could not be enforced as a promissory estoppel ([23], [52], [61]). Handley AJA, with whom Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreed ([1], [85]), said that promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine which, like other doctrines developed by the Court of Chancery, imposes equitable restraints on the enforcement of contractual and other rights ([54], [55]). He said that there are other equitable restraints on the enforcement of contractual rights based on pre-contractual conduct, including the equitable remedies for fraud, innocent misrepresentation and mistake ([56]), and that “These remedies and defences trump the legal rules about parol evidence and entire contracts” ([57]).
He accepted that Hoyts Pty Ltd v Spencer is clear authority that an informal collateral contract cannot be inconsistent with the principal contract, and that the trial judge correctly held that a collateral contract based on the promise would be inconsistent with the contract of sale ([58]). But he rejected the vendors’ submission: “A promissory estoppel is not enforced as a contract, but as an equitable restraint on the exercise or enforcement of the promisor’s rights”, Hoyts did not decide that the sub-lessee had no equity, and “Enforcement of a pre-contractual promissory estoppel is not barred by Hoyts’ case” ([62], [63]).
He relied on the Privy Council’s decision in Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim, which he said was referred to with approval in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher by Mason CJ and Wilson J, Brennan J and Gaudron J. Those cases, he said, “have added pre-contractual promissory estoppel to the grounds on which equity will protect one contracting party from inequitable conduct by the other”, and the legal rights trumped include those protected by the parol evidence and entire contract rules ([64]-[68]). He described dicta in Branir, Wright v Hamilton Island and Franklins v Metcash, and the remittal of a pleaded promissory estoppel in Equuscorp with Holmes J’s later remarks, as supporting that view ([69]-[72]), and held that the trial judge correctly held that the purchasers had established a promissory estoppel which entitled them to restrain the vendors from enforcing the contract of sale ([73]).
Handley AJA then addressed the form of relief. He said that the estoppel “is not the equitable equivalent of a contract, and cannot give the purchasers positive rights to rescind and recover their deposit that they would have had if the pre-contractual promise had contractual force”, and that a pre-contractual promissory estoppel conferring positive rights of that nature would be contrary to Hoyts’ case ([73]). He said: “A promissory estoppel is a restraint on the enforcement of rights, and thus, unlike a proprietary estoppel, it must be negative in substance”, and referred to the statements of Lord Cairns LC in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co and Bowen LJ in Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co, both quoted by Lord Wilberforce in Bank Negara ([74], [75]).
He said that the inherent limitations on the scope of promissory estoppel “do not matter in this case” because the purchasers could rely on the statutory remedy in s 55(2A) of the Conveyancing Act (NSW) to recover their deposit without rescinding the contract ([77]). The trial judge had held that the estoppel entitled the purchasers to rescind and recover their deposit; Handley AJA held that positive relief was not available on that ground, but that the judge’s decision that the estoppel prevented the vendors enforcing the contract entitled the purchasers to an order under s 55(2A), so that the judge’s orders could be affirmed without a formal order under the section ([81]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Handley AJA (Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreeing)
Read judgment: [54]–[68] (opens in a new tab), [73] (opens in a new tab)
The vendors’ legal ground of appeal was that the parol evidence rule and the entire agreement clause excluded the estoppel ([23], [52], [61]); rejecting it was necessary to dismissing the appeal on the judge’s estoppel finding, the alternative grounds in the purchasers’ notice of contention having been rejected without elaboration ([82]-[83]). The dicta reported at [69]-[72] are other courts’ statements, cited as support, and are not themselves the Court’s holding.
Proposition 2
Classification unresolved · Handley AJA (Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreeing)
Read judgment: [73] (opens in a new tab), [81] (opens in a new tab)
Handley AJA applied the limit to the judge’s reasoning: the estoppel could restrain enforcement but could not give the purchasers positive rights to rescind and recover their deposit, so the judge’s rescission-based relief was not available on that ground ([73], [81]). That was part of the reasons for the basis on which the orders stood. But he said the inherent limitations on promissory estoppel do not matter in this case because s 55(2A) gave the same repayment of the deposit ([77]), so the limit was not necessary to dismissing the appeal. A binary label would hide that both things are true.
Obiter · Handley AJA (Giles JA and Sackville AJA agreeing)
Read judgment: [74] (opens in a new tab), [77] (opens in a new tab)
The general statement that a promissory estoppel must be negative in substance, and the contrast with proprietary estoppel, go beyond what the facts required. No proprietary estoppel claim was before the Court, and Handley AJA said the inherent limitations on the scope of promissory estoppel do not matter in this case.
Why does this case matter?
Facts like these invite a quick answer in either direction. Examiners reward the student who tests that answer against the reasons Handley AJA gave, identifies whose reasons are being relied on, and is accurate about how much of that reasoning the decision needed.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where a party relies on a promise made before a written contract that the contract does not record, identify what the contract says about prior statements, who made the promise and what it was, what the party then did, and what that party asks the court to order. Then attribute each statement you use to the judge whose reasons it is in, and ask of each passage which part of the order it supports.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds the lower courts of that State and is persuasive elsewhere. It was decided in 2010 and applies s 55(2A) of the Conveyancing Act (NSW) as Handley AJA set it out at [78], so the section’s current text should be checked before it is relied on. A later decision of the same court, Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 12, discussed Handley AJA’s statements about the form of relief a promissory estoppel can support, and should be read before those statements are put as settled law.
Check your understanding
1. What did the trial judge find that Michael said to Harris in April 2004, and what did the contract of 13 May 2004 include that bore on prior statements ([7], [23])?
2. What two kinds of challenge did the vendors make on the appeal, and what did Handley AJA say about the finding that the promise was made ([2], [23], [24], [50])?
3. What did Handley AJA say the equitable remedies based on pre-contractual conduct do to the legal rules about parol evidence and entire contracts ([56], [57])?
4. Why did Handley AJA say that Hoyts Pty Ltd v Spencer did not bar the purchasers’ estoppel, even though a collateral contract would have been inconsistent with the contract of sale ([58], [62], [63])?
5. What did Handley AJA say the purchasers’ estoppel could not give them, and how did he describe the difference between promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel ([73], [74])?
6. What did Handley AJA say about the trial judge’s decision that the purchasers could rescind and recover their deposit, and on what basis did he say the judge’s orders could be affirmed ([77], [81])?
7. Which judges gave reasons, and whose reasons did the other two adopt ([1], [85])?