Redgrave v Hurd

Court of Appeal of England and Wales · 1881

ContractVitiating Factors

Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1

A buyer was told a solicitor’s practice earned about £300 a year, was shown papers pointing to far less, and barely looked at them before signing. Could he still get out of the contract?

Clarified by Gould v Vaggelas [1984] HCA 68; (1984) 157 CLR 215

In Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215, an action in deceit, Wilson J said that some of the cases on the need to prove inducement do not distinguish expressly between an evidentiary onus and an ultimate onus, so that their language can give rise to ambiguity. He gave Arnison v Smith as an example and cited Redgrave v Hurd, at p 21, for comparison (reasons of Wilson J, paragraph 5). He held that decisions of the High Court make it plain that the ultimate onus of proving inducement rests on the party seeking relief, and that the onus on the maker of the representation to point to circumstances which tend to rebut the inference of inducement is only an evidentiary onus (paragraphs 5 and 6). Gibbs CJ agreed with Wilson J on the onus question, and Dawson J agreed with what Wilson J said about it. In an Australian answer, state the onus language of Jessel MR and Lush LJ in that evidentiary sense, say that Gould was an action in deceit and that Redgrave v Hurd concerned rescission and specific performance, and cite Gould for the allocation of the ultimate onus.

What happened?

In January 1880 Redgrave, a solicitor of Birmingham, advertised in the Law Times under the heading “Law Partnership”. The advertisement described an elderly solicitor of moderate practice with extensive connections, shortly retiring and having no successor, who would first take as partner an efficient lawyer who “would not object to purchase advertiser’s suburban residence”, of a value of £1600, with “no premium for business and introduction”. Hurd answered it, and the negotiation proceeded on the footing that Redgrave would receive him as partner and transfer to him a moiety of the practice and the leasehold house for £1600 (reporter’s statement of the facts).

At two interviews on 12 February 1880 there was a direct conflict of evidence about what Redgrave said. Fry J preferred the evidence of Hurd and his wife and held that Redgrave had represented the practice as bringing in about £300 a year, or from £300 to £400 a year, and that this was not true. On 14 February Hurd wrote asking for some idea of the amount of business done over the past three years. At an interview on 17 February Redgrave produced three summaries for 1877, 1878 and 1879 showing gross receipts not quite reaching £200 a year.

Hurd asked how the difference was made up, and Redgrave showed him letters and papers which he said related to other business. No books of account were produced, because Redgrave had kept none showing the amount of his business, but Redgrave showed some letter-books, diaries and a day-book. Hurd looked at them only cursorily and agreed to buy. Fry J concluded that, had the papers been examined, they would have shown additional business of only £5 or £6 a year.

A written agreement of 2 March 1880 provided for the purchase of the house for £1600 and did not mention the practice, because Redgrave refused to have it included. Hurd paid a deposit of £100, took possession on 17 April 1880 and moved there with his family from Stroud, but finding, as he alleged, that the practice was worthless, he gave up possession and refused to complete. Redgrave sued in June 1880 for specific performance. Hurd defended on the ground of misrepresentation and counter-claimed for rescission, return of the deposit and damages.

Fry J held that Hurd had not bought the house on the faith of the representation about £300 a year. He relied on Hurd’s letter of 14 February, on the opportunity Hurd had to examine the papers, and on Attwood v Small, in which he took directors and agents who made an ineffectual inquiry to have been held bound by their investigation. He held that Hurd, who had inquired carelessly and inefficiently, “must be taken to have accepted the statements which were in those papers”. He gave judgment for Redgrave for specific performance with costs and dismissed the counter-claim with costs. Hurd appealed, and the appeal was heard on 25 November 1881.

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Jessel MR, Baggallay LJ and Lush LJ) allowed Hurd’s appeal and reversed Fry J’s decision. Jessel MR said that the counter-claim failed so far as damages were concerned, because Hurd had not pleaded Redgrave’s knowledge that the statements were untrue and had not pleaded the statements themselves in enough detail to found an action for deceit. He said it would be safer to make an order both in the action and in the counter-claim, “rescinding the contract and ordering the deposit to be returned”. Lush LJ agreed, for the reasons given by the Master of the Rolls, that Hurd was not entitled to damages.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Jessel MR said that a man induced to enter a contract by a false representation is not answered by saying: “If you had used due diligence you would have found out that the statement was untrue. You had the means afforded you of discovering its falsity, and did not choose to avail yourself of them.” He took that to be “a settled doctrine of equity, not only as regards specific performance but also as regards rescission”, unless there is such delay as constitutes a defence under the Statute of Limitations.

His examples were a prospectus that makes false statements about contracts made before the formation of a company and says the contracts may be inspected at the solicitors’ offices, and a vendor’s false statement about the contents of a lease which the purchaser could have inspected. Those who accepted the false statements as true, he said, were not deprived of their remedy merely because they neglected to look. He concluded: “It is not sufficient, therefore, to say that the purchaser had the opportunity of investigating the real state of the case, but did not avail himself of that opportunity.”

Jessel MR then considered Attwood v Small, on which Fry J had relied. He said the case did not support the proposition that a person who inquired to some extent but carelessly and inefficiently loses his right to complain. Looking only at the three Lords who decided the case in favour of the appellants, he found three grounds: that there was no fraud, that there was actual knowledge of the facts before the contract, and that no reliance was placed upon the representation. Of Fry J’s reading he said that “in no way” does the decision “support the proposition that it is a good defence to an action for rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud that the man who comes to set aside the contract inquired to a certain extent, but did it carelessly and inefficiently”.

On inducement he said: “If it is a material representation calculated to induce him to enter into the contract, it is an inference of law that he was induced by the representation to enter into it, and in order to take away his title to be relieved from the contract on the ground that the representation was untrue, it must be shewn either that he had knowledge of the facts contrary to the representation, or that he stated in terms, or shewed clearly by his conduct, that he did not rely on the representation.”

Where there was neither evidence that Hurd knew facts showing the statement to be untrue, nor that he said or did anything to show that he did not actually rely on it, “the inference remains that he did so rely”. He read Hurd’s letter of 14 February as asking for more information without giving up reliance on the statement. He also said that Fry J was mistaken on the facts: no books existed which showed the business done, so Hurd “was not guilty of negligence in not doing that which it was impossible to do”. He read the advertisement as meaning that the purchase of the house was the consideration for the partnership in the moderate business.

Baggallay LJ said: “The mere fact that a party has the opportunity of investigating and ascertaining whether a representation is true or false is not sufficient to deprive him of his right to rely on a misrepresentation as a defence to an action for specific performance.” The person who made the misrepresentation “cannot be heard to say” to the other party that he chose to believe when he might have doubted, and the representation “once made relieves the party from an investigation, even if the opportunity is afforded”.

He added a qualification: “I do not mean to say that there may not be certain circumstances of suspicion, which might put a person upon inquiry, and make it his duty to inquire, but under ordinary circumstances, the mere fact that he does not avail himself of the opportunity of testing the accuracy of the representation made to him will not enable the opposing party to succeed on that ground.” He relied on Rawlins v Wickham, where a person induced to enter a partnership could rely on the fraud although he might have investigated during four years, and said that Hurd’s investigation was “of a most cursory character”.

He treated the written evidence differently from the oral: “very different considerations apply to a case in which the testimony before the Judge in the Court below is written from those which apply where it is oral”. He accepted that the contract actually signed was limited to the house, but found it impossible to say that Hurd was not mainly induced to make it by the prospect of establishing himself in a remunerative business.

Lush LJ said that he entirely agreed with his brothers as to the propositions of law laid down by the Master of the Rolls, and that “where a false representation has been made it lies on the party who makes it, if he wishes to escape its effect in avoiding the contract, to shew that, although he made the false representation the Defendant, the other party, did not rely upon it”. He said that nothing in the evidence justified Fry J’s inference that Hurd had given up reliance, and that Redgrave’s own answer to interrogatories, that he had told Hurd the papers did not represent all the business done, was “an actual affirmance by the Plaintiff of his original representation”.

He agreed with Fry J that the contract for the house and for the purchase of the business was one entire contract, the purchase of the house being “only an accessory to the acquisition of the business”, so that the misrepresentation as to the business entitled Hurd to be discharged from the contract for the house.

Why does this case matter?

Misrepresentation problem questions routinely include a document, a clause or an invitation to inspect that the other party did not take up, and examiners expect a considered answer to the point rather than a bare assertion that the representee should have checked. Because it is an English decision of 1881, the way it is used in an Australian answer needs care.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the representation said to have induced the contract, what the representee knew and did before signing, whether the representee said or did anything bearing on reliance, and what a reasonable person would have been prompted to check. Attribute each statement of principle to the judge who made it: Jessel MR, Baggallay LJ and Lush LJ each wrote separately and did not use identical words, and Baggallay LJ’s judgment contains a point of its own. Ask whether any of the Lords Justices contemplated a limit on the principle, and say who stated it.

The decision is authority on rescission and specific performance rather than on damages. This is a decision of the English Court of Appeal, so in an Australian answer it is persuasive rather than binding, and the High Court’s later discussion of the onus on inducement should be stated with it.

Check your understanding

1. What did the advertisement offer, and what price was to be paid for the house (reporter’s statement)?

2. What did Fry J conclude about Hurd’s reliance on the statement about £300 a year, and which House of Lords decision did he rely on?

3. Which three Lords did Jessel MR look at in Attwood v Small, and what three grounds did he say they gave?

4. What did Jessel MR say about the books that Fry J thought were before Hurd, and what followed from it for the question of negligence?

5. Why did the claim for damages fail, and who gave the reasons?

6. Which Lord Justice contrasted written and oral testimony on an appeal, and what did he say about it?